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iAbOuT ThiS VOlumE
This collection has been assembled under the 
auspices of the Templeton project, God's Order, 
Man's Order and the Order of Nature, which I 
helped direct. Much of my work on that project 
was concerned with Man's Order. Specifically, 
with how better to use scientific evidence 
to improve Man's Order. My research in this 
area grew out of a study of evidence-based 
policy, which attempts to use evidence from 
the sciences to evaluate whether policies that 
have been tried have succeeded and to predict 
whether those we are thinking of trying will 
produce the outcomes we aim for.
Since randomised controlled trials (RCTs) 
are widely deemed the gold standard for 
evidence in evidence-based policy, much 
of my Order Project work centred on what 
can and cannot be immediately inferred 
from positive results in a well-done RCT. You 
will see a discussion of the formalities in a 
number of the papers collected here. The 
point is to be clear what RCTs can rigorously 
show in order to get clear just what their 
results can be evidence for and what not – 
or better, what more needs to be the case 
to turn an RCT result  into evidence. There 
are two further conditions, I argue, that are 
sufficient and more or less necessary if the 
same result (same "effect size") is to hold in 
a new setting as in the RCT study population, 
where "more or less necessary" just means 
that the same results could hold without 
these conditions but that would be pure 
serendipity. The two conditions are that the 
policy must play the same casual role in the 
target setting as in the study setting and that 
the study and target settings must have the 
same distribution (more properly, the same 
average) for the helping factors necessary 
for the policy to operate. Both these are 
explained in Section IV.
In working on the question "What makes 
an RCT result evidence for an effectiveness 
prediction?" in the context of the demands 
for rigour in evidence-based policy, it seems 
I have evolved an answer that works not just 
for RCT results and effectiveness predictions 
but across a wide range of result/hypothesis 
pairs where-ever a high premium is put on 
rigour. The answer picks up an old philosophical 
theme, that evidence is not a 2- but rather a 
3-place relation.  E is evidence for hypothesis H 
relative to something else. What else? I propose 
a demanding answer: a sound argument for H 
that uses E as an essential premise. This work 
on a theory of evidence where rigour is required 
is the most recent I have done in this project 
and so is still in development. I discuss this 
account of evidence in Section III.3 and again 
in parts of IV.1. My thinking here has been 
much helped by grappling with the exciting 
work on evidence by Sherilyn Roush, trying to 
understand which of her ideas can carry over to 
issues like those in evidence-based policy and 
which not. You can read about that in a joint 
paper I wrote with Damien Fennell, which is 
reproduced here as Section III.1.
The papers in Section I introduce my project. 
Those in Section II and III then split in two 
directions. The first route, which constitutes 
Section II, begins concretely with the current 
context in which RCTs are held as the highest 
form of evidence for predictions about policy 
effectiveness. The papers in this section bring 
to light some deep problems with this standard 
view. The second route, examined in Section III, 
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FOr mOrE DETAilS
The papers collected here are a sample from 
Cartwright’s recent work on evidence and 
evidence-based policy. The basic points presented 
in this volume are developed and explored in 
more detail in a number of further works.
Further aspects of the discussion of RCTs from 
Section II are examined in 
Cartwright, Nancy ‘What is This Thing Called 
Efficacy’ in Philosophy of the Social Sciences. 
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begins more abstractly and considers what an 
adequate theory of evidence could consist in for 
evidence-based policy and anywhere else where 
rigour matters. Finally the two routes rejoin in 
Section IV, on the role of evidence in policy.
The collection here presents a sample of the 
interlocking work on evidence that I have done 
during the Order Project. You can find a list of 
further work below. Some of the basic points 
on which the arguments build necessarily 
appear in more than one paper. I apologise to 
readers of this volume for the repetition.
I am very grateful to the Templeton 
Foundation for making this work possible 
and for supporting the exciting research 
team with whom I have worked on it. I think 
everyone involved has learned and benefitted 
from our interactions and interchanges on 
all aspects of the Order Project. I would also 
like to thank the Spencer Foundation, the 
British Academy, LSE's Grantham Research 
Institute on Climate Change and the UCSD 
Faculty Senate for support for aspects of the 
research reported here.
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iii
Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth Oberlin 
Colloquium in Philosophy. Published in 
Philosophical Studies 143 (2009): 127-136.  
Cartwright, Nancy  ‘Predicting What Will 
Happen When We Act: What Counts 
as Warrant?’ Preventive Medicine (53), 
September 2011, 221-224.
Further aspects of Section IV are explored in 
Cartwright, Nancy and Stegenga, Jacob. ‘A 
Theory of Evidence for Evidence Based Policy’ 
in Evidence, Inference and Enquiry, Dawid P. 
Twining, W. and Vasilaki, M. (eds.), New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012.
lOCATiONS OF OrigiNAl PubliCATiON
Chapter 1.1 ‘Evidence-Based Policy: Where 
is Our Theory of Evidence?’ was published 
in the Journal of Children’s Services (special 
edition), December 2009 4(4): 6-14. 
Chapter 1.2 ‘Evidence for Evidence Based 
Policy’ was presented at the Home Office 
Seminar on Criminology and Evidence-Based 
Policy June 10, 2008.
Chapter 2.1 ‘A Philosopher’s View of the 
Long Road from RCTs to Effectiveness’ was 
published in The Lancet (Art of Medicine 
Section), 377 (2011): 1400-1401.
Chapter 2.2 ‘Are RCTs the Gold Standard?’ 
was published in BioSocieties 2 (2007): 11-20.
Chapter 2.3 ‘RCTs, Evidence and Predicting 
Policy Effectiveness’ was published in The 
Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of the 
Social Sciences, Kincaid, H. (ed.), New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 298-318.
Chapter 3.1 ‘Does Roush show that Evidence 
Should be Probable?’ (with Damien Fennell) was 
published in Synthese 175 (2010): 289-310.
Chapter 3.2 ‘Evidence, External Validity and 
Explanatory Relevance’ was published in 
Philosophy of Science Matters: The Philosophy 
of Peter Achinstein, Morgan, G. (ed.), New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2011, 15-28.
Chapter 3.3 ‘Evidence, Argument and Prediction’ 
was presented at the European Philosophy of 
Science Association 2011 and will be published 
in Proceedings of the European Philosophy of 
Science Association (Forthcoming in V. Karakostas 
and D. Dieks (eds.), EPSA11 Perspectives and 
Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science, 
The European Philosophy of Science Association 
Proceedings 2)
Chapter 4.1 ‘The Theory that Backs up What 
We Say’ (with Jeremy Hardie) was published 
as chapter I.B in Evidence Based Policy: A 
Practical Guide to Doing it Better, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 14-58.
Chapter 4.2 ‘Will This Policy Work for 
You? Predicting Effectiveness Better: How 
Philosophy Helps’ was the Presidential 
Address of the Philosophy of Science 
Association, 2010. Published in Philosophy of 
Science 79.5 (2012): 973-989.
Section i
EViDENCE-bASED POliCy:  
SO, WhAT’S EViDENCE?
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(From The Journal of Children’s Services, 2009)
Nancy Cartwright with Andrew Goldfinch and 
Jeremy Howick.
The rise of evidence-based policy
In both the UK and the US there is an 
increasing drive to use evidence to inform, 
develop and refine policy and practice. This 
push to improve how research and analysis 
informs policy and practice is increasingly 
being felt in a wide range of areas: in addition 
to evidence-based health and social care, we 
now hear of evidence-based housing policy, 
transport policy, education and criminal 
justice. Since the election of the Labour 
Government in 1997, the UK has been firmly 
committed to evidence-based policy as a 
way of developing social programmes. The 
UK Government signalled its commitment 
to evidence-based policy in the 1999 White 
Paper Modernising Government, which 
calls for the "better use of evidence and 
research in policy-making and better focus 
on policies that will deliver long term goals" 
and stipulates evidence as a key principle for 
policy making (Cabinet Office, 1999: 16). A 
year later, the Cabinet Office’s Performance 
and Innovation Unit (2000) called for a 
"fundamental change in culture" in order to 
place good analysis at the centre of policy-
making and recommended that training 
for new Ministers and senior civil servants 
"should emphasise the importance of analysis 
for evidence-based policy" (p 4). In response 
to this recommendation the UK’s National 
School of Government, which provides 
training for the civil service, now runs regular 
courses on analytical skills and evaluation 
methods, including introductions to, and 
overviews of, evidence-based policy making. 
An example of evidence-based approach to 
policy making is the UK Sure Start programme. 
Initiated in 2001, the aim of the programme 
is to break the cycle of poverty by providing 
children and families with childcare, health 
and educational support. The Sure Start 
programme has been evidence-based from 
the start, using extensive reviews of research 
findings on what approaches and early 
interventions are most likely to work; its 
execution and continuing evaluation and 
refinement have also been evidence-based 
(Hunter, 2003). Another notable example is the 
UK’s National Institute for Clinical Excellence 
(NICE),1 which provides regulatory guidelines 
for the National Health Service (NHS) on 
particular treatments. These guidelines are 
based on reviews on the effectiveness and 
cost-effectiveness of various treatments. 
In the US, the Department of Education is 
actively committed to furthering evidence-
based approaches to education policy and 
practice. The Department’s Institute of 
Education Sciences established the What 
Works Clearinghouse in 2002 "to provide 
educators, policymakers, researchers, and 
the public with a central and trusted source 
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WhErE iS Our ThEOry OF EViDENCE?
1 www.nice.org.uk/
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of scientific evidence of what works in 
education"2. Furthermore, the Department 
in 2005 implemented a recommendation by 
the Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy3 that 
projects that include a randomised evaluation 
should have priority in its grant process. 
The commitment to evidence-based policy has 
been matched with funding. In June 2000, the 
UK Treasury established the Evidence-Based 
Policy Fund. With a budget of £4 million 
over two years, the aim of the fund was 
to support cross-cutting research and links 
between research institutes, universities, and 
government. Several government departments 
have also contributed funding to the Evidence 
for Policy and Practice Information and Co-
ordinating Centre (EPPI-Centre).4 Based at 
the Institute for Education, University of 
London, the EPPI-Centre collects, reviews and 
organises the results of evidence-based public 
policy and research in an accessible way for 
policy-makers and others. The Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC) funded the UK 
Centre for Evidence Based Policy, which was 
based at King’s College London. The centre 
co-ordinated a network of research centres 
dedicated to promoting evidence-based 
policy and practice by contributing to the 
development of methods for evaluating and 
summarising research. 
Not only are evidence-based approaches to 
policy making funded by governments but 
also some government funding is increasingly 
being tied to demands for evidence. For 
example, proposals to expand the Sure 
Start programme led to a £16 million 
research project to establish whether the 
programme was achieving results (see Belsky 
et al, 2007; Melhuish et al, 2008). In the US, 
the so-called No Child Left Behind Act 2001 
enshrines in law the principle that federal funds 
should support educational activities that are 
based on "scientifically-based research". Title I 
funding is designed to help schools improve the 
achievement of disadvantaged students. Those 
schools that receive Title I funding are required by 
the Act to use effective methods and strategies 
grounded in scientifically-based research. 
In addition to executives, legislatures too 
are beginning to take a strong interest 
in evidence-based approaches to policy 
making. In November 2005, the UK 
Parliament’s Select Committee on Science and 
Technology agreed to establish an inquiry on 
"Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence: How 
Government Handles Them". The inquiry 
examined the extent to which polices are 
evidence-based, what mechanisms are in 
place for the use of evidence, and the way 
in which guidelines relating to the use of 
advice are being applied. Issues addressed 
include "sources and handling of advice" 
and "the relationship between scientific 
advice and policy development". Particular 
questions explored by the Select Committee 
include: "What mechanisms are in place to 
ensure that policies are based on available 
evidence?"; "Are departments engaging 
effectively in horizon scanning activities and 
how are these influencing policy?"; and "Is 
Government managing scientific advice on 
cross-departmental issues effectively?"
Although the drive for evidence-based policy 
is strongest in the UK and US, the movement 
is picking up elsewhere in Europe. In its 2001 
white paper on governance, the European 
Union acknowledged that,
"Scientific and other experts play an 
increasingly significant role in preparing 
and monitoring decisions. From human 
and animal health to social legislation, the 
Institutions rely on specialist expertise to 
anticipate and identify the nature of the 
problems and uncertainties that the Union 
faces, to take decisions and to ensure that 
risks can be explained clearly and simply to 
the public." (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2001)
So in the UK, the US, and gradually in 
Europe, at the executive and legislative levels, 
and pushed by national and international 
organisations such as the Campbell and 
Cochrane Collaborations,5 institutions and 
regulations are increasingly attempting 
to ensure that evidence is appropriately 
considered at various levels of decision-
making processes. 
Evidence: the missing theory
Evidence-based policy is on the rise then, and 
all to the good we should suppose. Except 
that we do not have a theory of evidence that 
can be called upon in policy deliberations. We 
are supposed to base our policies on evidence 
but how exactly are we to proceed: what is to 
count as evidence and how shall we use it? 
My central thesis is that we lack a practicable 
theory of evidence – one that can be put to 
use for evidence-based policy. There are three 
essential ingredients missing. We do not have:
A reasonable and practicable concept of 
evidence
A reasonable and practicable account of 
what different pieces of evidence say about a 
hypothesis and with what strength they speak 
(see Hammersley, 2005 for a discussion of 
the variety of kinds of questions evidence can 
speak to)
A reasonable and practicable account of how 
to evaluate a hypothesis in the light of all the 
candidate evidence.
Philosophical accounts of the concept  
of evidence
What is it in virtue of which a fact is evidence 
for a hypothesis? Our philosophical
accounts fall into two categories. First are 
accounts based on some features of the 
probabilistic relations between the evidence 
and the hypothesis – for example, increase in 
probability or various functions of likelihoods 
(see Mayo, 1996 Chapter 3 for an overview 
of such positions). These are not useful for 
evidence-based policy. What we need is a 
concept of evidence that we can use to judge 
whether some fact should be taken into 
consideration – whether it should be "on 
2 www.whatworks.ed.gov/whoweare/overview.html
3 http://coalition4evidence.org/wordpress/
4 http://eppi.ioe.ac.uk/cms/
5 www.cochrane.co.uk and www.capmbellcollaboration.org.
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the table" for consideration. Then we would 
expect to look at all the evidence on the table 
to decide on the probability of the proposed 
policy claim. Concepts of evidence based on 
facts about probabilities put the cart before 
the horse. We need a concept that can give 
guidance about what is relevant to consider in 
deciding on the probability of the hypothesis 
not one that requires that we already know 
significant facts about the probability of the 
hypothesis on various pieces of evidence. 
Second are those accounts that are based 
on facts about explanation – for example, 
versions of inference to the best explanation 
(Lipton, 2004) or explanatory connectedness 
(Achinstein, 2001). The problem here is 
the concept of explanation. A good many 
accounts end up explaining explanation by 
reference to probability relations between 
the "explanans" [the means of making plain] 
and the "explanandum" [that which is being 
made plain]. This simply recreates the previous 
problem. Also, it seems to me that the 
concept is too narrow. Suppose for example 
that we are considering a policy to combat 
segregation, perhaps making "diversity 
training" mandatory in schools. But recall 
Thomas Schelling’s (1978) game-theory model 
where checkers are moved on a checkerboard 
so as to avoid any one checker being the 
only one of its colour in a group. Eventually 
clumping occurs even though no moves are 
designed to put checkers in neighbourhoods 
that are predominately of their own colour. 
This is an important model to consider in 
judging the efficacy of the program for 
diversity training in reducing segregation. 
But it is far-fetched to see it as explanatorily 
connected with the claim that the policy will 
be efficacious. 
Besides these problems, our accounts of 
evidence also tend to be accounts of genuine 
evidence. But we need an account of what 
makes something candidate evidence. I think 
I can convince you that you have such a 
concept by pointing out that we are often 
ready to blame people for failing to report 
facts that, though they may turn out not to 
be evidence, under some scenarios could have 
been. Mystery stories are rife with examples. 
In these cases the aim is to evaluate a 
retrospective rather than a prospective causal 
claim but the point is the same. 
Hypothesis: John Jones killed Roger Ackroyd. 
He could have done so by doing A, B and 
then C. Ah, but he couldn’t because in that 
case he would have had to travel between 
Binsey and Summertown in 8 minutes and 
even the fastest car could not do that. But 
you are Jones’s girlfriend and you know he 
keeps a fast cross-country motorcycle in his 
garage so he could have gotten there across 
Port Meadow in time. You are blameworthy if 
you do not speak up. Yet if it turns out that A, 
B and C did not occur, the fact that he owns a 
dirt bike is totally irrelevant to the hypothesis 
that Jones caused Ackroyd’s death. The case 
would be exactly similar if you were on a 
commission and did not report some fact you 
knew that might be relevant to the efficacy 
of a policy under consideration but in the end 
turns out not to be. 
What we are urged to do in practice 
We also have philosophical accounts that 
provide the second and third components 
that I claim to be missing from our theory 
of evidence. The problem with these is the 
same as with our philosophical accounts of 
what evidence is: they are generally not very 
practicable. They are well reasoned and make 
sense. But they are usually either too abstract 
or too circular to provide useable advice about 
how to conduct evidence-based policy. By 
contrast, there are now available a host of 
far more usable schemes – evidence-ranking 
schemes. The problem is that these schemes 
are not well reasoned and sensible; many 
seem to me to be daft, indeed pernicious. 
Yet they are being pushed by a number of 
influential institutions, not the least of which 
are the UK and US governments. 
These schemes provide all three of my 
"missing" components in one fell swoop. 
Kinds of evidence are ranked according to 
their "quality". Then: (1) Evidence is all and 
only facts of the kind listed in the ranking. (2) 
All evidence is taken to speak for or against 
the truth of an hypothesis and the strength 
of its support is in line with its quality: top 
ranked evidence indicates that the hypothesis 
is very likely true, and as quality decreases, 
so does the strength of support for the 
truth of the hypothesis. (3) In general the 
recommendations associated with these 
schemes do not combine evidence at all. 
Very often the advice is: if you have top grade 
evidence, go with what that says. The US 
Department of Education, for instance, which 
requires evidence of efficacy in order for a 
school to receive Title 1 support, tells us that 
RCTs (randomised clinical trials) are needed to 
establish strong evidence and that "Two or 
more typical school settings, including a setting 
similar to that of your schools/classrooms" is 
the quantity of evidence needed. 
There are a vast number of similar schemes 
available. I choose as an example one 
particularly thoughtful one, SIGN (Scottish 
Intercollegiate Guideline Network).6 As their 
own document reports: 
"SIGN formerly used the levels of evidence 
developed by the US Agency for Health 
Care Policy and Research (AHCPR, now 
the US Agency for Health Research and 
Quality, AHRQ). However as a number of 
limitations were becoming apparent in that 
system, a review was carried out and new 
levels of evidence and associated grades of 
recommendation were developed. Following 
extensive consultation and international 
peer review, the new grading system was 
introduced in Autumn 2000." (SIGN, 2008: 36)
6 www.sign.ac.uk
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Look now at samples of the kind of  
advice on offer about how to arrive at  
an overall judgment:
Statements that one piece of "level 1++" 
evidence is sufficient:
GRADE Working Group: "Once the results 
of high quality randomized trials are 
available, few people would argue for 
continuing to base recommendations on non-
randomised studies with discrepant results" 
(Atkins et al, 2004: 2). [GRADE (Grades of 
Recommendation Assessment, Development 
and Evaluation) is an international project 
aimed at developing a methodologically 
sound system that can be applied across 
countries and cultures7.]  
SIGN: The following quote from the SIGN 
50 document seems to imply that if there 
are RCTs, the other evidence need not be 
considered: "It is also intended to allow more 
weight to be given to recommendations 
supported by good quality observational 
studies where RCTs are not available for 
practical or ethical reasons." (SIGN, 2008: 36)
EBM [Evidence-based medicine]: "If the study 
wasn’t randomized, we’d suggest that you 
stop reading it and go on to the next article in 
your search" (Sackett et al, 2000: 108).
 
Cochrane Collaboration: In personal 
correspondence with Jeremy Howick [co-
author], Julian Higgins of the Cochrane 
Collaboration replied to the question of 
whether evidence from RCTs is sufficient, with 
the following statement: "I’m sure there are 
very many people who subscribe to this view 
[that RCT evidence is sufficient] (if interpreted 
as further evidence on the same questions 
that the RCTs address). Indeed, one might 
infer this from the fact that the majority of 
Cochrane reviews include only RCTs. This 
strongly implies that the authors believe 
there is no need to look at other evidence (or 
believe that "Cochrane" thinks they shouldn’t 
look at other types of evidence). I have much 
sympathy with this, given the numerous 
unpredictable and largely poorly understood 
biases in observational studies." 
 
In answer to the question of whether a 
single well-done RCT trumps evidence from 
any number of observational studies, Julian 
Higgins states that "If the RCT was done 
well, then I would always claim this is either 
the right answer or the answer to a different 
question from the observational studies." 
[The Cochrane Collaboration is dedicated to 
encouraging RCTs]
So, what’s wrong with that?
Virtually everything.
1. The concept of evidence involved is  
too restrictive
Hardly anything gets on the table. This is 
bad for a number of different reasons. To 
start with, the type of evidence restricts the 
type of conclusion for which we can have 
evidence. These schemes are all for judging 
SIGN (Scottish Intercollegiate Guideline Network) grading system
Levels of evidence:
1++   High quality meta-analyses, systematic reviews of RCTs, or RCTs with a very low 
risk of bias
1+   Well conducted meta-analyses, systematic reviews of RCTs, or RCTs with a low risk 
of bias
1 -  Meta-analyses, systematic reviews of RCTs, or RCTs with a high risk of bias
2++   High quality systematic reviews of case-control or cohort studies                       
High quality case-control or cohort studies with a very low risk of confounding, 
bias, or chance and a high probability that the relationship is causal
2+   Well conducted case control or cohort studies with a low risk of confounding, 
bias, or chance and a moderate probability that the relationship is causal
2 -   Case control or cohort studies with a high risk of confounding, bias, or chance and 
a significant risk that the relationship is not causal
3  Non-analytic studies, eg. case reports, case series
4  Expert opinion
The grading scheme goes like this:
Grades of recommendation:
A   At least one meta analysis, systematic review, or RCT rated as 1++, and directly 
applicable to the target population; or a systematic review of RCTs or a body of 
evidence consisting principally of studies rated as 1+, directly applicable to the 
target population, and demonstrating overall consistency of results
B   A body of evidence including studies rated as 2++, directly applicable to the target 
population, and demonstrating overall consistency of results; or extrapolated 
evidence from studies rated as 1++ or 1+
C   A body of evidence including studies rated as 2+, directly applicable to the target 
population and demonstrating overall consistency of results; or extrapolated 
evidence from studies rated as 2++
D  Evidence level 3 or 4; or extrapolated evidence from studies rated as 2+
The SIGN grading system is this:
7 www.gradeworkinggroup.org
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efficacy claims. But more, concepts in the 
study have to match exactly with those in 
the policy claim; especially they must be 
completely operationalisable and they must 
be operationalised in the same way. How 
could Oxford Council have used evidence 
like this to decide whether to build a leisure 
centre in the new housing estate at Blackbird 
Leys? Certainly not in the way envisaged in 
the grading schemes. Candidate evidence is 
not even in the ballpark. 
The advantage of an RCT is that it can clinch 
results. If the ideal conditions for an RCT are 
met, positive results deductively imply that in at 
least some subpopulations of the experimental 
population the treatment causes the relevant 
effect. But other methods have this advantage 
as well and they are not in the list. These 
include various econometric modelling 
techniques, deduction from established theory 
and experiments in ideal model systems 
(Cartwright, 2007a: Section I.3).
A host of other methods that can vouch for 
results even if not clinch them are excluded. 
These include the hypothetico-deductive 
method when used for confirmation, qualitative 
comparative analysis, game-theory modelling, 
ethnographic methods, and so on. Moreover, 
any "voucher" can be turned into a "clincher" 
by adding some additional premises – premises 
that may be reasonable to entertain in 
particular cases. All methods presuppose other 
assumptions. These ranking schemes seem to 
presuppose that the background assumptions 
required by the methods listed are more likely 
to be true for all cases than those for methods 
omitted, which is highly implausible. 
2. The claims about strength of evidence in 
the rankings are mistaken
Much is written about the pros and cons of 
the specific kinds of evidence that appear in 
these listings – fully randomised trials, partially 
randomised trials, observational studies, and 
so forth. I want to concentrate instead on the 
basic underlying ideas, which I think are way 
off base. I have already noted that the kinds of 
evidence permitted are only good for efficacy 
claims so I shall confine my attention to these, 
ignoring other policy issues such as claims 
about side effects (which nevertheless turn out 
to be an important issue in the example I will 
use), about implementation, about the effects 
of moral, cultural and political considerations, 
about estimates of costs and the like. I 
shall also concentrate on RCT evidence for 
concreteness but what I say can be carried 
over, mutatis mutandis, to other types of 
evidence that these rankings admit. 
Consider: we wish to evaluate a proposal to 
do A in order to achieve R: say to treat African 
children who are HIV-infected prophylatically 
with an inexpensive antibiotic called 
"cotrimoxazole" in order to reduce mortality 
and morbidity from opportunistic disease until 
they are old enough for retroviral treatment, as 
in the 2005 UNAIDS and UNICEF call to ensure 
that prophylaxis with cotrimoxazole reaches 80 
per cent of children in need by 2010 (UNAIDS, 
2006: 165). An evidence ranking scheme tells 
us which kinds of evidence speak strongly for 
or against this proposal, which less strongly. 
In this case the justification for the policy is 
an RCT on children in Zambia published in 
the Lancet in 2004, which concluded that the 
antibiotic reduced mortality in HIV-infected 
children by more than 40 per cent (Chintu et 
al, 2004: 1870). 
What is the underlying logic that shows 
how a study like this – assuming even that 
it meets all the ideal requirements – can 
serve as strong evidence for the efficacy 
of the policy? As far as I can see the most 
plausible construction of the underlying 
justification assumes that actions are justified 
by principles. 
We suppose:
(a) There is a certain type of HIV-infected 
child population, T, for which the Zambian 
RCT establishes "In T cotrimoxazole reduces 
average morbidity/mortality".
(b) The target population – in this case HIV-
infected children in resource-poor settings 
across Africa – is of type T.
(c) So administering cotrimoxazole in the 
target population will reduce average 
morbidity/mortality.
That is, we need some way to get from 
the evidence to the conclusion, and a way 
that shows how this evidence can speak 
so strongly for the conclusion. I think the 
only way it can work is via an intermediate 
principle. But this won’t do since both the 
way up to the principle and the way back 
down to the policy are shaky, and for much 
the same reason: how to specify T. This is now 
explained in more detail.
As regards moving from principle to policy, 
what is wrong here is what is generally wrong 
in supposing you can read off conclusions 
about single cases from scientifically 
established principles: almost all principles are 
defeasible and those that are not (like "All 
men are mortal") do not provide very detailed 
advice. We can all imagine a vast variety 
of happenings that can defeat the policy 
efforts even in the face of the principle. One 
may have the happy idea that if the target 
population is really of the right kind – kind 
T, whatever that is – the defeaters will be 
distributed the same in the target as in the 
trial population so the conclusion will still 
obtain. That has its own problems: 
We do not know what T is. This means that the 
guidelines may be able to provide sound advice 
but it is not practicable advice: we do not know 
how to tell whether we are following it or not. 
Our target population may start out satisfying 
the characterisation "T", whatever that is, but 
our efforts to implement the policy may change 
the distribution of defeating conditions or the 
underlying causal structure. This is a common 
worry about interventions in economics (Lucas, 
1976, 1988) but not much discussed in the 
evidence-ranking and grading schemes.
In relation to moving from RCT to principle, 
a positive result in an ideal RCT can establish 
that in at least one subpopulation of the 
population involved in the trials the treatment 
causes the relevant effect. It can also establish 
that the average result in this population is 
improvement in the effect. The principle says 
the treatment causes the relevant effect, or 
produces an average improvement, in any 
population of type T. How do we get from 
12 13
the first to the second? Laying aside Hume’s 
problem of induction,8 we suppose that the 
positive result will hold in any population like 
the one in the trial. Hence the emphasis on 
identifying T: "like" in what respects?
This is obviously not an unfamiliar problem. 
We do of course pay attention to what 
constitutes T. For instance, there were earlier 
RCTs in Cote d’Ivoire involving the treatment 
of adults with cotrimoxazole (Wiktor et al, 
1999) These obviously were not good enough 
because a population of children can be very 
different from one of adults. Moreover, many 
African children live in areas with high rates 
of bacterial resistance. So the RCT that is used 
to justify the UNAIDS and UNICEF-proposed 
policy was performed on children and in 
Zambia where there are high rates of bacterial 
resistance to cotrimoxazole. But what else 
might be relevant?
The answer is a tough one. The only way to 
characterize T that works is – "populations 
that have just the same causal structure 
and the same joint probability distribution 
across all relevant variables as the population 
in the study". (This is clearly not really 
true. But this is the only characterisation 
that does not depend on details about 
what the probability distribution or causal 
structure are – see Cartwright, 2007b for 
a fuller discussion.) And this is clearly not a 
practicable description. We can try to sidestep 
the problem by insisting that the experimental 
population be a random sample from the 
target. How practicable is that, say for our 
cotrimoxazole policy? Moreover, random 
sampling procedures require a great deal of 
knowledge of the relevant structure of the 
population sampled if they are to be at all 
reliable. Not only do we not in general have 
such knowledge – the guidelines generally do 
not take this much into account.
My basic point here is much the same as 
the one I made in discussing clinchers and 
vouchers. Nothing can count as evidence for 
anything except relative to a host of auxiliary 
assumptions; and the strength with which a 
body of evidence supports a hypothesis can 
never be higher than the credibility of these 
auxiliaries. The privileged items that tend to 
appear in evidence-ranking schemes have 
built-in methods for assuring that a few of 
the necessary auxiliaries are met – blinding in 
RCTs, for example, is good at ensuring that 
one source of confounding for the results 
is eliminated. But there are huge gaps left. 
And there is no reasonable promise that the 
gaps are in general smaller than with types of 
evidence that are commonly not even allowed 
on the table by these schemes. 
3. The advice about how to combine evidence 
is dreadful
Grading schemes do not combine evidence at 
all – they go with what is on top. But it seems 
to me to be daft to throw away evidence. 
Why are we urged to do it? Because we do 
not have a good theory of exactly why and 
how different types of evidence are evidence 
and we do not have a good account of how 
to make an assessment on the basis of a total 
body of evidence. Since we lack a prescription 
for how to do it properly, we are urged not to 
do it at all. That seems daft too. But I think it 
is the chief reason that operates. That is why 
the philosophical task is so important.
Conclusion
We need to develop a practicable theory of 
evidence, a theory that will work for evidence-
based policy. But it had better be a good theory, 
one that is both sound and usable: that is, a 
theory that is both practicable and philosophical.
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I start by announcing that I am firmly in 
favour of evidence-based policy, despite the 
disappointments with it. Though evidence is 
not the only consideration, it is clearly better 
to look at the evidence and think hard about 
it than not. I am not at all surprised however 
that it has had disappointing results in both 
the UK and the US since we are not giving 
good advice about how to go about it.
Two lost questions
For today I stick with the issue of evidence 
for effectiveness; that is, for the claim that 
a policy will produce the desired ends when 
implemented – how, when and where it will  
be  implemented. I start with a truism:  In  
evaluating the  effectiveness of  a proposed 
policy we need credible evidence that speaks 
for or against the policy and we need to know 
what to do with the evidence when we have it. 
This truism naturally generates three questions:
1.   What counts as credible evidence – what 
evidence claims are likely to be true?
2.   What evidence claims are relevant – 
what claims speak for or against the 
proposed policy and how strongly?
3.   How should the evidence be integrated – 
how should the probability of the policy 
being effective be established in light of all 
the evidence?
Begin with credibility. We do not wish to enter 
claims into the record of evidence that are 
themselves not likely to be true. Compare: In 
deciding if a person is guilty or innocent we 
do not take into account the testimony of 
a witness without good reason to think the 
witness is telling the truth. So too in deciding 
if a policy will be effective or not.
Suppose however just for the moment that 
this is no issue. Suppose we have at our 
disposal the entire encyclopaedia of unified 
science, an encyclopaedia that contains 
within it all the true claims there are. But for 
deliberating about a particular policy we are 
not going to cart the entire encyclopaedia to 
the table. Rather we want a selection
– we want on the table only true facts 
that are relevant to the effectiveness of the 
policy.  And given a collection of relevant 
facts we want to know how to assess the 
probability that the policy will be effective in 
light of them. How are we supposed to make 
all these decisions?
Let us look at an American case that is 
particularly egregious. It does not have to 
do with crime but with education: the so-
called "No Child Left Behind" legislation. I 
use it because it illustrates my points clearly 
and sharply. Go to the US Dept. of Education 
website, as school masters are supposed to 
do, and this is the advice you find:
1.2 EViDENCE FOr EViDENCED-bASED POliCy
16 17
The left-hand side of the + sign – "quality" 
of evidence – plus all of step 2 is in answer to 
the first question: when is a particular kind 
of evidence claim credible? The US Dept of 
Education’s is typical of a large number of 
evidence-ranking schemes currently available, 
including  the  Maryland  rules. These 
schemes gauge the credibility of causal claims 
based on their associated research design. 
The advice they give is excellent, and detailed. 
As we know, there are very long checklists of 
demands a trial must meet to earn the label 
"well-designed and well-implemented".
Questions 2 and 3 are lumped together under 
the heading "quantity of evidence".
The advice on relevance, Question 2, is short 
indeed – the RCT should be in "settings similar 
to that of your schools/classrooms" and page 
10, which this page refers to, adds only 4 lines 
describing one case – trials on white suburban 
populations do not constitute strong evidence 
for large inner city schools serving primarily 
minority students. This is like the warning: 
Beware, results about police-initiated fear 
reduction programmes in large estates in 
South Birmingham and Southwark may not 
carry over to Belgrave Square.
The answer to question 3 is equally short: 
two positive relevant RCTs are strong 
evidence for effectiveness. So with two good 
RCTs we can assign a high probability that 
the policy will work in our school.
One obvious problem is that this violates 
the principle of total evidence, which is at 
the heart of practice in the natural sciences: 
look at all the evidence, strong and weak, 
of various kinds and from various sources. 
Other guidelines do better in this regard. 
For instance the NICE guidelines allow us to 
consider all the evidence, weak and strong, 
pro and con. But we are still without advice 
about how to go about considering it.
The well-known Maryland rules prominent in 
criminology are very much the same. Here is the 
entire section headed "integration of evidence". 
This is where we should look for an answer 
to question 3 – how should we combine the 
evidence to evaluate the probability that the 
policy will be effective when we implement 
it? The integration offered is no integration 
at all. We are told to judge that a programme 
"works" if it has positive results in two rigorous 
studies, with an acknowledged need for 
"judgement" in the end:
Integration of  Evidence.  The  end 
product of the analysis of empirical evidence 
contains a range of findings with respect to 
effectiveness. In the interests of clarity of 
presentation for policy analysis purposes, 
we organize the presentation of material 
in each chapter by the content of the 
findings, rather than the priority of the 
program. The content is defined both the 
strength of the scientific evidence and the 
strength (and direction) of the program 
effects. We ultimately report on four 
categories of effectiveness.
Program categories are sorted into these 
effectiveness categories using the following rule:
Works (1): At least two studies with 
methodological rigor greater than or equal 
to “3” reporting significance tests have 
found crime prevention effects for the 
program condition, and where effect sizes 
are available, the effect is at least one-tenth 
of one standard deviation (eg, effect size = 
.1) better than the effects for the control 
condition, and the preponderance of the 
evidence supports the same conclusion.
Doesn’t Work (2): At least two studies with 
methodological rigor greater than or equal to 
“3” reporting significance tests have found no 
effect favoring the program condition, and the 
preponderance of other evidence supports the 
same conclusion.
Promising (3): At least one study with 
methodological rigor greater than or equal to 
“3” reporting conventional significance levels 
has found crime prevention effects for the 
program condition, and where the effect size 
is available, the effects are at least one-tenth of 
How to evaluate whether an educational intervention
is supported by rigorous evidence:  An overview
Quality of studies needed to
establish “strong” evidence:
• Randomized controlled trials
(defined on page 1) that are
well-designed and
implemented (see pages 5-9).
Quantity of evidence needed:
Trials showing effectiveness in —
• Two or more typical school
settings,
• Including a setting similar to
that of your schools/
classrooms.
(see page 10)
+ = “Strong”Evidence
Step 1. Is the intervention backed by “strong” evidence of effectiveness?
Types of studies that do not comprise
“possible” evidence:
• Pre-post studies (defined on page 2).
• Comparison-group studies in which
the intervention and comparison
groups are not closely matched
(see pages 12-13).
• “Meta-analyses” that include the
results of such lower-quality studies
(see page 13).
Types of studies that can comprise
“possible” evidence:
• Randomized controlled trials whose
quality/quantity are good but fall short of
“strong” evidence (see page 11); and/or
• Comparison-group studies (defined on
page 3) in which the intervention and
comparison groups are very closely
matched in academic achievement,
demographics, and other characteristics
(see pages 11-12).
Step 2. If the intervention is not backed by “strong” evidence, is it backed by“possible” evidence of effectiveness?
If the answers to both questions above are “no,” one may conclude that th e
intervention is not supported by meaningful evidence.Step 3.
[From Identifying and Implementing Educational Practices Supported by Rigorous Evidence: A User Friendly Guide, 
December 2003. US Department of Education Institute of Education Sciences National Center for Education Evaluation 
and Regional Assistance.]
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one standard deviation better than the effects 
for the control condition OR the preponderance 
of evidence favors the program.
Don’t Know (4): Categories with empirical 
evidence which do not fit one of the above are 
included in this residual category.
We must, of course, be extremely careful 
in labeling any program category as highly 
certain to be good or bad in its effects. Yet 
we must also be clear enough to make our 
conclusions useful, no matter how much we 
anticipate that science is always provisional 
and that our conclusions may be changed 
by next year. The large number of programs 
to be reviewed almost guarantees that some 
have strong evidence of extreme effects, both 
positive and negative. Yet most extreme results 
are from single, unreplicated studies. It is just 
as important not to conclude too much from a 
single negative result as from a single positive 
one. A single evaluation, even with strong 
evidence, cannot be assumed to generalize to 
all or most other settings. The primary objective 
of identifying promising results should be to 
foster replications, and the more promising the 
results the greater the replication need. Where 
there is substantial consistency of evidence in 
one direction, the senior author of each chapter 
makes a judgement and defends it in the text.
Here again we have no advice about question 
2 – when is an evidence claim relevant to 
assessing the probability of effectiveness for 
a proposed policy; and faulty advice about 
question 3 – how to settle on the probability 
of effectiveness: to wit, don’t look at the 
total picture. (This despite the fact that it is 
contrary to what we do in physics.)
So, we have arrived at my first point. We put 
a huge amount of effort and expense into 
question 1, which ensures that there really 
is a causal connection between programme 
and outcome somewhere. We do so in aid of 
evidence-based policy. But question 1 is not a 
policy question; it is a question in pure science. 
This is like Galileo rolling balls down an inclined 
plane or dropping them from the leaning 
tower of Pisa to test the effects of gravity 
on them. Galileo’s experiments yield a great 
deal more precise information than any RCT; 
yet Galileo’s results are a long way from the 
policy question: predicting the trajectory of our 
cannonballs under the influence of gravity.
Question 1 is a question in pure science; the 
policy-relevant issues about evidence are 
encoded in questions 2 and 3. Yet all the rigor, 
and almost all the attention, is to question 1. 
We are urged to extreme rigor at one stage, 
then left to wing it for the rest. But: a chain of 
defence for the effectiveness of a policy, like a 
towing chain, is only as strong as its weakest 
link. So the investment in rigor for one link 
while the others are left to chance is apt to be a 
huge waste. So if we do want decision-makers 
to use evidence as the basis for judgements 
about whether a policy will be effective when 
implemented, we need to develop far better 
guidelines for questions 2 and 3. Whatever 
else is going on, I am not surprised that 
evidence-based policies are not proving as 
effective as hoped. For if policy makers were 
assiduously following the advice of the current 
dominant guides, they would be making wrong 
assessments a great deal of the time.
How to use evidence: the need for a  
causal model
My second point is that the right answers to 
these two crucial questions in any particular 
case depend on the right choice of a causal 
model for that case, and advice on the two 
questions should reflect that.
Consider a simple case using every day 
physics. I choose this because it is simple, 
well understood and I am not likely to 
get involved in subject-specific debates in 
criminology. I have access to a desk magnet, 
alternatively to a large industrial magnet. I 
know the exact strengths of these with a 
very high degree of certainty – claims about 
their efficacy for lifting objects have passed 
far more than two good RCTs: they have 
centuries of study behind them. Shall I use 
one of them to lift an object in my driveway? 
That depends at this stage entirely on features 
of the target situation.
First, magnets need helping factors to be 
effective at all. My desk magnet is useless for 
lifting a matchstick; it is only the combination 
of a magnet and a metal object that produces 
a magnetic force. This has easy analogues in 
crime reduction. Consider the nice example of 
Nick Tilley and Ray Pawson. If CCTV cameras 
in car parks reduce car theft by discouraging 
thieves, they need to be visible to be effective 
at all. But if they work by alerting the police 
to get there in time to arrest the thieves, they 
had better be hidden. We need to know the 
necessary auxiliary factors.
Then the acceleration caused by the magnet 
is only one part of the story, often one very 
small part. To know what happens when we 
apply the magnet we need to know the other 
forces as well. Here, especially gravity. The 
desk magnet may lift a pin but it is hopeless 
for my car, where we need the industrial 
magnet. We also need to tend to what other 
forces we introduce in the course of getting 
the magnet in place. Perhaps the industrial 
magnet would have lifted the car if only we 
hadn’t thrown the heavy packing case for 
the magnet into the boot. Finally, we need 
to know how all these factors combine to 
produce a result. Often in criminological 
or other social contexts we assume simple 
additivity: add a good thing and the results 
can only get better. But that doesn’t work 
in even this simple physical case. We get so 
used to vector addition that we forget that 
it isn’t simple addition of effect sizes. Add 
a magnetic acceleration of 42 ft/sec/sec to 
that of gravity’s 32 ft/sec/sec and you won’t 
necessarily get 74.
The point is that whether the magnet will be 
effective at all in the target situation and to 
what extent depends on the causal structure 
of the situation. So the most direct way of 
predicting its effects is to construct a causal 
model of the situation and estimate them.
I know no-one wants to hear this since 
it seems difficult. But consider: we know 
industrial magnets would pass any number 
of RCTs, of any degree of stringency. But 
that’s not anywhere near enough to know. 
None of us would rent an industrial magnet 
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EViDENCE ON ThE grOuND: 
WhAT rCTs CAN SuPPOrT
to remove a load of rubbish without looking 
at the rubbish. Knowledge that magnets just 
like this can lift is only a small part of what 
we consider when we evaluate whether 
renting the industrial magnet will be effective 
in removing our rubbish. If this is so in 
everyday calculations and in applied science 
and engineering, why should we expect it to 
be substantially different – and substantially 
easier – in social engineering
Of course constructing causal models is 
hard, even if the models are rough and 
we have figured out ways to tolerate 
the uncertainties. Sometimes there are 
shortcuts, "cheap heuristics". For instance, 
one powerful cause can swamp everything 
else so you don’t need to model the rest. 
If you are going to put a bullet through 
someone’s heart you do not need to find out 
what his cholesterol levels are to calculate his 
longevity. Or, as with the magnet and the 
matchstick, the absence of some necessary 
auxiliary can show that a policy will not 
be effective without further thought. For 
instance an elaborate schedule of rewards 
and punishments is not going to work in 
cases where people’s actions aren’t responsive 
to their utilities.
Failing a nice heuristic for a case, the right 
advice is: do your best with the resources and 
time available to build a causal model. This is 
my second point. We may not wish to build a 
causal model. We may not know how to; we 
may think it takes too much time or money, 
intelligence or attention. That does not alter 
the fact that when we buy a policy we are 
betting on a causal model, willy-nilly, whether 
we wish to think about it or not.   Generally 
then it is better to think about it than not, and 
to do so in a systematic and deliberate way.
Finally, tying the two points together: If 
what we are aiming for are reasonable 
causal models for our policy decisions, this 
provides direction for constructing advice for 
how to answer the three central questions, 
including the first, which I have ignored – the 
question of credible evidence claims. Because 
now we see we need information far beyond 
the kinds of causal claims that are the subject 
of the standard evidence- ranking systems. 
Those causal claims bear on one piece of 
the causal story. The guides show us how 
to decide if a magnet can lift – because 
it has definitely lifted somewhere in some 
circumstances. That does not tell us at all 
that it will lift in our circumstances. For that 
we need to know what the rubbish is like as 
well, what situation it is in and how all these 
factors behave together. These judgements 
should have solid backing as well if predictions 
are to be relied on.
To repeat, our assessment of the probability 
of effectiveness is only as secure as the 
weakest link in our chain of reasoning to 
arrive at that probability. We may have 
to ignore some issues or make heroic 
assumptions about them. But that should 
dramatically weaken our degree of 
confidence in our final assessment. Rigor 
isn’t contagious from link to link. If you want 
a relatively secure conclusion coming out, 
you’d better be careful that each premise is 
secure going in.
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2.1 A PhilOSOPhEr’S ViEW OF ThE lONg rOAD FrOm 
rCTs TO EFFECTiVENESS
(From The Lancet, 2011)
For evidence-based practice and policy "RCTs 
are the gold standard." But exactly why? 
We know that RCTs do not, without a series 
of strong assumptions, warrant predictions 
about what happens in practice. But just 
what are these assumptions? I maintain that 
answers to both questions are obscured 
because we don’t attend to what causal 
claims say. Causal claims entering evidence-
based medicine (EBM) at different points say 
different things and failure to attend to these 
differences makes much current guidance 
about evidence for medical and social policy 
simplistic and misleading. 
What a claim says and how it is warranted 
must slot together as in a jigsaw puzzle. The 
special virtues of RCTs are then a clue to the 
real content of the causal claims they warrant, 
and vice versa. So here I shall examine the 
evidential credentials of RCTs and from them 
derive what kind of causal claims they can 
support. Next I shall describe three different 
kinds of causal claims that commonly get 
conflated. Finally I shall argue that these three 
kinds of claims play very different roles in 
supporting effectiveness predictions and that 
the three kinds of claims need very different 
kinds of evidence to support them. The result 
is that we need a far more varied palette of 
kinds of evidence for predicting effectiveness 
than most prominent advice guides outline.  
The first big question we need to be clear 
about is "What’s so good about RCTs?"
The canonical answer: "RCTs control for 
unknown confounders." This answer jumps 
into the middle of a discussion long underway. 
Two special features of ideally-conducted RCTs 
provide more fundamental grounding:
1. Ideal RCTs can clinch causal conclusions.
2. Ideal RCTs are self-validating.
Clinching. Some methods merely vouch for 
their conclusions. Though it is problematic to 
say exactly what it takes for a finding to vouch 
for a hypothesis, it generally involves at least 
that the finding is surprising but not surprising 
given the hypothesis. Others methods in the 
ideal clinch their conclusion: If the assumptions 
defining the method are met, positive results 
deductively imply the conclusion. The ideal 
RCT – ie, one for which all the requisite 
premises are met – is a clincher. Roughly, 
RCT logic assumes a general metaphysical 
premise (1): Probabilistic dependence calls for 
causal explanation. Experimental design acts 
to ensure premise (2): All features causally 
relevant to the outcome other than the 
treatment (and its downstream effects) are 
distributed identically between treatment and 
control groups. If [premise (3)] the outcome 
is more probable in the treatment than the 
control group, the only explanation possible 
is that the treatment caused the outcome in 
some members of that group.
EBM focuses on clinchers. Yet studies in 
philosophy of science suggest that physics 
claims are primarily warranted by large 
collections of varied results merely vouching 
for them. There are no checklists for handling 
vouching evidence, however; perhaps this is 
why EBM guidelines favour clinchers.
Clinching is not unique to RCTs however. 
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Economists use the rigorous methods of 
econometric modelling to estimate the 
degree to which one factor predicts another 
in a given population. This could be mere 
correlation. But given the right assumptions 
their results can deductively imply causal 
conclusions from non-experimental data. 
Deduction from accepted theory can also 
clinch causal conclusions; as can ideal case-
control studies, since these have the same 
logic as RCTs. The difference between RCTs 
and these others is the grounds for accepting 
the requisite premises, which is the second 
special feature of RCTs.
Self-validating. All methods have assumptions 
that must be met before conclusions from 
them are warranted. For causal conclusions, 
some of these premises must be causal: "No 
causes in; no cause out." For most studies 
– eg, the economic ones mentioned – the 
warrant for these assumptions comes from 
outside the study design.
The metaphysical assumption aside, support 
– though no guarantee – for premises 2 and 
3 is built right into RCT design. Premise 2, by 
policing of treatment administration, blinding, 
random assignment, etc.; premise 3, by 
techniques – including large sample size – for 
reliably inferring probabilities from observed 
frequencies. RCTs are thus self-validating.
Self-validation is a virtue but not a necessity. 
We often have good reason to accept the 
premises necessary for other study designs, 
including case-control studies, which is 
where unknown confounders enter. By 
definition we do not know "unknown" 
causal factors. We may nevertheless know 
enough about underlying mechanisms and/
or the study environment to assume no 
strong unknown causes obtain. Sometimes 
we even shield studies to prevent unknown 
sources of confounding, eg, by conducting 
magnetic-resonance studies in Hertz boxes. 
RCTs trust to procedure; other methods 
import information. Which strategy provides 
most support for a particular conclusion 
depends on how confident we can be that 
the procedures achieve their aim in the case 
at hand versus the strength of justification for 
the information imported.
All the studies I have discussed so far justify 
"efficacy claims", where "efficacy" is what 
happens in ideal circumstances. But recall the 
logic of RCTs. The circumstances there are 
ideal for ensuring "The treatment caused the 
outcome in some members of the study"; 
ie, they are ideal for supporting "it-works-
somewhere" claims. But they are in no way 
ideal for other purposes; in particular they 
provide no better base for extrapolating 
or generalizing than knowledge that the 
treatment caused the outcome in any other 
individuals in any other circumstances 
(except in the very unusual situation where 
there is good reason to think that the study 
population is a representative sample of the 
target population).
For policy and practice we do not need to 
know "it works somewhere". We need 
evidence for "it-will-work-for us" claims: The 
treatment will produce the desired outcome 
in our situation as implemented there. 
How can we get from it-works-somewhere 
to it-will-work-for-us? Perhaps by simple 
enumerative induction: Swan 1 is white; swan 
2 is white; So the next swan will be white. For 
this we need a large and varied inductive base 
– lots of swans from lots of places; lots of 
RCTs from different populations – plus reason 
to believe the observations are projectable, 
plus an account of the range across which 
they project. Electron charge is projectable 
everywhere – one good experiment is enough 
to generalize to all electrons; bird colour 
sometimes is; causality is dicey. Many causal 
connections depend on intimate, complex 
interactions among factors present so that no 
special role for the factor of interest can be 
prised out and projected to new situations.
Sometimes it can. Magnets are tested in 
ideal circumstances; their power to attract 
metal objects can be relied on widely.  The 
Heimlich manoeuvre is good for removing 
airway obstructions in almost anyone and 
aspirins are generally a good bet for relieving 
headaches. Knowledge like this involves a 
third kind of causal claim, a power or capacity 
claim: The treatment reliably promotes the 
outcome, or reliably contributes across a 
given range of circumstances. "Reliably 
promotes" means roughly that across a wide 
range of circumstances there will be more 
cases, or a higher level, of the outcome with 
the treatment than there would be without 
it. What the actual numbers are depends on 
what other factors are present, just as the 
actual motion of a pin attracted by a magnet 
depends on gravity, the wind, etc. 
Where available, knowledge of capacities is a 
powerful tool. To use RCT results as evidence 
for effectiveness we are generally told to 
look for populations/settings like those of 
the study. This is advice difficult to follow. 
We do RCTs because we do not know all the 
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major relevant factors, so judging whether 
other situations are relevantly similar is hard. 
Moreover, similarity is rare. But then, similarity 
is not necessary if the treatment reliably 
promotes the outcome. Magnets attract metal 
objects almost everywhere. The Heimlich 
manoeuvre depends on almost universally 
shared structures in the human body, so it 
can be relied on to encourage removal of 
obstructions across a wide variety of settings 
and individuals.  So capacity claims provide 
evidence for effectiveness even in situations 
very different from those of any study. And 
where no capacity claims obtain, there is 
seldom warrant for assuming that a treatment 
that works somewhere will work anywhere 
else. (The exception is the one noted, where 
there is warrant to believe that the study 
population is a representative sample of the 
target population – and cases like this are 
hard to come by.)
But there are problems for using capacity 
claims. First, although knowledge that a 
treatment reliably promotes an outcome is 
evidence that it will cause that outcome for 
us, it is only part of an evidential argument. 
We also need to know that our situation 
contains all requisite helping factors and 
that there are no overwhelming countering 
causes. Magnets lift objects only if the objects 
are metal and they will not lift even metal 
objects when gravity is too strong. Nor will 
the Heimlich manoeuvre remove objects if 
the oesophagus is too swollen by disease; 
many powerful medicines will not work if 
certain items are missing from the diet; and 
homework is generally an aid to learning 
only given a quiet, supportive environment 
in which to do it. I highlight these additional 
factors not because they are unfamiliar but 
because influential guidelines for evidence-
based medical and social policy often do not 
mention them let alone discuss standards of 
evidence for claims about them – despite the 
fact that such information is necessary for any 
reasonable predictions about effectiveness.
Second, capacity claims are hard to warrant. 
Worse, there is no explicit methodology 
describing exactly what it takes to warrant 
them, even in physics, despite the fact 
that most of our successful interventions 
using physics depend on capacity claims. 
What is clear is that even a handful of 
RCTs by themselves will not do the job. 
In general to support a capacity claim, a 
general understanding is needed of why the 
treatment should have the power to produce 
the outcome. Happily this is often available 
though few guidelines direct us to look out 
for it, let alone provide advice about what 
counts as good evidence that the backup 
understanding is sound. Probably that’s 
because we try to rely on procedures, as with 
RCTs, to avoid relying on claims of a general 
theoretical nature.
But an RCT supports only an "it-works-
somewhere" claim. How can we put hard-
won RCT results to use for predicting "it will 
work for us"? Similarity is problematic to 
judge and the kind of similarity necessary for 
warranting direct extrapolation from RCTs 
is rare. Capacities provide a conduit from 
RCTs to effectiveness, often the only one. But 
these are hard to warrant and even when 
warranted are only part of a good evidence 
base for predicting effectiveness. Effectiveness 
predictions are always dicey. Use of scientific 
evidence makes them far less so. But to use 
this evidence we need to tackle, not ignore, 
the messy issue of "theoretical" warrant for 
capacities in medical and social contexts.
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2.2 ArE rCTs ThE gOlD STANDArD?
(From BioSocieties, 2007)
The answer to the title question, I shall 
argue, is "no". There is no gold standard; 
no universally best method.  Gold standard 
methods are whatever methods will provide 
(a) the information you need, (b) reliably, 
(c) from what you can do and from what 
you can know on the occasion. Often 
randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are 
very bad at this and other methods very 
good. What method best provides the 
information you want reliably will differ 
from case to case, depending primarily 
on what you already know or can come 
to know. Since I have no expertise in 
psychiatry, I shall discuss methods in general 
use in the human sciences without trying 
to approach special problems of psychiatry. 
The article will have six parts:
•   Clinchers vs vouchers: a distinction and  
its implications
•   A straddler: the hypothetico-deductive 
method
•   Examples of methods that clinch 
conclusions
•   RCTs: ideal RCTs, real RCTs and the 
scope of an RCT 
•   The vanity of rigor in RCTs
•   Closing remarks
Bits of the section "RCTs: ideal RCTs, real 
RCTs and the scope of an RCT" will rely 
on some formal results that I will present 
informally. I hope to convey a sense of the 
kind of information that is required to justify 
the claims of RCTs to be a gold standard, 
both as a basis for caution and as a basis for 
comparison with other methods that have an 
equal claim to this status (because they are 
what I shall call "clinchers").
Clinchers vs vouchers: a distinction and 
its implications
Methods for warranting causal claims fall 
into two broad categories:
1. Those that clinch the conclusion but are 
narrow in their range of application, for 
example RCTs, derivation from theory or 
certain econometric methods.
2. Those that merely vouch for the 
conclusion but are broad in their range 
of application, for example qualitative 
comparative analysis, or looking for quantity 
and variety of evidence.
What is characteristic of methods in the 
first category is that they are deductive: 
if all the assumptions for their correct 
application are met, then if evidence 
claims of the appropriate form are true, 
so too will the conclusions be true. But 
these methods are concomitantly narrow 
in scope. The assumptions necessary for 
their successful application will have to be 
extremely restrictive and they can take only 
a very specialized type of evidence as input 
and special forms of conclusion as output. 
That is because it takes strong premises to 
deduce interesting conclusions and strong 
premises tend not to be widely true. 
Methods in the second category are more 
wide-ranging but it cannot be proved that 
the conclusion is assured by the evidence, 
either because the method cannot be laid 
out in a way that lends itself to such a proof 
or because, by lights of the method itself, the 
evidence is symptomatic of the conclusion but 
not sufficient for it. What then is it to vouch 
for? That is hard to say since the relation 
between evidence and conclusion in these 
cases is not deductive and there are no general 
good practicable "logics" of non-deductive 
confirmation, especially ones that make sense 
for the great variety of methods we use to 
provide warrant.
The fact that RCTs are a deductive method 
underwrites their claims to be the gold 
standard. But RCTs suffer, as do all deductive 
methods, from narrowness of scope. Their 
results are formally valid for the group 
enrolled in the study, but only for that group. 
The method itself does not underwrite any 
strong claims for external validity, that is for 
extending whatever results are supposed to 
be established in the test population to other 
"target" populations. This is important to 
keep in clear sight in comparing RCTs with 
other methods.
Compare, then, the costs and benefits 
of the two categories. Clinchers are 
deductive: if they are correctly applied 
and their assumptions are met, then if our 
evidence claims are true, so too will be 
our conclusions – a huge benefit. But there 
is an equally huge cost. These methods 
are concomitantly narrow in scope. The 
assumptions necessary for their successful 
application (a) tend to be extremely 
restrictive, (b) can only take a very 
specialized type of evidence as input, and 
(c) have only special forms of conclusion as 
output. In consequence we face a familiar 
kind of trade-off: we can ask for methods 
that clinch their conclusions but the 
conclusions are likely to be very limited in 
their range of application.
A straddler:  
the hypothetico-deductive method
The hypothetico-deductive method is a 
straddler. Used one way – the way Karl 
Popper advocated – it is purely deductive 
and so is in the same category as the 
RCT. The method works, as all methods 
do, by presupposing a variety of auxiliary 
assumptions, otherwise nothing really 
follows from the hypothesis of interest.
Popper:
Hypothesis → outcome 
¬outcome
Therefore, ¬hypothesis
This is a clincher.
Positivists:
Hypothesis → outcome
outcome
probability of the hypothesis increases  
(ceteris paribus) 
This is a voucher.
Popper argued that the only correct use of 
the hypothetico-deductive method is as a 
clincher, to deduce that hypotheses are false. 
The argument accepted by the Positivists, 
he pointed out, is a deductive fallacy – 
the fallacy of affirming the consequent. 
And deductive logic, he maintained, is 
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all the logic there is. This is borne out by 
centuries of failed efforts to establish some 
reasonable relatively uncontroversial theory 
of inductive confirmation. On the other 
hand, philosophers of physics maintain 
that the hypothetico-deductive method is 
the method by which physics theories are 
established. Nevertheless, medical science – 
and most of current evidence-based policy 
rhetoric – will not allow it.
Perhaps an example related to topics of 
interest to psychiatry will help. Consider 
the widespread correlation between low 
economic status and poor health, and look at 
two opposing accounts of how it arises (for 
a discussion and references see Cartwright, 
2007). Epidemiologist Michael Marmot 
from University College London argues that 
the causal story looks like this:
Marmot:
Low status → "stess" → too much "fight 
or flight response → poor health
In contrast, Princeton University economist 
Angus Deaton suggests this:
Deaton:
Poor health → loss of work → low income 
→ low status
Deaton confirms his hypothesis in the 
National Longitudinal Mortality Study 
(NLMS) data. He reasons: if the income–
mortality correlation is due primarily to 
loss of income from poor health, then it 
should weaken dramatically in the retired 
population where health will not affect 
income. It should also be weaker among 
women than men, because the former have 
weaker attachment to the labour force over 
this period. In both cases these predictions 
are borne out by the data. Even more, split 
the data between diseases that something 
can be done about and those that nothing 
can be done about. Then income is correlated 
with mortality from both – just as it would 
be if causality runs from health to income. 
Also, education is weaker or uncorrelated 
for the ones that nothing can be done about. 
Deaton argues that it is hard to see how this 
would follow if income and education are 
both markers for a single concept of socio-
economic status that is causal for health.
Thus Deaton’s hypothesis implies a number 
of specific results that are borne out in 
NLMS data and would not be expected 
on dominant alternative hypotheses. So 
the hypothesis seems to receive positive 
confirmation, at least if we share the 
Positivists’ intuition. More carefully, it seems 
to receive some confirmation for the 
population sampled for the NLMS data. 
But what about other populations, ie, what 
about external validity? The arguments I have 
just described that seem, contra Popper, 
to provide some evidence for Deaton’s 
hypothesis in the population sampled, 
do nothing  as they stand to support any 
claims about alternative populations. More 
premises and more and different arguments 
are needed to do that. So here we are reminded 
how badly even a non-clinching method can 
suffer from problems of external validity.
Examples of methods that  
clinch conclusions
I list just a few other kinds of methods that 
work deductively.
•  Econometric methods
•  Galilean experiments
•  Probabilistic/Granger causality
•  Derivation from established theory
•  Tracing the causal process
•  Ideal RCTs
These are clinchers: it can be proved that 
if the auxiliary assumptions are true, the 
methods are applied correctly and the 
outcomes are true and have the right form, 
then the hypothesis must be true. Even 
though I do not have the space to discuss 
them here, I mention  them in order to 
stress that, when it comes to clinchers – to 
methods from which the hypothesis can be 
rigorously derived from the evidence – RCTs 
are not the only game in town. There are 
lots of methods that can clinch conclusions.
It is important to keep in mind one caution, 
however. To buy the benefits of a clinching 
method we must be able to ensure that it is 
highly probable that all the requisite premises 
are obtained. That’s because of the weakest 
link principle for deductive reasoning. The 
probability of the conclusion can be no higher 
than that of the weakest premise.
–  Suppose you have 10 premises, 9 of them 
almost certain, one dicey. Your conclusion is 
highly insecure, not 90 per cent probable.
–  In a deductive argument P(conclusion) ≤ 
P(conjunction of premises)
I belabour this because of the benefits of 
clinching methods – clinchers are rigorous. It 
is transparent why the results are evidence: 
given the background assumptions the 
hypothesis follows deductively from the 
results. And it is transparent when the 
results are evidence: when the background 
assumptions are met. This contrasts with 
ethnographic methods and expert 
judgment, for example. These can provide 
extremely reliable evidence. But there is no 
specific non-trivial list of assumptions that 
tell when they have done so. But if you 
want credit for this benefit of a clinching 
method, you must be able to show that 
the conjunction of your premises has high 
probability in the case at hand.
Randomized controlled trials
Ideal RCTs
I have claimed that ideal RCTs are clinchers. That 
of course depends on how they are defined. 
But there are perfectly natural definitions 
from which it can be proved that RCTs, as 
thus defined, allow causal claims about the 
population in the study to be deduced from 
probability differences between the treatment 
and control groups (cf. Cartwright,1989; 
Heckman, 2001; Holland and Rubin, 1988). 
The one I have worked with extensively is the 
probabilistic theory of causality, formalized 
by Patrick Suppes (1970) but widely adopted 
throughout the human sciences, even if not 
consciously so under that title. Suppes’ concept 
of probabilistic causality is similar to the 
concept of Granger causality (Granger,1969) 
that is frequently used in econometrics.
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The root idea of the probabilistic theory 
of causality is that if the probability of an 
"outcome"O is greater with a putative cause 
T than without T, once all "confounders" 
are controlled for in some particular way, 
that is sufficient for  the claim "T causes  O" 
in that particular setting of confounding 
factors. So, in a population where "all 
other"causes of O are held fixed, any 
difference in probability of O with T present 
versus with T absent shows that T causes O 
in that population. The rationale supposes 
that differences in probability need a causal 
explanation, and, if all explanations 
relying on confounders are eliminated, 
then T causes O is the only explanation 
left. T must be causing O in at least some 
members of the population in order to 
account for the difference in probability. 
I should note that whether one wishes to 
adopt the theory in exactly this form, some 
such assumption is necessary to connect 
causes and probabilities if we are to 
suppose that the probabilistic observations 
in RCTs can yield causal conclusions.
The definition so far only tells us when we 
can assert that T causes O for populations 
that have some fixed arrangement of "all 
other" causal factors. To get a more general 
conclusion we may accept as well that if 
T causes O in a subpopulation of a given 
population φ, then T causes O in φ. This 
is consistent with my suggestion in the last 
paragraph that, on the probabilistic theory 
of causality, when we say T causes O in a 
population we mean that T causes O in at 
least some members of that population.
The proof that positive results in an ideal 
RCT deductively imply that the treatment 
causes the outcome would go something 
like this: to test "T causes O" in φ via an 
RCT, we suppose that we study a test 
population φ all of whose members are 
governed by the same causal structure (CS), 
for O and which is described by a probability 
distribution P. P is defined over the event 
space {O,T,K1,K2,. . .,Kn}, where each Ki is 
a state description over "all other" causes 
of O except T.1 The Ki are thus maximally 
causally homogeneous subpopulations of 
φ. Roughly: 
– "Ki is a state description over other causes" 
= Ki holds fixed all causes of O other than T.
– "Causal structure" = the network of causal 
pathways by which O can be produced, 
with their related strengths of efficacy.
Then assume
1. Probabilistic theory of causality. T causes 
O in φ if P(O/T&Ki) > P(O/¬T&Ki) for some 
subpopulation Ki with P(Ki) > 0.
2.  Idealization.  In an ideal RCT for "T causes 
O in φ", the Ki are distributed identically 
between the treatment and control groups.
From 1 and 2 it follows that ideal RCTs are 
clinchers. If P(O) in treatment group > P(O) in 
the control group in an ideal RCT, then trivially 
1 This must include ‘spontaneous generation’. More formally, Ki holds fixed one variable on each pathway that does not go 
through T, as judged by the causal structure CS.
by probability theory P(O/T&Ki) > P(O/ ¬T&Ki) 
for some Ki. Therefore: if P(O) in treatment 
group > P(O) in control group, T causes O in φ 
relative to CS,P.
What is going on here? We suppose that 
increase in probability of O with T does 
not show that T causes O in an arbitrary 
population. But it does in a maximally 
causally homogeneous population. We 
of course are almost never in a position 
to identify what makes for a maximally 
homogeneous population, so how can we 
tell whether T increases the probability of O 
in some one of these? The RCT is a clever 
way to find out. The RCT tells us that in 
some one or another maximally causally 
homogeneous subpopulation of the 
population in the study, T does increase the 
probability of O. Given the probabilistic 
theory of causality that tells us that T 
causes O in that subpopulation. So, what 
is established in the ideal RCT, according 
to the account based on probabilistic 
theory of causality, is that T causes O in at 
least one maximally causally homogeneous 
subpopulation of φ. We may say we have 
established "T causes O in φ" and that is 
a fine way to talk, so long as we recall 
that this means that T causes O in some 
subpopulation of φ.
It is important to notice that, on this account, "T 
causes O in φ" is consistent with "T causes ¬O 
in φ". This lines up with what we know of RCTs:
– RCTs deliver population-average results. 
A positive result shows that T causes O 
in at least one subpopulation. It could 
produce exactly opposite results in other 
subpopulations.
– Positive results are conclusive but negative 
ones are not. Equal probability for O in the 
treatment and control groups does not show 
that T does not cause O in φ. It shows that if T 
causes O in φ (because it does so in some Ki ⊆ 
φ) it must also cause ¬O (because it does so in 
some other  Ki ⊆ φ).
Real RCTs 
So, from positive results in an ideal RCT for 
"T causes O in φ", we can deduce that  the 
causal hypothesis is true. But we can be 
no more certain of our casual conclusion 
than we are of our premises, to wit, that 
the RCT is ideal and that the probability of 
O is indeed higher with T than without 
in the test population. What do we do to 
ensure the premises? Here are just some of 
the principal precautions we take: careful 
use of statistics to move from  frequencies 
to probabilities, "random" assignment to 
treatment and control groups, quadruple 
blinding,  careful attention to drop-outs 
and non-compliance, and so on.
I mention them just to point out that the 
practical methodology must match and be 
matched with the kind of formal treatment I 
have outlined. RCT advocates claim that RCTs 
are extremely reliable if carried out properly. 
That claim can be justified by an account of 
the kind I have outlined. But then—what is 
justified is that positive results as defined by 
the account, in an ideal RCT as defined by the 
account, imply a causal conclusion of the 
kind defined by the account. The practical 
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methodology then must be geared to 
ensuring that the premises required by the 
formal account are very likely to be true; 
and the conclusions drawn can only be 
of the kind admitted by the account. Of 
course the converse holds as well: a formal 
account that does not match well with 
our most careful, most well thought-out 
practical methodology should be viewed 
with at least a little suspicion.
The Scope of an RCT
Starting as I have from the probabilistic 
theory of causality, there are two kinds 
of causal conclusions we might naturally 
try to export from an RCT to some target 
population θ:
1. T causes O in θ. That is, T causes O in at 
least some members of θ.2
2. Some measure of "average improvement" 
that holds in the experiment will hold in the 
target population. I shall consider the simple 
case of P(O/T) > P(O/¬T).
Both conclusions need strong auxiliary 
assumptions to be warranted, well beyond 
those supported by the structure of the RCT. 
For the first, the RCT shows that T causes 
O in at least some members of some fixed 
causally homogeneous subpopulations. So 
to draw conclusions that T causes O in at 
least some members of θ, we need at least 
these kinds of assumptions:
– Auxiliary 1.a. At least one of the 
subpopulations (with its particular fixed 
arrangement of "other" causal factors) in 
which T causes O in φ is a subpopulation 
of θ.
– Auxiliary 1.b. The causal structure and 
the probability measure is the same in 
that subpopulation of θ as it is in that 
subpopulation of φ.
For the second kind of conclusion we need 
to show that the outcome is more probable 
with T than without in θ.3 The simplest 
guarantee for this is
– Auxiliary 2. The causal structure  (CS) and 
the probability (P) are the same in θ as in φ. 
There is an indefinite number of other ways 
that guarantee P(O/T)>P(O/¬T) in θ given it 
holds in φ, depending on the exact strengths 
of efficacy and the exact probabilities 
involved. But this is the only rule that 
does not require explicit statement of the 
specific numbers, most (if not all) of which 
are unknown to us. To get a sense for 
this, just imagine a case where there are 
only two relevant subpopulations, in one 
of which T is strongly positive for O and 
in the other it is equally strongly negative. 
The results will be positive in the RCT if the 
first subpopulation is more probable than 
the second, but will be reversed in targets 
where the second outweighs the first even 
2 In the ‘long run’, of course, since all results are probabilistic.
3 Or as near enough as matters for our purposes. I shall here ignore these niceties and how to treat them in order to focus on 
the main point. 
if the new population has the same causal 
structure as the test population. Clearly 
if the causal structure differs, matters will 
depend on just how, just as the net result 
will depend on just what the probabilities 
are if the probabilities of the relevant 
subpopulations differ.
The central question for external validity then 
is, "How do we come to be justified in the 
assumptions required for exporting a causal 
claim from the experimental to a target 
population?" Here rigor gives out. This is 
not to say that we do not have procedures or 
that we do not proceed in an intelligent way. 
We could aim to draw the test population 
"randomly" from the target.  We know that 
this is almost never possible.  Moreover, we 
must not be deluded about sampling methods: 
You cannot sample randomly without any idea 
what factors are to be equally represented – 
which is just the issue that drives us to RCTs 
to begin with. One thing we certainly can 
do is to try to take into account all possible 
sources of difference between the test and 
target populations that we can identify. This 
is just what we do in matched observational 
studies. When it comes to internal validity, 
however, advocates of the exclusive use of 
RCTs do not take this to be good enough – 
matching studies are not allowed just because 
our judgements about possible sources of 
difference are fallible. Yet exactly the same kinds 
of "non-rigorous" judgments are required if 
RCTs are to have any bearing outside the test 
population. For an RCT, the reliability of the 
claims in the target population is only as good 
as our estimates that very demanding auxiliaries 
like those above are met. The question then 
is about the trade-off between internal and 
external validity.
Lesson. We experiment on a population 
of individuals each of whom we take to be 
described (or "governed") by the same fixed 
causal structure (albeit unknown) and fixed 
probability measure (albeit unknown). Our 
deductive conclusions depend on that very 
causal structure and probability. How do we 
know what individuals beyond those in our 
experiment this applies to? We have seen 
some typical auxiliary assumptions about 
target populations that allow us to export 
conclusions from the experimental population 
to a target population, and we have seen 
that these assumptions are very demanding – 
demanding of information that is not supplied 
by the RCT and that is hard to come by. But 
our conclusions about the target can be no 
more certain than these auxiliary assumptions. 
The RCT, with its vaunted rigor, takes us only 
a very small part of the way we need to go for 
practical knowledge. This is what disposes me 
to warn about the vanity of rigor in RCTs.
The Vanity of Rigor in RCTs
The title is borrowed from my article 
"The vanity of rigor in economic models" 
(in Cartwright, 2007). In both cases we 
see identical problems: that of internal 
versus external validity. Economists make 
a huge investment to achieve rigor inside 
their models, that is, to achieve internal 
validity.  But how do they decide what 
lessons to draw about target situations 
outside from conclusions rigorously derived 
inside the model? That is, how do they 
establish external validity? We find: thought, 
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discussion, debate; relatively secure 
knowledge; past practice; good bets. But 
not rules, check lists, detailed practicable 
procedures; nothing with the rigor 
demanded inside the models.
And RCTs? If we compare them with economic 
models on internal validity, economic models 
have the advantage: We can readily see when 
the results are internally valid in an economic 
model just by inspecting the derivation.  This 
is clearly not so with RCTs. Consider the equal 
distribution of "other" causal factors.  Once 
we check the causes we know about, we have 
no further evidence that our precautions, our 
quadruple blinding and random assignment 
and so forth, indeed result in an equal 
enough distribution. And we know lots of 
things can go wrong. The best we can do is 
for people expert at what could go wrong 
to have a very close look at what actually 
happens in the experiment. It is important 
though that these are not people like me (or 
independent experimental- design firms) 
who know only about methodology, but 
rather people with subject-specific knowledge 
who can spot relevant differences that come 
up. But this introduces expert judgment into 
the assessment of internal validity, which 
RCT advocates tend to despise. Without 
expert judgment, however, the claims that 
the requisite assumptions for the RCT to be 
internally valid are met depend on fallible 
mechanical procedures. Expert judgments are 
naturally fallible too, but to rely on mechanics 
without experts to watch for where 
failures occur makes the entire proceeding 
unnecessarily dicey.
This brief mention of economic models versus 
RCTs highlights the conventional trade-off 
I recalled at the start between internal and 
external validity.  Despite the claims of 
RCTs to be the gold standard, economic 
models have all the advantages when it 
comes to internal validity. As I remarked, 
we need just mathematics and logic to 
decide if the conclusions are internally valid, 
whereas RCTs need a number of demanding 
assumptions beyond valid reasoning.  But it 
seems that RCTs have the advantage over 
economic models with respect to external 
validity. Surely, no matter what the target 
population, people in experiments are more 
like people in the target population than 
people in models are. Even here there is a 
caution, however, for of course this claim 
depends on exactly what kind of knowledge 
about people in the target population 
we build into the construction of our 
experiments versus how much we build into 
our models, and how we do so.
Closing Remarks
I close with some reminders for those who 
advocate RCTs as the gold standard.
The method of our most successful science – 
the h-d method – is not a clincher  at all. (And 
we do have some biomedical theory!)
There are many other clinching methods. 
Which method provides the most secure 
conclusions in a given case depends entirely 
upon which kinds of premises we can be most 
secure about and the situation at hand.
An argument that certain procedures 
achieve a given result much of the time 
may not be a good argument that they 
do so on any one occasion. External validity 
for RCTs is hard to justify. Other methods, 
less rigorous at the front end, on internal 
validity, can have far better warrant at the 
back end, on external validity. We must 
be careful about the trade-offs. There is 
no a priori reason to favour a method that 
is rigorous part of the way and very iffy 
thereafter over one that reverses the order 
or one that is less rigorous but fairly well 
reasoned throughout.
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2.3 rCTs, EViDENCE AND PrEDiCTiNg  
POliCy EFFECTiVENESS
(From The Oxford Handbook of the 
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 2012)
1. Introduction
"To Test Housing Program, Some Are Denied 
Aid", so says a headline in the New York Times 
published December 8, 2010. Why were they 
denied aid? Because they were in the control 
wing of a randomized controlled experiment 
(RCT) to determine for a New York City 
Homeless Services program called Homebase 
"whether the $23 million program… helped 
the people for whom it was intended". 
Apparently New York City has bought into a 
standard claim in the movement for evidence-
based policy and practice (EBPP): that RCTs 
are the gold standard for establishing "what 
works". So too it seems has the Greater 
London Authority whose Project Oracle "aims 
to establish a coordinated London wide way 
of understanding and sharing what really 
works". That’s according to the Authority’s 
Standards of Evidence document, which later 
explains that "the Standards value evaluations 
that use a comparison or control group … 
If the children going into the comparison or 
control group are assigned at random, so 
much the better as far as confidence in the 
results is concerned." 
And according to the same New York Times 
article so too does the US federal Department 
of Housing and Urban Development which 
is also doing a RCT on families in homeless 
shelters. The article also reports on the very 
vigorous movement to introduce RCTs widely 
in development economics, spearheaded by a 
group of MIT economists:
Such trials, while not new, are becoming 
especially popular in developing countries… 
“It’s a very effective way to find out what 
works and what doesn’t,” said Esther Duflo, 
an economist at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology who has advanced the 
testing of social programs in the third world. 
“Everybody, every country, has a limited 
budget and wants to find out what programs 
are effective” (Buckley 2010).
I urge we resist this movement. RCTs, if done 
very well, can indeed establish something 
about a program – that it worked in the 
studied situation.  Just that, according to the 
New York Times is what the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development is trying 
to do: "The goal, a HUD spokesman, Brian 
Sullivan, said, is to find out which approach 
most effectively ushered people into 
permanent homes." Pay careful attention to 
the form of the verbs. To show that a program 
ushered people into homes – ie, that the 
program worked for the population studied –  
is a long way from establishing that it will work 
in a particular target, let alone that it works in 
general. I will here show just how long – and 
tortuous – this way is. That however is not the 
impression you get from the Duflo quote nor 
from the GLA document, which propose to use 
RCTs to find out "what works".
I have for a while been urging that we need 
a theory of evidence in terms of which we 
can evaluate strong claims like these for RCTs 
(Cartwright 2009; Cartwright and Stegenga 
2009, 2011). Here I shall provide such a 
theory, a simple straightforward theory that 
allows us to see just what must be in place 
for RCT evidence to be relevant to predicting 
that a program or treatment will work in a 
target setting. Often the claim that a program 
worked in a studied population is called an 
efficacy claim and the prediction that it will 
work in a target, an effectiveness claim. It is 
widely acknowledged that the two are not 
the same. But little is said about how to get 
from one to the other and often it seems to 
be implied that the fall back position is that 
it is a reasonable bet that a program that 
was efficacious somewhere will be effective 
in any other situation unless we have specific 
reason to think it won’t work in that other 
situation, especially if the two have superficial 
similarities that are salient in the discipline 
proposing the inference (eg, demographic 
features like urban versus rural; physiological 
features like gender or age;  or socioeconomic 
ones like class, wealth or religion). On the 
contrary, I shall argue, the demands that 
must be met for efficacy to count as evidence 
for effectiveness at all, let alone sufficient 
evidence, are high and need good reasons in 
their favor if this bet is to be reasonable. 
Before turning to the "theory of evidence for 
effectiveness claims" I shall first explain what 
RCTs can show, and why.
2. RCTs and what can be inferred  
from them
I shall describe here an ideal RCT. 
Randomization of subjects to treatment 
and control groups, blinding and large 
study populations are supposed to provide 
warrant for the assumption that a real RCT 
approaches the ideal – or near enough. This 
assumption is controversial (Worrall 2002, 
2007). But I should like to sidestep this 
controversy and consider what can be inferred 
from a positive RCT result if we are willing to 
take it as well-established. 
An ideal RCT for cause X and outcome Y 
randomly assigns individual participants in 
the study, {ui},  into two groups where X = x 
for some value x universally in one group (the 
treatment group) and X = x’ ≠ x universally in 
the other (the control group). No differences 
are to obtain in the two groups other than X 
and its downstream effects.
The standard result measures the so-called 
"treatment effect", T, across the units 
participating in the study (letting <θ> 
represent the expectation of θ):
2.1. T =df <Y(u)/X(u) = x)> - <Y(u)/X(u) = x’>
Of what interest is this strange statistic about 
randomized units in a study group – and 
familiarity should not make you forget that it 
is strange? There are two standard answers. 
One relies on the counterfactual analysis of 
Paul Holland and Donald Rubin (Holland and 
Rubin 1988). This is for instance the method 
of analysis adopted by James Heckman, who 
won the Nobel Prize for his work evaluating 
social programs, especially on selection bias 
and particularly with respect to labor markets 
(Heckman 2001, 2005)1. Let Yx(u) =df the value 
u would have for Y if X were set at x by a David 
Lewis-type miracle (which changes only X and 
its downstream effects). 
1 See also my discussion of Heckman in Cartwright 2007.
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Now consider the expectations for the 
difference in counterfactual values of Y across 
units in the study. That is, the difference in Y 
each individual would experience were they 
treated with x’ versus with x, and take the 
average. So:
2.2. <CD>: <Yx(u) - Yx’(u)> = <Yx(u)> - 
<Yx’(u)>.
Notice that this is not the same as T since 
we can’t observe <Yx(u)> across all the units 
in the experiment but only <Yx(u)/ X(u) = x> 
or the same for X = x’. But we may suppose 
that randomization – in the ideal at least – 
guarantees that for u’s in the study the value 
u would have for Y if u received the treatment 
or control is (probabilistically) independent of 
whether u gets the treatment or control. Then 
<Yx(u)> - <Yx’(u)> = <Y(u)/X(u) = x) - Y(u)/X(u) 
= x’>
Or
T = <CD>: the observed treatment effect 
= the expectation of the counterfactual 
difference.
What use is the treatment effect under this 
interpretation, that is, where it is taken to 
be the expectation of the counterfactual 
difference? It’s surely good for post hoc 
assignment of responsibility. It tells us that X 
definitely contributed to the Y values of some 
individuals in the study and further tells us the 
average contribution. For these individuals, X 
is definitely to blame – or praise – for part of 
their Y values. This is attribution or evaluation 
– which is what, according to the Times 
article, the HUD spokesman said their RCT 
was aimed at. RCTs can be very good for that. 
But beyond that? 
We can look for so-called "external validity". 
Where else does the same result hold?
Range of external validity = those situations 
where the same result holds.
But with the assumptions so far, I see no 
way to begin to answer this question. Here 
the canonical trade-off between internal 
validity and external looms large. The study 
is perfectly geared to yield the average 
counterfactual difference. But without a lot 
more assumptions – both substantive and 
metaphysical – there’s no place to go with it.
Notice that the counterfactual interpretation 
makes no mention of causal principles. The 
other common analysis of RCTs postulates 
that Y values for the units in the study (or 
their probabilities) are determined by a causal 
principle. The RCT can tell us something 
about the role of X, if any, in this principle. 
Suppose then that Y in the study population 
of individuals  is determined by the causal 
principle L:
L: Y(u) c= a(u) + β(u)X(u) + W(u)2 
2 The symbol ‘c=’ implies that the left- and right-hand side are equal and that the factors on the right-hand side are causes of 
the one on the left.
where W represents the net contribution of 
causes that act additively in addition to X, and 
X may not play a role in the equation at all 
if β = 0.  The formula makes clear that β not 
only determines whether X contributes to Y 
at all but it also controls how much a given 
value of X will contribute to Y.
From L and the definition of T it follows that
T =df <Y(u)/X(u)=x> - <Y(u)/X(u)=x’> 
    =  <a(u)/X(u) = x> -  <a(u)/X(u) = x’> + 
        <β(u)/X(u) = x>x – <β/X(u) = x’>x’ + 
        <W(u)/X(u) = x> - <W(u)/X(u) = x’>.
If we are prepared to suppose that the 
random assignment of units to x and x’ 
assures that for units in the study, X is 
probabilistically independent of a,β,W, then
2.3. T = <β(u)> (x – x’)
If T is positive then β is too.  So X genuinely 
appears as a cause for Y in the law L for 
the study population. If β = 0 for all units 
then X does not appear in L. So under L, 
X makes no contribution to Y outcomes; 
these are produced entirely by the quantities 
represented in the variable W.  
Note that the effect size of X with respect 
to Y does not tell the actual value of Y that 
occurs, nor its mean; rather it tells only the 
contribution of X. What actually happens, 
or happens on average, depends on W as 
well. And this can be a problem. Sometimes 
things are getting worse naturally (due to 
the action of factors in W); then the net 
results after the policy may be worse than 
before even though the policy improved 
matters over what they otherwise would have 
been. Sometimes we make matters worse 
ourselves in implementing the policy, as in the 
California class-size reduction program, where 
class-sizes were reduced but so too, due to 
the sudden need for many more teachers, 
was teacher quality (Bohrnstedt and Stecher 
2002). So what’s in W matters to forecasting 
actual results. Here though I shall lay aside 
consideration of factors in W in order to 
concentrate on the effect size and what can 
be learned from it.
3. What we want for predicting 
effectiveness and what’s on offer
For evidence-based policy we want to 
predict with reasonable confidence3 that the 
proposed policy will contribute positively to 
targeted outcomes in our situation as the 
policy would in fact be implemented there.  
What characterizes a body of evidence that 
can do this for us? I propose a broad swipe 
at a straightforward answer, an answer that 
works for any empirical hypothesis H. This 
proposal is clearly very crude but it will suffice 
for moving the discussion along:
3 I don’t imagine that we will generally be able to assign numerical probabilities to these hypotheses in any reasonable way; 
but we can certainly often make sound judgments about when a hypothesis is fairly well supported given the current state of 
knowledge and when badly supported. For policy prediction I would expect that most often the support that we can muster 
is weak. If so, we should acknowledge that and manage the uncertainty in sensible ways, not pretend we have assurances 
we lack.
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H is well supported by a set S of empirical 
facts if
(A) The facts (fact claims) in S are true.
(B) The facts in S are relevant to the truth of H.
(C) "All" or "enough" of the true relevant 
facts are in S.
(D) All told, these speak for the truth of H.
There is currently no dearth of what turn out 
to be very similar guides that tell you how to 
evaluate effectiveness claims. Here is a sample:
IARC: International Agency for Research on 
Cancer
SIGN: Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines 
Network
U.S. Department of Education What Works 
Clearinghouse
USEPA: US Environmental Protection Agency
CEPA: Canadian Environmental Protection Act
Cochrane Collaboration
Oxford Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine
Daubert decision (US Supreme Court).
How do these guides help with A.–D.? 
First they make a bad presupposition about 
relevance (B): The only kind of fact seriously 
relevant to predicting that a policy will work 
for you is that the policy worked in some 
studied situation. Then they focus on A., the 
"quality" of proffered facts of this kind – how 
likely are they to be true? And they take 
an odd view about that.  Only comparison 
studies are allowed to count as good evidence 
that the policy worked in a studied situation, 
with RCTs as the best among comparison 
studies. Econometric models, for instance, 
which can under specifiable circumstances 
produce good support for causal claims, are 
not even considered; nor is derivation from 
well-established theory (Cartwright 2007; 
Reiss 2005; Fennell 2007a, 2007b). Then the 
advice given explicitly about B is generally of 
little practical use. They most often ignore C. 
And they are very weak on D. 
Here for instance is the quality grading 
scale from SIGN, which is used by NICE (the 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence) to set 
best health practice in the UK:
LEVELS OF EVIDENCE
1++ High quality meta-analyses, systematic 
reviews of RCTs, or RCTs with a very 
low risk of bias
1+ Well conducted meta-analyses, 
systematic reviews, or RCTs with a low 
risk of bias
1 - Meta-analyses, systematic reviews, or 
RCTs with a high risk of bias
2++ High quality systematic reviews of 
case control or cohort studies
High quality case control or  
cohort studies with a very low risk 
of confounding or bias and a high 
probability that the relationship  
is causal
2+ Well conducted case control or cohort 
studies with a low risk of confounding 
or bias and a moderate probability 
that the relationship is causal
2 - Case control or cohort studies with a 
high risk of confounding or bias and 
a significant risk that the relationship 
is not causal
3 Non-analytic studies, eg case reports, 
case series
4 Expert opinion
Notice that, as I remarked, what are ranked 
are study designs for establishing claims 
about the efficacy of a policy or treatment in 
a studied population, and they are all, bar the 
strange last entry, comparative studies. 
The marks from 1++ to 4 are then to be used 
to help grade policy predictions, presumably 
to grade them according to how likely they 
are to be true (or perhaps to be "likely, failing 
good reason to the contrary"). The grades 
are assigned thus (Scottish Intercollegiate 
Guidelines Network 2008):
GRADES OF RECOMMENDATION
A At least one meta-analysis, 
systematic review, or RCT rated as 
1++, and directly applicable to the 
target population; or
A body of evidence consisting 
principally of studies rated as 1+, 
directly applicable to the target 
population, and demonstrating 
overall consistency of results
B A body of evidence including studies 
rated as 2++, directly applicable 
to the target population, and 
demonstrating overall consistency of 
results; or
Extrapolated evidence from studies 
rated as 1++ or 1+
C A body of evidence including studies 
rated as 2+, directly applicable 
to the target population and 
demonstrating overall consistency of 
results; or
Extrapolated evidence from studies 
rated as 2++
D Evidence level 3 or 4; or
Extrapolated evidence from studies 
rated as 2+
So a really good RCT testing the policy on a 
study population can be enough to warrant 
confidence that the policy will work for 
you – at least it can, on this grading scale, 
if that RCT is "directly applicable" to your 
population. That is, it is relevant to your 
population. But when is a well-established 
claim that the policy worked somewhere – in 
some study population – relevant to your 
prediction that it will work for you? The U.S. 
Department of Education is equally vague. 
They tell you that strong evidence for your 
policy is two or more high quality RCTs in 
"settings similar to that of your schools/
classrooms". The only elaboration later 
adds four lines – trials on white suburban 
populations do not constitute strong evidence 
for large inner city schools serving primarily 
minority students. 
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These two grading schemes address C. and 
D. together in one fell swoop.  The advice is, 
"Take the best". If you have two good RCTS, 
that’s enough to go with the policy; you don’t 
need to look at the rest of the evidence. It 
looks then as if this is advice to reject C and 
do D an easy way. Other guides take C. more 
seriously and suggest a judicious consideration 
of "lower grade" evidence as well, allowing 
that sometimes lower grade evidence that the 
policy failed in some study populations should 
dilute your confidence that the policy will work 
for you (eg, The Grading of Recommendations 
Assessment n.d.). But how do you "weigh it 
all up together"? And isn’t weighing already 
perhaps a misleading way to put the problem? 
On this issue I think no-one offers very good, 
practicable advice; and I’m afraid I can’t either.4
What justifies these answers? There is little 
grounded discussion. Most of what there is 
focuses on the grading schemes, in defense of 
putting RCTS way out ahead. Only these, we 
are told, control for unknown confounders. 
But how did unknown confounders enter? 
This is clearly a remark somewhere very deep 
in the middle of an argument. I propose to 
start back at the beginning of the argument, 
to offer a theory of what counts as evidence 
from which we can construct answers. 
The simple theory I propose does not help 
much with C. and D. But it has immediate 
consequences for B., relevance, and this 
is where I shall concentrate. Already, just 
looking at relevance we will get a very 
different account of the role of RCTs in 
warranting effectiveness predictions than we 
see in these guides and that is suggested by 
the remarks of Duflo and the GLA document 
cited in my section 1.
4. A simple theory of relevance for 
predicting effectiveness
This theory has two straightforward claims. 
The first theory claim is
TEE 1. X as implemented will 
contribute positively to the production 
of Y in situation S iff 
TEE 1.1. There is a causal principle 
that holds in S from implementation 
till time of outcome in which X figures 
as a cause of Y, 
and
TEE 1.2. All the factors that are 
required in that principle for X to 
contribute to Y obtain in S at the 
required times.
TEE 1 is based on two presuppositions:
Law-governedness: If X is to contribute to 
the production of Y it must do so under the 
governance of a causal principle.
Analyticity: Causal principles generally allow 
different kinds contributions to the same 
effect from different distinguishable sources, 
some positive, some negative. 
The first presupposition supports theory 
4 For a survey of problems on evidence amalgamation see Stegenga 2009 and forthcoming .
claim TEE1.1. Causings don’t happen by 
accident, by mere hap, but in accord with 
causal principles at work in the situation. 
These need not be deterministic. They could 
for instance be probabilistic causal principles 
or expressions of causal powers, which may 
not have probabilities attached. For simplicity 
though I will use deterministic principles here 
to keep formal complications to a minimum. 
I do not want to endorse the claims that 
causings happen under principles as a 
universal truth and, personally, I do not 
think it is true. But I take it that I am in the 
minority. More importantly, it is happening 
under a principle that ensures that a causing 
can be relied on to happen. It is this that 
makes effects predictable; and for policy, it is 
predictability that matters.
Analyticity supports theory claim TEE 1.2. 
As with law-governedness, I do not take 
analyticity to be a universal truth and again 
I personally have argued that sometimes a 
kind of causal holism that counters it is true. 
But analyticity is at the base of much scientific 
method and it is the standard assumption in 
physics and economics and in large swathes 
of biology. It may not be so reasonable to 
assume in social contexts but in that case 
again policy prediction will be exceedingly 
difficult, as indeed the Historical School 
scholars who favored holism argued. So as 
with law-governedness, I shall take analyticity 
to be true for the kinds of policy causes that 
we can sensibly make predictions about. In 
that case we can suppose that the kind of 
causal principles that will produce predictable 
policy outcomes can be represented like this:
Y c= C1 + … + Cn – P1 … – Pm.
where the C’s and P’s are complex 
combinations of empirical factors and the 
meaning of "+" can vary. (For instance, when 
it comes to forces "+" will represent vector 
not scalar addition.5)
Principle L from section 2 is just a shortened 
form of this that focuses on terms that show 
X as a cause of Y with all the remaining terms 
gathered together in W.
To complete my simple theory we need only 
add the second theory claim: 
TEE 2: The facts relevant for predicting 
"X as implemented will contribute 
positively to the production of Y in S" 
are those that must obtain in S if that 
claim is to be true.
So we are warranted in predicting that X will 
make a positive contribution in S to the extent 
that we are warranted in assuming: 
Rel 1. There is a causal principle that 
holds in S from implementation till 
time of outcome in which X figures as 
a cause of Y,
and
5 For examples of other methods of combination see Cartwright 1999, 54.
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Rel 2. All the factors that are required 
in that principle for X to contribute to 
Y obtain in S and at the right times.
These are the two kinds of facts that are 
directly relevant to predicting a positive 
contribution from X. Other facts can be 
relevant – indirectly – by speaking for the 
truth of either of these.6
5. RCTs and Relevance 2
Let us start with Rel 2. since that is easiest 
and my remarks here are probably familiar. 
As earlier I shall suppose that laws of form L 
govern the production of Y for individuals u in 
the situations of interest, represented by S:
L: Y(u) c= a(u) + β(u)X(u) + W(u).
Causes are INUS conditions. From that it 
follows that two kinds of facts are directly 
evidentially relevant to predicting "X will 
contribute positively to the production of Y 
in S":
Rel 2.1. Facts about which are the 
factors that regulate whether X 
contributes to Y in S, and by how 
much, under a law that governs the 
production of Y in S, 
and
Rel 2.2. Facts about which of those 
will be present in S and at the 
right times were the policy to be 
implemented as envisaged.
When laws are expressed in the familiar form 
of L, facts that are mentioned in Rel 2.1. are 
represented, in one fell swoop, in β.  It is 
important not to be misled by β’s simple form 
into taking it as a constant or as a simple 
random variable. β will generally represent 
a complex function of further factors that 
together fix whether and how much X 
contributes to Y. Also keep in mind that there 
might well be different sets of complexly 
interacting factors, any one of which allows 
X to contribute to Y. So β looks like this: β = 
f1(z11,…,z1n) + … + fm(zm1,…,zmp). 
The quantities represented by z’s are 
sometimes called "confounding factors". That 
term though is often applied to the quantities 
represented in W as well. I suggest instead 
calling the z’s that must act in tandem with 
X to produce a contribution to Y, the support 
factors for X with respect to outcome Y. To 
make good predictions about the effects of 
X on Y in S you need first to identify what 
these are in laws that obtain in S and then 
to ascertain which of these will in fact obtain 
in S were the policy to be implemented. The 
usual advice you receive does not mention 
the support factors explicitly. But there is an 
assumption about β built into it. Look back 
to section 3 and the advice there from SIGN 
or the US Department of Education. You can 
6 We may not be interested just in whether X would contribute positively but in how much contribution we would get from 
inputting a given value of X. In this case we are not just concerned with whether positive β values obtain in our population 
(or whether enough positive ones obtain to outweigh the effects of those producing negative contributions) but also with 
what the mix of values of β is for us.
expect the same contribution in your situation 
as in an RCT if your situation is "similar 
to" that in the RCT or the RCT is "directly 
applicable" to your situation. 
So, similar in what respects? Or when is a 
result "directly applicable? That is not hard 
to answer, though the guides don’t write it 
out for you.  Looking at formula 2.3. for the 
treatment effect it is clear that you will get the 
same treatment effect in S as in an RCT only if 
your situation and that in the RCT share a law 
in which the same support factors figure for X 
with respect to Y and the two situations have 
the same mean value for these. Otherwise it 
is an accident. And having the same mean is 
pretty much an accident unless the two share 
the same distribution of the different values of 
β, which represent different combinations of 
values for support factors. 
How are you to make any kind of reasoned 
judgment about whether the two have 
the same mean or same distribution of 
combinations of support factors if you have 
no idea what these factors are and what 
range of values they will might take in 
your situation and with what probability? 
If you adopt the policy you will be betting 
that your situation has enough of the right 
combinations of support factors to ensure 
a positive contribution overall. But you are 
seldom urged to consider these and standard 
guides give little or no advice about how 
to evaluate the evidential weight of claims 
offered in support of proposals about them. 
Edward Leamer, famous for his paper "Let’s 
Take the Con out of Econometrics" (Leamer 
1983), in discussing RCTs expresses the 
same worry about this that I have: "If little 
thought has gone into identifying these 
possible confounders, it seems probable 
that little thought will be given to the 
limited applicability of the results in other 
settings"(Leamer 2010) .
What if some thought has gone into it and 
you have reason to believe you have identified 
a number of the necessary support factors 
for X to contribute to Y – the Z’s? Then the 
advice in the guides is poor advice. For you 
do not really want your situation to reproduce 
the same distribution across β as in the 
RCT. Rather you want a distribution that is 
heavy on the combinations of values of Z’s 
that boosts the input of the value of X you 
propose to implement and is light on the 
values in which that X value contributes little 
or nothing, or worse, is harmful.  
Where does this leave us with respect to the 
relevance of RCTs to our policy predictions? 
Look at Rel 2.1. RCT results will be indirectly 
evidentially relevant if they help support 
claims about what the requisite supporting 
factors are in our situation. And this they 
can do. Suppose we hypothesize that Z is a 
support factor and that Z = zg is a good value 
for us – ie, it boosts the contribution of the X 
value (say x) we propose to implement, and 
we hypothesize that Z = zb is a bad value. If 
we can find an RCT situation that we have 
good reason to believe shares laws for the 
role of X in the production of Y with our 
own then we can use an RCT to test this 
hypothesis, by setting the treatment as X = x 
and Z = zg and the control as X = x and Z = 
zb.  It is important to note however that this 
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test is only relevant for us if we have reason 
to believe that this RCT situation has the same 
laws for the production of Y from X as does 
ours – and that needs warranting.
As to Rel 2.2., RCT results are clearly no 
help in telling whether various factors that 
have been identified as support factors for 
us will obtain in our situation. For that we 
need local information. Sometimes we can 
tell by looking; sometimes it can require 
careful measurement; often – as I will discuss 
in the next section – it will require careful 
interpretation of what exactly those factors 
amount to on-the-ground, in-the-concrete in 
our situation.
6. RCTs and Relevance 1
If we assume law-governedness, as I did in my 
second treatment of RCTs in section 2, then a 
successful well-conducted RCT provides good 
evidence in favor of the claim that a causal 
principle like L in which X figures as a cause 
of Y held in the study situation. This provides 
no evidence that X will produce a positive 
difference in the target unless the target and 
the study share L. L must be, at least to that 
extent, a general causal principle. I take it 
this is what is supposed to be expressed in 
the claim "X works". But the stretch of L is 
certainly not addressed in the RCT and for 
the most part generality cannot be taken for 
granted. That’s because the kinds of causal 
principles that govern policy effectiveness are 
both local and fragile.
These principles are local because they 
depend on the mechanism or the social 
organization, what I have called the 
"socioeconomic machine", that gives rise to 
them. I have developed this claim for locality 
at length in many places (Cartwright 1999, 
2007). Here let me give one vivid example, 
far removed from our topic of social science 
and evidence, the case of a Rube Goldberg 
machine, say this one:   
We can fly the kites repeatedly and in different 
conditions to determine the exact form of the 
equation by which flying kites lift the small 
door. The equation may look like this:
Size of door opening c= β(height of kite) + W.
But we cannot take this principle very far. Kites 
do not very generally open doors. This causal 
principle is true but local. This, as I said, is an 
old theme of mine. I have returned to in recent 
work because of its central importance for 
successful prediction about policy interventions.
Some economists are very clear about locality. 
The Chicago School notoriously used it as an 
argument against government intervention: 
The causal principles that governments 
have to hand to predict the effects of their 
interventions are not universal. They arise 
from an underlying arrangement of individual 
preferences, habits and technology and are 
tied to these arrangements. Worse, according 
to the Chicago School, these principles are 
fragile. When governments try to manipulate 
the causes in them to bring about desired 
effects, they are likely to alter the underlying 
arrangements responsible for those principles, 
so the principles no longer obtain (Lucas 1981). 
Or, British econometrician Sir David Hendry 
(Clements and Hendry 2008; Hendry 2006) 
urges the use of simple "quick catch-up" 
models for forecasting rather than more 
realistic causal models because the world 
Hendry lives in is so fluid that yesterday’s 
accurate causal model will almost certainly 
not be true today. JS Mill had similar views 
(Mill 1836/1967, 1843/1973). Economics 
cannot be an inductive science, he argued, 
because underlying arrangements are too 
shaky; there’s little reason to expect that a 
principle that has held over some period or in 
some place will hold at a different period or in 
a different place. 
For purposes of policy we want to predict 
the truth of a singular counterfactual –  "This 
program would work for us, given where and 
how we would implement it". Nature fixes 
the outcomes of our policy interventions by 
working through her own casual principles for 
the situation.  We can try to follow her lead 
but we will need causal principles appropriate 
to our situation. Our situation will almost 
certainly have a different complex of causal 
factors present than any study populations. 
And implementation generally produces even 
more differences.  We seldom manage to 
introduce the intended intervention by itself; 
we usually end up changing lots of other 
causally relevant factors as well. (Recall the 
brief discussion of the importance of factors 
in W in section 2.) Even more fundamentally, 
our situation may well have a different 
underlying structure than the study situations 
and thus be subject to different causal 
principles; and even if the structure wasn’t 
different to begin with, our actions can alter 
it, as the Chicago school warns.
Because causal principles are local you can’t 
just take a causal principle that applies 
here, no matter how sure you are of it, and 
suppose it will apply there. Perhaps you think 
– as many other economists and medical 
RCT advocates seem to – that the different 
populations you study, here and there, are 
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more likely to share causal structure than 
not. That’s fine. But to be licensed in that 
assumption you need good evidence and 
generally varied in form: evidence about the 
nature and stability of the structures involved 
and evidence about the nature and stability of 
the causal principles they give rise to.
This is a quarrel I have with Judea Pearl 
(Pearl 2000), who has done such marvelous 
work on causal inference. I worry about 
the comprehensiveness of his methods, 
not their validity.  Pearl offers a complete 
methodology from hunting to using causes. 
First he provides a general way to represent 
causal principles; I believe he maintains that 
his representations are general enough to 
treat any kinds of causal principles we are 
familiar with. I don’t quarrel with this here. 
Second he offers a detailed semantics for 
inferring singular counterfactuals from casual 
models of this form. Nor do I quarrel with 
this. Third he points to reliable methods like 
causal Bayes-nets and RCTs for inferring 
causal principles from probabilities. Though 
we probably disagree about how widely 
the assumptions hold that are necessary for 
these methods to be valid, I agree that the 
methods are both powerful and often reliable. 
The scheme is ideal. We have trustworthy 
methods for going from data to model and 
from model to prediction. So the predictions 
are well supported by the empirical evidence. 
The problem is in the joining-up. We need 
reasons to suppose that the causal principles 
that produced the data in the studied 
situation are the same as those that will 
produce the outcomes we want to predict 
in the target situation. But we seldom have 
such guarantees. The probabilistic methods 
that Pearl and others endorse for discovering 
causes can provide good descriptive accounts 
of the network of causal relations that obtain 
in various populations. These can be a part of 
the evidence base for the more basic science 
that allows us to predict what the causal 
principles might be in new situations. 
But simple induction, even if the models 
are for what is supposed to be the "same" 
population, is seldom a good tool of inference 
– and to be warranted in using it, we need 
good reasons to believe we are studying an 
entrenched structure. Otherwise for new 
situations we need to predict new principles 
and we can’t do this by collecting statistics on 
populations in the not-yet-existing situations. 
We can though sometimes do so with an 
understanding of underlying mechanisms and 
how they interact to generate new causal 
principles. But for this we need theory, not 
necessarily grand sweeping theory but theory 
none-the-less, and in consequence we need 
the large and tangled confluence of evidence 
and hypotheses that go into building up and 
supporting reasonably reliable theory. Of course 
theory is hard – and unreliable. Simple induction 
is far easier. But it requires stability and stability 
is hard to come by. Without at least enough 
theory to understand the conditions for stability, 
induction is entirely hit or miss. 
Here are the remarks of a pair of other 
economists who like me stress the importance 
of finding shared laws if study results on a 
policy or program are to serve as evidence that 
the policy will be effective in a target setting: 
Structural analysis gives us a way to 
relate observations of responses to 
changes in the past to predict the 
responses to different changes in  
the future.
It does so in two basic steps: First, 
it matches observed past behavior 
with a theoretical model to recover 
fundamental parameters such as 
preferences and technology. Then, the 
theoretical model is used to predict the 
responses to possible environmental 
changes, including those that have 
never happened before, under the 
assumption that the parameters are 
unchanged (Nevo and Michael 2010).
 
To find shared laws I do not think we always 
have to go all the back to first principles, as 
the talk of "fundamental parameters" and 
"theoretical models" suggests. But if we 
are to use results from a study situation as 
evidence for predictions about a target, we 
had better have reason to believe the study 
results depend on a law that is at least wide 
enough to cover both.
One way to find shared principles can be 
to "climb up the ladder of abstraction", to 
provide more abstract descriptions of the 
cause and effect factors at work in the study. 
This is a good idea because laws that hold 
relatively widely generally involve abstract 
features. So there is a very rough correlation. 
The higher the level of abstraction of the 
features in a principle the wider is its range 
of applicability. For example, the sun causes 
the earth to move around it in an the orbit we 
observe yearly; a large mass causes smaller 
ones to move around it in elliptical orbits; a 
mass of size M causes objects at separation r 
from it to accelerate at GM/r2. Each of these 
principles is true, and each is true of the 
earth, which is the original object of focus.  
But each involves more abstract features than 
the one before. And each has a wider domain 
of application than the one before.
These layers of principles can all be true at 
once, and all apply at once to the earth, 
because of a simple fact about the abstract 
and the concrete. Abstract features are always 
instantiated in more concrete ones. Fables 
and morals often relate in just this way. 
Consider a favorite of mine by the German 
Enlightenment thinker and playwright, GE 
Lessing (Lessing 1759/1967):
A marten eats the grouse.
A fox throttles the marten; the tooth 
of the wolf, the fox.
Moral: The weaker are always prey to 
the stronger.
The moral of the fable teaches a lesson in the 
abstract, the fable shows what it amounts to 
in one or more concrete cases.
The same is very often the case in the social 
sciences. Economic agents do not always act so 
as to maximize their income, nor their leisure, 
nor their consumption, nor the educational 
levels of their children, nor anything else in 
the concrete. But perhaps for the most part 
economic agents act so as to maximize their 
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expected utilities and when we see them 
acting for income or leisure this is what, on 
that occasion, constitutes their utility. 
It is just this assumption that underwrites 
a good many social science experiments. 
Consider economics. We engineer situations 
to ensure as much as possible that for the 
nonce at least, the only source of utility is, 
say, money to be won in the experimental 
game. Then we look to see whether, if the 
monetary rewards are structured like those in 
a prisoners’ dilemma game, agents play the 
antisocial equilibrium solution predicted from 
the principle that agents act to maximize their 
expected utility. If they do, the experimental 
results are not only an instance of the 
principle "In a prisoners" dilemma game, 
agents both defect’ but also "Agents act to 
maximize their expected utility." Conversely, 
if agents in the experiment cooperate it is not 
just a challenge to the principle about what 
should happen in a prisoners’ dilemma game, 
but a challenge to the fundamental principle 
of utility maximization as well.
To get a shared lesson from a study like an 
RCT it is often best then to couch that lesson 
in far more abstract terms than those in 
which it is carried out. But there is a problem. 
How do you know when you have made the 
right associations between the abstract and 
the concrete? 
Sometimes the identification can be easy. 
Here’s a case I discuss in more detail 
elsewhere (Cartwright 2011). There was 
good evidence that a nutritional counseling 
program for mothers in the Indian state 
Tamil Nadu improved the nutrition of their 
young children. Yet a similar program did 
not succeed in Bangladesh. The principle 
"nutritional counseling in mothers improves 
their young children’s nutrition" was too local 
to cover Bangladesh as well. The after-the-fact 
evaluation of the Bangladesh program indicated 
that a good part of the reason the program 
didn’t work there was that often mothers 
neither did the shopping – the men did it – nor 
controlled food distribution in the family – their 
mother-in-law did that. Let’s take this account 
for granted for purposes of illustration. 
The information from the evaluation plus the 
background knowledge that prompted the 
nutrition program in the first place7 make it a 
good hypothesis that there is a more abstract 
principle that holds in both Tamil Nadu and 
Bangladesh: Nutritional counseling for those 
who procure the family food, control its 
distribution in the family and reflect concern 
for a child’s nutritional welfare in doing these 
improves the child’s nutrition. In India mothers 
satisfied the complex description in this 
(hypothetically) shared principle, though not 
in Bangladesh. And in this case it would not 
be hard to verify that in Bangladesh "mother" 
does not do so – just go to the market and 
notice that all the food shoppers are male.
Other cases will be more problematic. The 
prisoners’ dilemma experiment is designed 
7 This might include, for instance, well-evidenced claims that in both places mothers believed in eating down during 
pregnancy or conventional child rearing habits forbade certain nourishing food to children, like fish.
to make easy the identification of money 
won in the game with utility but what tells 
us what is to count as utility in most naturally 
occurring situations? I take it that sometimes 
we will be in a position to make and defend 
identifications and sometimes not; it will 
depend on our background knowledge, both 
local and general. It is important to stress that 
this is not the kind of knowledge that RCTs 
are good at securing. It requires a different 
kind of scientific backup and exactly what 
kind – or better, "kinds" – is required can  
differ from case to case. 
This points out a great shortfall in helpful 
advice. In general evidence hierarchies like 
those mentioned in section 3 only rank 
methods for producing evidence that a 
program works somewhere, with no advice 
at all about how to judge when evidence 
proffered for identifying features across levels 
of abstraction is likely to be sound and strong.
Let us return finally explicitly to the lessons 
about where RCTs are relevant. RCT results are 
relevant only to situations where the effect is 
produced under a principle shared with the 
study situation. The very methodology of the 
RCT tends to restrict its range of relevance. 
In order to ensure that all members of the 
treatment group receive the same treatment it 
is important for a proper RCT that the program 
under test – the treatment protocol – be very 
precisely specified. This means describing 
the treatment in very concrete terms and 
the very concrete features picked out by the 
protocols are likely to figure only in very local 
principles. Yet the very same RCT results can 
at the same time be evidence for a principle 
connecting more abstract features that has 
far wider coverage – if only we can import 
the web of background knowledge that it 
takes to recognize those features and support 
the breadth of the more abstract principle. 
The point is that sometimes we have such 
knowledge, or at least a body of evidence that 
provides reasonable support for it. 
Many RCT advocates, however, urge trusting 
to nothing but what can be established by an 
RCT. The irony is that this advice undermines 
the usefulness of RCT results and it is at any 
rate impossible to follow. To present results 
some choice must always be made about 
what the relevant treatment and effect 
features are. That is a choice that cannot be 
underwritten by RCTs. Rather it depends on 
the complicated kind of consilience of theory 
and empirical studies that is always necessary 
to grasp what features, among the panoply 
on offer, are linked in the kinds of regular 
ways we describe in our causal principles. 
Perhaps we get carried away by drug 
trials, where we suppose a vast amount 
of biochemistry and knowledge of human 
physiology picks out what are the widely 
applicable relevant treatment features, 
background knowledge that we take to 
be so secure that we can ignore its role in 
warranting our choice of features to figure 
in the causal principles that we take the RCT 
to test. Whether this is true about drugs and 
certain other medical treatments, it is surely 
very doubtful about social interventions. It 
is almost a truism in social science that one 
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and the same thing, concretely described, 
can have very different meanings in different 
social, cultural and economic settings, and 
hence have very different effects.8
What then of advice that urges that exactly 
the same protocol as in the RCT should be 
satisfied if one is to expect the same kinds 
of results in a new setting as in the RCT? 
For instance the Greater London Authority 
Standards of Evidence document claims: 
"… it is now established that programs that 
are delivered with what is called ‘fidelity’ – 
meaning they are implemented as intended 
by the program designers – achieve the best 
results"(Greater London Authority n.d.).
On the one hand, this can be good advice. 
Policy makers quite reasonably often try 
to cherry pick through the features of a 
program to implement only ones that are 
cheaper, or more feasible or more politically/
culturally acceptable in hopes that they will 
still get reasonably close results to those in 
the RCTs. This can be a very bad idea for 
often program features are interactive and 
program designers have been at pains to 
include enough of the right combination to 
ensure that the program, taken as a whole, 
will generate positive contributions, but if 
factors are omitted, a positive contribution is 
unlikely – that is, they have worked to ensure 
that many of the main members of what I 
have called the requisite "support team" is 
built into the program design. 
An example might be the Nurse-Family 
Partnership (Olds 2006; Olds et al. 2003) 
that has been used in a number of US cities 
and is now being introduced into the UK to 
improve pregnancy outcomes, child health 
and development, and parents’ economic 
self-sufficiency. It involves a heavy program 
of prenatal and infant home visiting and is 
thus costly – though, as designers claim, not 
relative to the costs saved from many of the 
later problems averted by the program, let 
alone the suffering averted. The designers will 
not sell the license for this program unless 
it is to be taken up in its entirety – though 
they are concerned to pursue ways to adapt 
the program to make it more suitable to, for 
instance, use in Birmingham, which is where 
it is first being tried in the UK.
So it can be a good idea to stick to the RCT 
protocol. On the other hand it can be a very 
bad idea for the reasons I’ve rehearsed: It’s 
not the protocol that matters more widely 
but rather something more abstract that the 
protocol instantiates in the RCT situation.
How do you judge when it is good advice 
and when bad? As I said, that takes a 
good network of theoretical and empirical 
knowledge. A policy that worked somewhere 
will not work for you unless there’s a shared 
principle that governs the results in both the 
study situation and your own. If you don’t 
have good reason to believe there is one, and 
that you have correctly identified what the 
appropriate concrete form of the treatment 
8 For another example involving child welfare practices see Cartwright 2012.
is under that principle in your situation, then 
you are betting when you set out on a policy 
course and probably betting at unknown 
odds. Sometimes you need to do this. But 
it’s best to acknowledge it and manage the 
uncertainly as best possible, not act as if you 
have warrant that you lack.
7. Summary
There are two kinds of facts directly relevant 
to predicting "X will contribute to Y in S": the 
facts that 
Rel 1. The production of Y in S is 
governed by a law L in which X 
appears as a cause of Y.
Rel 2. All the factors necessary 
under L to support X in producing a 
contribution to Y obtain in S.
Other facts are relevant – indirectly – if they are 
relevant to establishing either of these facts. 
This includes the kind of fact that an RCT can 
lend support to – that X caused Y in a study 
situation, or that the effect difference for X with 
respect to Y was positive in a study situation.
What then in more detail of the  
evidential relevance of RCT results to 
effectiveness predictions? 
A positive effect size for treatment X and 
outcome Y in an RCT in situation R is directly 
evidentially relevant to "R is governed by a 
law, say L, in which X causes Y." The positive 
effect size can be indirectly relevant to facts 
about the laws in another situations S –  "S is 
governed by a law in which X causes Y" – but 
its relevance is conditional on the fact that R 
and S share L. That is, a positive effect size in 
R is relevant to whether X figures as a cause 
of Y in S if, but only if, R and S share L. For 
evidence-based policy we should have good 
reason before we assume this. And RCTs will 
be hard pressed to provide that reason. Even 
if the RCT were conducted on a sample of the 
target population, samples can be misleading. 
Equally important, one must suppose that 
the causal structure does not change from 
the time of study till the time the policy 
begins to work its effects. That is an empirical 
hypothesis that may or may not be true and 
that should not simply be assumed without 
reflection and without reason to back it up.
Not only do RCTs not tell us that two 
situations share a causal structure. They 
also fail to tell us what the operative factors 
in the causal principles are. S may share 
with the study situation R a general causal 
principle under which the results in the study 
are produced, but the causes in the shared 
principle need not be the ones described 
in the protocol of the study. The protocol 
may pick out causes at too low a level of 
abstraction for sharing and the very same 
protocol carried out in S may not constitute 
the same cause that it constitutes in Y. Again, 
the RCT can be indirectly relevant, but only 
conditionally, in this case conditional on the 
fact that the protocol in the study and the 
proposed policy both instantiate the causes in 
a shared causal principle.
As to Relevance 2, RCTs are not relevant to 
"All the supporting factors required by L for T 
to contribute to O obtain in S." That requires 
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different kinds of evidence, more local and 
different in kind. It requires studies aimed at 
establishing what features are there in S, not 
ones geared to establishing causal connections. 
RCTs can be relevant to identifying what 
the supporting factors are. But again, only 
conditionally: If – but only –if the study and 
target situations share the relevant causal 
structure. And again, for evidence-based policy 
this should not be assumed without reflection 
and without reason.
Overall, the lesson is simple. It is a long road 
from an RCT that evidences the fact that a 
policy works somewhere to the prediction 
that the policy will work for us. A lot of 
different kinds of facts requiring evidence 
of different kinds to support them must be 
in place before the road is secure, or secure 
enough for us to bet on it given the costs and 
benefits of success and failure. That makes 
policy predictions dicey – but then that is 
something to expect. Many of the facts we 
need to establish are sometimes within our 
grasp or can become so with reasonable effort. 
Sometimes they aren’t and we need to hedge 
our bets as best we can. But in any case, the 
more of the road we support, the more likely it 
is that our inferences will go through. 
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EViDENCE iN ThE AbSTrACT: 
A gENErAl ThEOry OF 
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3.1 DOES rOuSh ShOW ThAT EViDENCE ShOulD  
bE PrObAblE?
(With Damien Fennell from  
Synthese 2010)
1. Introduction
Evidence has always been a central topic in 
the philosophy of science. But with debates 
raging throughout the US and the UK about 
what counts as evidence for evidence-
based policy, the topic has become one of 
immediate practical importance. This makes 
very timely Sherrilyn Roush’s recent efforts to 
characterize evidence.
Roush presents her account near the end of 
her detailed development of a tracking theory 
of knowledge, now one of the central topics in 
epistemology. Even if tracking is not the correct 
or the only good account of knowledge, it 
would certainly be a plus to have a theory of 
evidence for which it could be assumed that 
anything that counts as evidence is a source of 
tracking knowledge. We shall here look into 
the question of how her theory of evidence 
dovetails with her tracking view of knowledge.  
Our primary topic, however, is another important 
claim that Roush defends.  Roush claims for 
her account the special virtue that it "explains 
why better evidence makes knowledge more 
probable" (Roush, 2005, 185). This seems a 
truism: What we mean by better evidence for 
h is evidence that makes h more probable. 
But this is not what Roush means. For her, 
"better evidence" is evidence that has a higher 
probability. If e is to be evidence for anything, she 
maintains, it is ideal that P(e) be high.
This conclusion matters, and not just for the 
philosophical explication of the concept of 
evidence. Now that evidence-based policy 
is widely mandated, guides outlining what 
counts as evidence for policy effectiveness 
proliferate.1 Roush’s demand for high P(e) is at 
their heart. The guides offer schemes that rank 
methods for producing evidence according 
to the degree of certainty that the method 
confers on the conclusions it produces: High-
quality evidence claims are claims produced by 
methods that make it likely that those claims 
are true, claims e for which P(e) is high,2 No 
policy recommendation can get a top-grade 
rating unless it has top-ranked evidence claims 
in its favour. For these guides it is not only 
"ideal" that P(e) be high if e is to count as 
evidence; it is necessary.3
There is a simple reason why one might adopt 
this view. It is almost certainly what motivates 
1 For instance evidence evaluation schemes from the Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network, the International Agency 
for Cancer Research, or the Maryland rules in criminology.
2 The guides clearly seem to make the assumption that high probability can be assigned to results from reliable methods. 
While an important issue, this is tangential to concerns here about whether a claim must have high probability if it is to be 
counted as evidence. 
3 This raises a question as to how to interpret probabilities. Roush claims that her definition of evidence is compatible 
with both subjectivist and objectivist readings. In section 3 we explore issues relating to the subjectivist interpretation of 
probabilities when we consider Roush’s argument from a Bayesian standpoint. To interpret Roush in an objectivist way, 
we avoid standard controversies in the philosophy of probability by assuming that e and h both denote event-types. This, 
however, is not to say we believe that it is straightforward to find an interpretation of probability that makes sense of 
Roush’s definition of evidence or her arguments for probable evidence. Indeed, the difficulties discussed in section 3.2 
suggest otherwise. 
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the ranking schemes and it is one of the 
reasons Roush herself gives: If e is to be good 
evidence for h, e should provide good reason 
to believe h. Surely we shouldn’t believe h 
on the basis of e unless there is good reason 
to believe e. So P(e) should be high. We shall 
here accept this line of defence for high 
P(e) without discussion and concentrate 
on the rest of Roush’s discussion, for she 
has far more than this to offer. In particular 
she develops two original, challenging 
defences of high P(e), both of which open 
new perspectives on the age-old topic of 
evidence. The first is based on an interesting 
mathematical relationship and a related series 
of graphs and the second on arguments 
against modelling surprising evidence as 
evidence with low probability. 
We shall argue that these defences do not 
carry the conclusion. In good part that is 
because there is not one conclusion in Roush’s 
discussion but three, all expressed in the 
same words: High P(e) is ideal if e is to be 
evidence for h. We claim that there are three 
conclusions because we think there are three 
different senses of "evidence" at play in 
Roush’s discussion, senses that are important 
to distinguish independent of their role in the 
specific issue of P(e). They are –
(1) Evidence as the ground for knowledge.4 
In order for e to be evidence for h, e should 
be an appropriate basis for knowledge that 
h. The version of "evidence as the ground for 
knowledge" we find in Roush supposes both 
that h be true – "as it must be for anyone to 
know it" (Roush, 2005, 153) and also that e 
provides grounds for believing it so.5  
(2) Evidence as a two-place relevance relation 
("e is evidence for h") between propositions 
or possible events, in which the evidence is 
supposed to be relevant to the truth of the 
hypothesis, without any presumption about 
whether either the evidence or the hypothesis 
is true.
(3) Evidence for a hypothesis h as a lever 
to infer P(h), that is, knowledge about the 
evidence or its probability can be used to 
deduce informative, previously unknown 
constraints on P(h), or better, P(h) itself.
The second is the usual topic of confirmation 
theories and one could take it that Roush’s 
explication is aimed here since she engages 
with the conventional literature at various 
points. It is at any rate an important topic, 
and again, not one just of philosophical 
interest. Consider hypothesis testing or policy 
deliberation. Gathering facts, finding out 
what is true and what is not, conducting 
experiments, even just sitting and discussing 
the facts is costly and time consuming. So 
one wants a concept of evidence that tells 
what facts bear on the hypothesis in order 
to decide which ones to find out about, 
which experiments to run or which facts 
to let onto the table for discussion. This is 
looking at evidence from the perspective of 
the deliberation process, prior to any views 
about whether what is admitted as evidence 
provides sufficient grounds for believing the 
hypothesis, ie, before considerations about 
issue (1). This perspective also fits particularly 
nicely with Roush’s own concerns, which we 
separate out as issue (3), that evidence should 
provide leverage. She does not want P(h) to 
be presupposed in our attempts to settle if her 
two central requirements for evidence are met 
because that would undermine our ability to 
leverage from the evidence to the hypothesis. 
Roush’s discussion of high P(e) does not 
differentiate these three notions, yet P(e) seems 
to fare differently in each. For sense 1 it seems 
natural to suppose evidence should have high 
probability for the trivial reason that e can hardly 
be the basis for knowledge that h if e isn’t itself 
true, or highly probable, just as the evidence-
ranking schemes suppose. But high P(e) should 
surely be omitted as a criterion for evidence in 
sense 2. For sense 3, we shall argue, none of 
Roush’s three criteria are necessary. 
We look at Roush’s defences of high P(e) in 
section 3, evaluating them both on their own 
merit and with an eye to disentangling sense 
1 and 2 of "evidence". We look at leveraging 
in section 4. In section 5 we produce a simple 
counterexample to show that, strictly speaking, 
evidence for h as defined by Roush does not 
imply that e tracks h, contrary to her hopes.
2.  Roush’s graphical analysis and 
definition of evidence
Roush constructs her definition of evidence 
from two desiderata. The first is that evidence 
should discriminate between hypotheses. 
She takes this to mean that if e is evidence 
for h then P(e|h) > P(e|¬h), or, in terms of 
the likelihood ratio (LR = P(e|h)/P(e|¬h)) that 
LR > 1.6 Roush takes the discrimination 
condition to be uncontroversial and focuses 
greater attention on a second desideratum, 
the indication condition, P(h|e) > 0.5. The 
motivation for this is that evidence should, 
when true, make the hypothesis more likely 
than not, thus giving us some reason to 
believe h (rather than its alternative ¬h).7 
These are both well rehearsed conditions, 
familiar from debates about how to define 
what we have prised out under the label 
"evidence as a relevance relation". For 
present purposes we shall take her arguments 
for them as sufficient for evidence in a 
relevance sense since our focus is on her 
further requirement that P(e) be high.
Roush defines evidence so that both 
4 The idea here is similar to Williamson’s "E=K" thesis (2000, 185) that evidence is just what we know. This thesis is 
motivated, as with Roush, by a desire to use evidence to justify belief in a hypothesis.  Williamson’s treatment is similar 
to Roush’s in other respects as well. For instance, he requires that P(h|e) > P(h) for e to be evidence which is equivalent 
to Roush’s discrimination condition. However he does not adopt a condition similar to Roush’s indication condition 
P(h|e)>1/2. Instead Williamson uses the fact that evidence is knowledge and the requirement that P(h|e)>P(h) to justify 
belief in the hypothesis from evidence.  
5 As Roush puts it in her discussion of tracking and evidence "… if h is true – as it must be for anyone to know it – and 
e tracks h then it is unlikely that e is false. And, if e is false, then because the subject's belief in e tracks e, the subject 
is unlikely to believe e. Since b(h) tracks b(e), the probability of b(h) given b(e) is low too. All of this suggests that if the 
subject knows h through this trajectory, then because in order to do that she must believe h, e is likely to be true." (Roush, 
2005, 153).
6 She further invokes a number of authors to argue that the likelihood ratio is the best measure of how good evidence is 
at discriminating.
7 Roush notes "… we do not have good reason to believe, or even some reason to believe, a hypothesis is true, if we have 
no assurance that the posterior probability [P(h|e)] is greater than 0.5" (Roush, 2005, 165).  
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desiderata are met, with particular emphasis 
on the indication condition.
R: e is some/good evidence for h if and only if 
"there is a lower bound greater than 1 on [LR] 
and a lower bound greater than 0 on P(e) such 
that P(h|e) is greater than 0."/ "greater than 
some high threshold appropriate to having 
good reason to believe" (Roush, 2005, 183).
Despite its roundabout formulation in terms 
of lower bounds, the definition is logically 
equivalent to the following simpler definition.
(DEF1) e is some [alternatively, good] evidence 
for h if and only if
DC (Discrimination Condition): LR > 1
IC (Indication Condition): P(h|e) > 0.5 
[alternatively, P(h|e) > a, where a is some 
chosen level greater than 0.5]
But this definition does not sit well with other 
statements made by Roush:
"An obvious solution … is to adopt as a 
second condition for e to be evidence the 
demand that …P(h|e), be high. However, that 
is merely a restatement of our desideratum." 
(emphasis added, Roush, 2005, 166).
Also, the lack of reference to a lower bound 
on P(e) in (DEF1) ignores the importance 
Roush attributes to evidence being probable:
R-addendum: "high P(e) is not necessary but 
is ideal" (Roush, 2005, 183).
This suggests that (DEF1) is not an adequate 
interpretation of Roush’s definition of 
evidence. An alternative, more suitable 
definition can be discerned by careful 
consideration of Roush’s graphical analysis, 
where she uses a series of graphs to explain 
the connection between lower bounds on 
LR and P(e) and IC. These are based on 
an identity that she establishes using the 
probability axioms:
A.  P(h|e) = [LR-P(e|h)/P(e)]/[LR-1].
She points out that A implies facts about 
how P(h|e) can increase under special 
circumstances. The special circumstances are 
that 
(1) LR>1
(2) LR is held fixed  
(3) P(e|h) is held fixed.
Note that this implies that P(e|¬h) is also fixed. 
Given these three conditions it follows from 
A that
B. P(h|e) increases with increasing P(e). 
Roush elaborates on B defending her  
advice that P(e) should ideally be high by 
taking the reader through a series of graphs 
and formulae. 
 
We summarize her eight graphs in Figure 1.
 
Her graph for P(e) = 0.4 is the one she 
presents first. On it is displayed a shaded 
area above the P(e) = 0.4 line in Figure 1, 
representing the continuum of lines graphing 
P(h|e) versus LR for the continuum of values 
of P(e) possible above P(e) = 0.4.  
She explains:
"This graph presents a convenient lower limit for 
the trends that we will see when we increase LR 
and P(e). The result is this: this surface bounds 
from below in the [P(h|e)] dimension every graph 
with LR>1 and P(e)>0.4, and as these terms 
increase the [P(h|e)] term increases. That is, as LR 
and P(e) increase above 1 and 0.4 respectively 
the value of P(h|e), for any given values of P(e|h) 
and the LR, monotonically rises to 1. We can see 
why this is by inspecting the equation
P(h|e) = [LR – P(e|h)/P(e)]/(LR-1)
If we suppose that the LR is some fixed value 
greater than 1, then P(e|h) will be greater than 
or equal to P(e)… In other words, increasing 
P(e) with fixed or rising LR will have the effect 
of increasing P(h|e)." (Roush, 2005, 168)
This means that with fixed LR, high enough 
P(e) guarantees whatever value of P(h|e) 
is demanded. Specific values for P(h|e) are 
necessary on Roush’s characterization for e 
to be some/good evidence for h. Supposing 
LR> 1, it follows that high enough P(e) is a 
sufficient condition for a condition (viz. P(h|e) 
> a) that is necessary for e to be some/good 
evidence for e. High P(e) is not necessary 
though, as Roush herself notes in places. We 
Figure 1 - P(h|e) vs. LR for various fixed P(e) with P(e|h) = 1
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stress this because we found some comments 
in her text that could be misleading on this.8 
Roush’s graphical analysis also suggests a 
corresponding definition of evidence. In her 
analysis, the lower bounds on LR and P(e) that 
are sufficient for IC are independent of the 
value of P(e|h). Indeed, she states as much: 
"Through graphing P(e|h), P(e) and the LR, 
we have found a result that is independent 
of P(e|h) and depends only on P(e) and LR." 
(Roush, 2005, 168) Though she does not 
say this explicitly, this suggests that Roush 
intends the lower bounds on LR and P(e) in 
her definition of evidence to be independent 
of the value of P(e|h). To construct a 
corresponding formal definition of evidence, 
it is first instructive to construct lower-bound 
conditions equivalent to DC and IC. In the 
appendix we prove:
C.  DC and IC if and only if there exist x > 1, y 
> 0 and 0<z ≤ 1 such that
(i)LR  ≥  x  
(ii)P(e) >  y  
(iii) P(e|h)  ≤  z 
(iv) x - z/y  =  ½ . 
      x - 1
Condition (iii) shows how, given lower 
bounds on P(e) and LR, whether DC and IC 
are met depends on P(e|h). Roush’s apparent 
desire to construct a definition of evidence in 
terms of lower bounds that are independent 
of P(e|h) suggests the following natural 
move: To stipulate that z=1 so that condition 
(iii) becomes P(e|h)≤1, which always holds 
regardless of the value of P(e|h). This suggests 
defining evidence this way:9
(DEF 2) e is some [alternatively, good] 
evidence for h if and only if there exist x > 1,   
y > 0 such that 
(i)LR  ≥  x  
(ii)P(e) >  y  
(iii)  x - 1/y  =  ½ 
       x -1
[alternatively  x-1/y = a for appropriate a>½]      
                     x -1                                         
        
(DEF2) fits Roush’s roundabout expression 
and gives P(e|h)-independent lower bounds in 
line with her graphical analysis. It also makes 
explicit a trade-off: As the lower bound on 
LR strengthens, the lower bound on P(e) can 
weaken and vice versa. Given this trade-off, 
high P(e) is not necessary for e to be evidence, 
since for any low y there is a sufficiently high 
x that ensures that e is evidence. Yet for any 
given x, a higher y raises the lower bound on 
P(h|e) setting out how more probable evidence 
is ideal. In these ways the above definition of 
evidence neatly fits Roush’s discussion.
In this definition  IC and DC are necessary but 
not sufficient for evidence as can be seen in 
the following probability distribution:
P(e) = 0.6001, P(h) = 0.8,  LR= 2
For this distribution P(h|e) ≈ 8/9. But e is not 
evidence because the lower bound on P(e) 
would have to be less than 0.6001. By (iii) this 
implies that the lower bound on LR would 
have to be greater than 21/3, which is false. 
This example shows that this version of Roush’s 
definition has an undesirable consequence of 
ruling out some cases where e is probable and 
IC and DC are met. Why shouldn’t e count as 
evidence in cases like this?  
What is missing here is why a definition of 
evidence should be constructed in terms 
of lower bounds of LR and P(e) that are 
independent of the value of P(e|h). Though 
Roush does not explicitly discuss this, one 
candidate answer is that it yields a leverage 
advantage by it allowing one to classify 
e as evidence without needing to know 
P(e|h). Roush’s discussion of the leverage 
advantage of using a lower bound on P(e) 
(Roush, 2005, 170) suggests that this may 
be her motivation. However, this leverage 
advantage comes at a cost, since it rules out 
the case above, which seems paradigmatically 
evidence on Roush’s terms (IC and DC are 
met, P(e) is high). Moreover ignorance of 
P(e|h) also makes it hard to evaluate LR!
Finally, it should be stressed that, though 
Roush’s definition requires the existence of 
a lower bound on P(e), it does not require 
that evidence be probable at all, since the 
lower bound on P(e) can – provided LR is 
high enough – be arbitrarily close to zero. So, 
although probable evidence is defended by 
Roush as ideal, it is not a necessary condition 
of evidence as she defines it. We think 
this is an advantage, since we now defend 
improbable evidence.
3. In defense of improbable evidence
We find in Roush three major arguments that 
high P(e) is ideal:
* The argument from equation A and the 
accompanying graphs.
* An argument against a simple story of 
Bayesian updating. 
* High P(e) has a leveraging advantage for 
finding P(h).
The first argument seems most suited to a 
relevance sense of evidence, but we discuss it 
in section 3.1 more or less on its own grounds 
without putting weight on our view that there 
are three different senses of evidence involved 
in Roush’s discussion. The second argument 
seems geared to knowledge as a grounds 
for knowledge. Bayesian updating allows 
that surprising evidence – in the sense of 
evidence with low probability – can increase 
the degree of belief in a hypothesis more than 
non-surprising evidence. Roush’s discussion 
seems to suppose that this is incompatible 
with her view that evidence should have high 
probability. We address this in Sect. 3.2. Sect. 
3.3 briefly considers other shorter defences 
Roush offers for high P(e). We take up 
leveraging in Sect. 4.
3.1 Low probability evidence can satisfy DC 
and IC maximally
We assume, for the sake of argument, that 
high P(e) is a reasonable requirement on 
evidence as a ground to knowledge.  But we 
8 For instance, when she says "my proposal, then, is that the second condition on evidence, the indication condition, be a 
lower bound on the value of P(e)". Or just after, "there are three broad questions to ask about this idea…a third is whether 
high P(e) is plausibly a necessary condition for evidence, since there seem to be counterexamples" (Roush, 2005, 171). 
9 This reading is in accord with suggestions from an anonymous referee.
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do not see how it can be taken as an ideal 
way to satisfy the definition Roush offers, 
which at any rate we think is best seen as a 
reasonable candidate for defining a relevance 
notion of evidence. For despite Roush’s 
proposal, a lower probability claim can make 
for better evidence using her own criteria.  
Suppose P(e|h) = 1,10 which is one way to 
model "h explains e" in the deductive-
nomological account of explanation. Then 
Bayes Theorem reduces to
D. P(h|e) = P(h)/P(e).
Since P(e|h) = 1, it is follows that
E.  P(e)  = P(h) + P(e|¬h)P(¬h)
and so
F.  P(h|e) = P(h) / [P(h) + P(e|¬h)P(¬h)].
Given P(e|h) = 1 it also follows that
G.  LR = 1/P(e|¬h).
So lowering P(e) by lowering P(e|¬h) 
simultaneously produces improvements in LR 
and in P(h|e), making e better evidence for h 
on both Roush’s criteria. While it is true, as 
she concludes, that "increasing P(e) with fixed 
or rising LR will have the effect of increasing 
P(h|e)" (Roush, 2005, 168), it is equally true 
that decreasing P(e) with rising LR can have 
the effect of increasing P(h|e). Thus the 
graphs hardly provide a strong argument for 
increasing P(e) in order to satisfy the criteria 
for evidence.
 
Not only can lowering P(e) raise both LR and 
P(h|e), but both conditions DC and IC can be 
maximally satisfied while P(e) takes any value 
whatsoever. Suppose e is a perfect sign of 
h; ie, e ≡ h. Then P(h|e)=1 and LR is infinitely 
high, but P(e) can be as small or as large as 
one would like. This example has another nice 
aspect. Whenever there are two independent 
criteria for the same thing, trade-offs may be 
required, but here a trade-off is avoided. In 
this case (or any case with fixed P(e|h)) less 
probable evidence can be better evidence by 
both criteria at once.  
We should also note that Roush’s graphical 
arguments for high P(e) depend on the 
asymmetry with which she treats the two 
independent criteria for evidence. Suppose 
e is "candidate" evidence for h in the sense 
that DC is well satisfied (ie, LR is high). Then 
high P(e) is sufficient for the satisfaction of 
IC.  But the exactly symmetric claim is not 
true. Suppose e is "candidate" evidence for 
h in the sense that IC is well satisfied. Then it 
is not true that high P(e) is sufficient for the 
satisfaction of DC.11  So high P(e) is useful for 
obtaining high P(h|e) when LR is sufficiently 
10 Similar examples can be generated for any fixed non-zero value of P(e|h). Note that given P(e|h) = 1, e is evidence if and 
only if it satisfies DC and IC.
11 See theorem 2 in the appendix.
12 We have not here rehearsed Roush’s arguments for DC and IC but we don’t find anything in them that gives a reason 
to treat the two in this different way.
13 See, for example, Howson and Urbach (2005, p.97).
high, but high P(e) is not sufficient for high LR 
when P(h|e) is high. Yet there seems to be no 
special reason for considering either criterion 
differently from the other.12 
3.2 A Bayesian defense of improbable 
evidence and a frequency defence of  
probable evidence
As a prelude to our arguments, we first set out 
two distinct analyses on how the probability 
of evidence relates to the probability of the 
hypothesis. The first is Roush’s while the 
second is an analysis often presented to 
support the conventional claim that evidence 
with a lower probability makes a hypothesis 
more probable (all else being equal) than 
evidence with a higher probability.  
Section 2 described Roush’s argument that 
if LR is sufficiently high a lower bound on 
P(e) is sufficient for a lower bound on P(h|e). 
Importantly, given Roush’s constraints – P(e|h) 
fixed and LR fixed (>1)) – P(e) increases if and 
only if P(h) increases.  
A second analysis, one conventionally used in 
discussions of the greater confirmation power 
of surprising evidence, 13follows from Bayes 
Theorem:
 P(h|e) = P(h)P(e|h)/P(e)
In this case, assuming P(e|h) and P(h) are 
fixed, P(h|e) increases as P(e) decreases. In this 
case, LR must increase and P(e|¬h) decrease 
when P(e) decreases. Labelling evidence that 
has lower probability as "more surprising", 
this result shows that the more surprising e is, 
the higher P(h|e) is.
These two analyses can be summarised as 
follows:
Since both analyses follow from the 
Analysis Fixed Factors Change 
to P(e)
Resulting 
change in 
P(h|e
Resulting changes in other 
factors
Roush LR (>1), 
P(e|h)
P(e) increases P(h|e) 
increases
P(h) increases, 
P(e|¬h) fixed
Conventional P(e|h), P(h) P(e) decreases P(h|e) 
increases
LR increases, P(e|¬h) 
decreases
Table 1 – Two analyses of relationship between P(e) and P(h|e)
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probability axioms, there is no contradiction 
between them despite their apparently 
conflicting conclusions as to the relationship 
between changes in P(e) and changes in 
P(h|e). As the table makes clear, the difference 
is due to different factors being held fixed.  
This is just arithmetic with probabilities. 
However, both analyses are used to make 
arguments as to the significance of the 
probability of evidence. The conventional 
analysis is used to argue, via Bayesian 
updating, that the more surprising evidence 
is, the more confirmation it lends to the 
hypothesis once learned. This clearly 
involves evidence in the sense of grounds to 
knowledge. Roush’s is used to support her 
claims that more probable evidence is "ideal" 
and if there is to be a conflict at all, this must 
involve evidence in the same sense. To clarify 
the dispute we shall first consider what Roush’s 
analysis looks like in a "Bayesian" framework, 
then what it looks like in a "frequentist" 
framework. By a "Bayesian framework" we 
mean one in which probabilities represent 
degrees of belief and in which on learning a 
new fact e, probabilities are "updated" by 
changing from the "prior" probability (labelled 
Pi(•)) to a new "posterior" probability (labelled 
Pf(•)) by the rule: Pf(•) = Pi(•|e).  
Interpreted in a Bayesian way, Roush’s analysis 
can then be expressed as follows. If the agent 
holds a higher prior degree of belief in e, 
but the same values for Pi(e|h) and Pi(e|¬h), 
then on learning e the agent would have a 
higher posterior degree of belief in h than 
would have been the case had the agent 
learned e while holding the lower prior belief 
in e.  Though this is a consistent Bayesian 
account of how higher priors in e can be 
advantageous for obtaining a higher posterior 
in h on learning e, there is problem.  The 
agent can only have the higher prior in e, 
given the other fixed conditional probabilities, 
if the agent also has a higher prior in the 
hypothesis.  This follows from the fact that 
the higher Pi(e) also implies a higher Pi(h) 
given the factors Roush holds fixed.  There 
is then no reason to attribute the higher 
posterior in the hypothesis to the higher prior 
in the evidence (as Roush would like) rather 
than to the higher prior Pi(h). 
In contrast the conventional analysis avoids this 
difficulty. Here Pi(h) is fixed when comparing the 
cases where evidence has low and high prior 
degrees of belief.  Thus the higher posterior 
degree of belief in h once e has been learned is 
attributable to the lower prior degree of belief 
in the evidence under the conventional view.  
Indeed, this is just the Bayesian story as to why 
surprising evidence confirms more: Evidence 
with a lower prior once learned raises the 
posterior in the hypothesis more assuming fixed 
values for the probability for the hypothesis and 
for the conditional probability of the evidence 
given the hypothesis.
Unsurprisingly perhaps, given this tension 
between her analysis and a Bayesian 
interpretation, Roush rejects the premise that 
P(h) should be fixed when comparing high and 
low probability evidence. Instead she takes it 
that high P(e) should make a difference to P(h) 
before learning that e is the case:
"Your degree of belief in e prior to the 
conditionalisation is just P(e), so high P(e) is 
(almost) sufficient for you to take e as evidence 
for whatever e happens to be positively relevant 
to, that is, to conditionalize upon it.  Roughly, 
if you are confident of e, then you ought to let 
your other beliefs feel the appropriate effects of 
e’s truth" (Roush, 2005, 174)
However, for a Bayesian this is irrational, since 
if P(e) is less than one then this means that 
the agent does not believe e is certain and 
would not rationally "let [their] other beliefs 
feel the appropriate effects of e’s truth".14  
Roush, however, takes her unorthodox 
interpretation of Bayesian updating to be 
virtuous, since it fits with her view that for e 
to be evidence for anything else it must itself 
be probable: 
"It seems to me inescapable that in order for 
the value of P(e) that precedes Bayesian strict 
conditionalization to justify Bayesian strict 
conditionalization P(e) must be high" (Roush, 
2005, 174).
It is as if Roush supposes that Bayesians have a 
three-step process. Agents begin with degrees 
of belief represented by the "antecedent" 
probability Pi. At the first step they observe e. 
At the second they decide on this basis that 
the probability of e should be 1. Because the 
probability of e is 1 they are justified, at the third 
step, in changing their degrees of belief to those 
represented by the "posterior" probability Pf. 
But of course Bayesians do not take three steps, 
only two. They observe e at the first step and 
at the second, revise their probabilities in one 
fell swoop to Pf, which among other features 
sets the probability of e to 1.  For the Bayesian 
the new probability is justified by learning e, 
not by the fact that one has become confident 
of e (ie, already set the probability of e high). 
The posterior probability is an expression of 
one’s confidence, not a justification of it. The 
Bayesian is far more objective here than Roush 
would have it:  It is observations that justify new 
degrees of belief, not simply one’s antecedent 
degrees of confidence.
These difficulties suggest a possible fix: Do not 
assume e is certain when it is not, but use Jeffrey 
conditionalization, under which Pf(•) = Pi(•|e)
Pf(e) + Pi(•|¬e)Pf(¬e). With this approach one 
might be able to argue that it is better to have a 
higher prior in the evidence, assuming identical 
Pi(e|h) and Pi(e|¬h), than otherwise. However, as 
it happens this runs into the same difficulty as 
the strict conditionalization case, namely a higher 
prior in the hypothesis is implied when there is 
a higher prior in the evidence. Thus even with 
Jeffrey conditionalization, the higher posterior 
cannot be attributed to the higher prior in the 
evidence.15
Perhaps a resolution lies elsewhere. In 
her examples, 16Roush describes scientists 
14 Note that Jeffrey conditionalization does not help here, since conditionalization on the original value of P(e) does not 
lead to any change in the degrees of belief, and conditionalizing on a different value of P(e) is inconsistent with the agent’s 
degree of belief in e.
15 This is as one would expect given that it is a generalisation of the strict Bayesian case already discussed.
16 Such as the Rutherford example (Roush, 2005, 174) and her hypothetical medical test example (Roush, 2005, 171).
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or doctors finding out that the evidence 
is probable, arguing that having a high 
probability here is important. This may 
suggest that the way to make sense of the 
importance of probable evidence for Roush 
is take evidence to be probable once the 
agent has become confident of it, that is, 
to take her demand that the probability 
of the evidence to be high to refer to the 
posterior rather than prior probability of 
the evidence. 17This would assume Jeffrey 
conditionalization, since in the strict updating 
case the posterior of the evidence is always 
one, so more or less probable evidence 
cannot be modelled.18
At first blush, this modified approach looks 
promising. To see why, assume identical 
priors in the evidence and in the hypothesis 
in order to allow one to attribute the greater 
confirmation power to the higher probability 
of evidence. With Jeffrey conditionalization, 
the higher the posterior in the evidence, the 
higher the posterior in the hypothesis.19 Yet 
this is not consistent with Roush’s analysis, 
since under these assumed conditions, Pi(h|e) 
(which under Jeffrey conditionalization 
equals Pf(h|e)) must be the same across the 
comparison of higher and lower probability 
evidence. Moreover, this proposed analysis 
amounts to an argument that it is better 
to learn more probable evidence because it 
raises the posterior in the hypothesis more. 
But since P(h|e) is unchanged, this is not an 
argument that probable evidence makes 
for better evidence in a relevance sense. It 
is rather an argument that learning more 
probable evidence makes for better grounds-
for-knowledge evidence since it leads to a 
higher posterior in h. But that more probable 
evidence makes for better grounds for 
knowledge is not in dispute.20 
Turn finally to the frequency perspective on 
probability, from which Roush’s argument 
for probable evidence can be made sense of. 
Consider two populations where event-types h 
and e both occur, where P(e|h) and P(e|¬h) are 
the same across both populations, and where 
LR>1. It follows by Roush’s analysis that if e is 
more long-run frequent – in this sense more 
probable – in the first population, then the 
probability that h occurs in the subpopulation 
where e occurs must also be greater for that 
population. This shows that if an event-type is 
more probable (in the frequency sense), it must 
also be more positively relevant to h, assuming 
P(e|h) and P(e|¬h) are the same (again in the 
frequency sense).
Note that by contrast with the Bayesian cases 
above, the fact that h must also be more 
probable in the population where e is more 
probable is not a problem. Far from it, h’s 
being more probable in the first population 
shows that, in addition to more probable 
evidence making for better relevance evidence 
(in that P(h|e) is higher), it makes for better 
grounds for knowledge in that  P(h) is higher. 
We must be careful, however, about what 
claim "h" represents. That P(h) is higher in one 
population than another gives better grounds 
for knowledge of the claim that a randomly 
drawn member of that population will be an 
h.  Likewise the other probabilities, P(e) and 
conditional probabilities, must be interpreted 
accordingly for the same population.21 
Finally, it is important to emphasise that not 
all of Roush’s examples of hypotheses can 
be construed as event-types occurring in 
(ideally) "infinite" populations. Nor can most 
hypotheses for which we wish to have a theory 
of evidence. There are notorious and well-
rehearsed difficulties in applying this kind of 
frequentist account to hypotheses of arbitrary 
form, which we need not repeat here.
3.3 What we conclude about Roush’s 
defences of high P(e)
In conclusion, independently of her 
arguments about tracking knowledge (which 
we turn to in section 5), Roush defends her 
claim that P(e) be high in order for e to be 
evidence for anything on three fronts. The 
first involves arguments based on formula 
A. and the accompanying graphs. These, we 
have argued, provide weak grounds for the 
demand, if any at all. On the second front 
she attempts to defuse arguments to the 
opposite conclusion, that P(e) should be low. 
One of her arguments on this front is that 
Bayesians need high P(e) to warrant updating 
degrees of belief. We have countered that this 
argument rests on a mistake about the nature 
of Bayesian conditionalization. In a further 
attempt to reconcile Roush’s arguments for 
probable evidence with Bayesianism, we also 
considered Jeffrey conditionalization. The first 
case considered, Jeffrey conditionalization 
with a higher prior in the evidence, 
entailed a higher prior in the hypothesis 
undermining the attribution the greater 
confirmation power to the higher probability 
of the evidence. The second case, Jeffrey 
conditionalization with a higher posterior 
in the evidence, entailed a higher posterior 
in the hypothesis with P(h|e) unchanged, 
thus showing how learning more probable 
evidence can be beneficial in a grounds-for-
knowledge rather than relevance sense.  
17 Such a reading also fits well with some of Roush’s comments: "P(e) reports actual degree of belief, not how much you 
expected at some prior stage that you would believe e at this stage" (Roush, 2005, 175).
18 Yet another option would be to move to Jeffrey conditionalization, take P(e) to be a posterior but stick to something 
akin to Roush’s three-step updating by allowing the updating to P(e) before updating other degrees of belief on e. This 
might better describe how beliefs change in practice and could also help modelling "old evidence" situations, since old 
evidence could be modelled as evidence which has already been updated upon specifically, but which has not been 
updated upon generally. However, this approach also requires that the agent hold incoherent degrees of belief which 
undesirable when one is arguing for a normative model of belief, as Roush is doing.
19 This follows immediately from the formula for Jeffrey conditionalization:  ie, the greater Pf(e) is (assuming LRi>1), the 
greater Pf(h) will be.
20 A final attempt to find a suitable Bayesian interpretation of Roush’s argument might be to try to show that a higher 
posterior in the evidence after Jeffrey conditionalization makes for higher Pf(h|e) assuming identical posteriors for Pf(e|h), 
Pf(e|¬h) such that LRf>1 in line with Roush’s formal analysis. We then know, from Roush, that Pf(h|e) must be greater 
when Pf(e) is greater. But this also fails to give a plausible Bayesian argument for probable evidence since it implies a 
higher prior in the hypothesis for the case where one learns the more probable evidence (see theorem 4 in appendix). 
21 The importance of taking care when interpreting the probabilities can be seen in Eric Barnes’ recent criticism of Roush’s 
medical example (Roush, 2005, 171) where he argues that she equivocates in her interpretation of P(e). See Barnes (2008, 
554-555) for details.
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In addition to these two fronts, Roush 
points out that with LR>1 as the criterion, 
as opposed to P(h|e) > P(h), e can still 
discriminate even if it has probability very 
close to 1. She also offers an alternative 
interpretation to some examples of Peter 
Achinstein that were supposed to provide 
cases where "it is the very improbability of 
e that makes it evidence for h" (p.176). All 
these show either that P(e) need not be small 
or that it is no harm for it to be big.  This is in 
line with the view that follows from DC and 
IC, that the probability of e is irrelevant to 
whether e is evidence or not.  
The only positive argument for evidence – 
in a relevance sense – to be probable was 
revealed when we considered a frequentist 
interpretation of Roush’s argument. Here it 
was shown that higher probability evidence 
can be beneficial both in a grounds-for-
knowledge and relevance sense. This positive 
result, however, is somewhat tempered by 
the well-known limitations of frequentism for 
assigning probabilities to hypotheses.
4. Leveraging
We want to use evidence for h to arrive at an 
assessment of P(h) – that’s what evidence is 
supposed to be good for. If the ultimate aim is 
to use the evidence to arrive at an assessment 
of P(h), it should not be necessary to assign a 
value to P(h) in order either to assess P(e) or to 
assess whether e is evidence for h. In Roush’s 
terminology, we should leverage to P(h) by using 
information other than P(h).
For Roush, evidence must meet both DC and 
IC. To assess if DC is met, it is sufficient to assess 
LR and the usual and most immediate way to 
do this is to assess P(e|h) and P(e|¬h).  Formula 
A shows that all that is required in addition to 
assess whether IC is met is an assessment of P(e). 
And the discussion following it shows that high 
enough P(e) ensures IC, given that DC is met.  So 
an ideal way to satisfy DC and IC is for P(e) to 
be high. If we know this, we can know that e is 
evidence for h without having to assess P(h).  
Leveraging is an idea we entirely endorse [cf. 
Cartwright (2009)]. Indeed the importance of 
leveraging cannot be stressed enough when it 
comes to considerations of the use of evidence, 
considerations that we think philosophers need 
to keep centrally in view in developing accounts 
of what evidence "really is". Both pure science 
and policy want to use evidence for h to help 
to arrive at a reliable estimate of P(h). This gives 
yet another argument, based on the idea of 
leveraging, for concentrating as Roush does on 
the size of P(e).  
Suppose one has gone down the route of 
demanding that evidence must have a high 
likelihood ratio, as she supposes, or as many 
others suppose, must satisfy a relevance 
requirement, like P(h|e) > P(h|¬e). In both 
cases, once it is known that either of these 
requirements is met by knowing the relevant 
conditional probabilities, it remains only 
to learn P(e) to fix P(h) because both the 
following formulae are true:
 
 P(h) = P(h|e)P(e) + P(h|¬e)(1-P(e))
 P(h) =   P(e)-P(e|¬h)
             P(e|h)-P(e|¬h)  
So from the point of view of leveraging, 
if one must know P(e) in order for e to be 
usable as evidence (as one must given Roush’s 
requirement that P(e) is high), demanding 
knowledge either of the components of the 
likelihood ratio or the components of the 
relevance difference is enough. No additional 
requirements are needed, such as DC. More 
may be needed to characterize what it is for 
e to be "relevant to" the truth of h, that is, 
for our second sense of evidence. But they are 
not needed for leveraging, which can make 
do with far less. This is why we think it is 
important to prise the two notions apart and 
to allow different accounts for them  
In particular, for leveraging, tacking on 
requirements from the other senses of 
evidence can be highly restrictive. When 
it comes to calculating a given target 
probability, any kind of information that 
does the job is as good as any other. It all 
depends on what probability assignments 
we already accept  or can efficiently find 
out. The calculus of probability constrains 
the relations among probabilistic facts, but 
a large variety of combinations can fix the 
value for a given target. This suggests that 
no particular constraints should be put on 
what probabilistic facts should be counted as 
evidence when it is evidence as leverage to 
targeted probabilities that is at stake.22  
Leveraging has two aspects, of which we have 
so far discussed only one. For evidence of h 
to be of genuine use, not only should it help 
us calculate P(h), but it should also be more 
accessible than P(h) itself.  From this point 
of view we should like to comment, albeit 
briefly, on a deep and controversial position 
that Roush defends: that evidence should be 
characterized entirely in terms of probability.  
Roush argues that this should be done in order 
to avoid introducing concepts in the explication 
of "evidence" that are even more obscure than 
"evidence" itself.  Indeed, she claims, concepts 
are often offered in explication of "evidence" 
themselves generally receive their clearest 
explication in terms of probabilities. Explanatory 
relevance is a prime example.
We take issue with this last claim, since it 
has been argued at length that causation, 
and thereby causal explanation and thereby 
explanation in general, cannot be given a 
purely probabilistic explication.23 But that 
is not the issue we would like to point to 
here. Rather we worry about the fact that 
probabilities are hard to come by. It is for 
this reason that we urge that the project of 
explicating "evidence" should start a big step 
before the starting position of Roush and 
others who offer purely probabilistic accounts. 
For the purposes of both pure science and 
policy it is standard practice – and a practice 
we would wish to defend – to first gather the 
evidence and then to use it to assess various 
probabilities, eg, P(h), P(h|e), P(h|¬e), P(e|h) 
or P(e|¬h). And for this we need guidelines 
about what counts as evidence that are not 
couched in terms of probabilities. One might 
think of these guidelines as an approach 
to our second notion of evidence as a two-
place relevance relation. But it also helps 
with the accessibility aspect of leveraging, 
22 Note too that in this case it is not knowledge of events that is being employed but rather knowledge of their probabilities.
23 Cf., among works by many authors, Cartwright (1979) and Cartwright (1989).
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since the idea is to isolate those kinds of 
facts that will help in the assessment of the 
otherwise difficult to reach probabilities. This, 
however, is a project much in its infancy in the 
contemporary philosophical literature.
5. Evidence and Tracking
What is the connection between tracking and 
evidence as Roush defines it, and what role 
does high P(e) play in it? Very roughly, x tracks 
y means that x and y are correlated: They 
both obtain or fail to obtain together. Roush is 
concerned with the kinds of cases common in 
philosophy of science in which a subject comes 
to know h via believing evidence e. For this she 
maintains that high P(e) is required because
"...in this trajectory for knowing h not only is h 
true but also b(h) TRACKS b(e), b(e) TRACKS e, 
and e TRACKS h.  Now, if h is true – as it must 
be for anyone to know it – and e TRACKS h 
then it is unlikely that e is false." (Roush, 2005, 
153) [b(x) = "The agent believes x."]
This involves claims about beliefs whereas the 
relationship between evidence and hypothesis 
does not involve belief. As one would expect 
therefore, the relevant concept of tracking for 
evidence is different. Following Roush (p.150) 
it can be formulated as follows 
Evidence e tracks a hypothesis h at 
level u (< 1) if and only if
 TR1. P(e|h) > u
 TR2. P(e|¬h) < 1- u.
For Roush, it is important that evidence tracks 
the hypothesis because that ensures – provided 
u is high enough and other tracking relations 
are met – the desirable epistemic goal that 
belief in the hypothesis tracks the hypothesis.24
Note that one could take TR1 and TR2 
to define evidence and call it "tracking 
evidence".  By definition then, evidence 
would track the hypothesis and it would, 
following Roush (p.154), meet intuitive 
indication and discrimination conditions. 
Tracking evidence is also an example of a 
relevance concept of evidence. Here whether 
or not e is tracking evidence for h depends 
purely on the relationship between e and h, 
and the probabilities of e and h are no part 
of the characterization.  Moreover, it has 
the nice property that when e is tracking 
evidence, then P(e) and P(h) must be close in 
value.  But, whether P(e) and P(h) are high or 
low is independent of whether e is tracking 
evidence for h.   
Given the attractive properties of the tracking 
definition, one may wonder why Roush does 
not adopt it. In short, Roush (n.7, p.160) 
explains that she does not define evidence 
in this tracking way because so defined, e 
being evidence for h does not imply P(h|e) 
> 0.5.Thus e can be evidence for h and yet 
fail to provide adequate reason to believe h. 
Nevertheless Roush does not relinquish the 
aim that evidence should track the hypothesis. 
So it is important to ask whether evidence as 
she defines it meets the tracking requirement. 
It is not hard to see that it does not always 
do so. The probability distribution specified 
by P(e) = 0.2, P(h) = 0.9, LR = 19  has P(h|e) = 
0.994, P(e|h) = 0.22 and P(e|¬h) = 0.012. It is 
evidence under Roush’s definition, but given 
the low value of P(e|h), e does not track h.  
More generally, the relationship between 
Roush’s definition of evidence and tracking 
can be made clearer using two simple bounds 
on P(e|h) and P(¬e|h).25
(i) 1/LR ≥ P(e|¬h)   
(ii) P(e)/P(h) ≥ P(e|h) > P(e) 
When LR is sufficiently high, bound (i) implies 
that P(e|¬h) must be low and thus that TR2 
will be met. Likewise, bound (ii) shows that a 
high P(e) is sufficient for TR1. This fits Roush’s 
analysis well, since high LR and P(e) are shown 
together to be sufficient for evidence to track. 
Moreover, the higher LR and P(e) are, the 
better the tracking will be. However, bound 
(ii) also shows how tracking can fail when P(e) 
is significantly smaller than P(h) since then 
P(e|h) must be small so TR2 fails. This is what 
happens in the example above.
The relationship between Roush’s evidence 
and tracking suggests another rationale for 
imposing a lower bound on P(e): to ensure 
that evidence tracks the hypothesis.  However, 
doing this does not just imply tracking. To see 
why, recall that tracking evidence is a relevance 
concept.  However, when supplemented with 
a requirement that P(e) be high, one can infer 
that P(h) must also be (quite) high in virtue of 
e tracking h. Therefore, imposing a high lower 
bound on P(e) ensures e tracks h and thus that 
P(h) is high,26  which is what is required for 
a grounds-for-knowledge concept. So high 
probability of evidence plays a double role, 
which arguably leads to a conflation absent 
in the simple tracking concept of evidence. 
Probable evidence makes evidence track the 
hypothesis, a feature characteristic of evidence 
in the relevance sense, and simultaneously 
makes evidence a ground for knowledge. 
To finish, it is interesting to note that Roush’s 
failure to define evidence so that it implies 
that evidence tracks a hypothesis need not 
be a serious problem for her concept of 
evidence. Tracking evidence is extremely 
powerful when one has it, since if one knows 
the evidence is false, then one can be pretty 
sure the hypothesis is false, and conversely. 
This, though highly desirable, is rarely met in 
practice. Often evidence speaks for the truth 
of a hypothesis when we know it to hold, but 
when false does not say much for the falsity 
for the hypothesis. For example, let
h: Jill murdered Jack
e: Jill’s fingerprints are on the murder weapon.
In this case, e is intuitively evidence for h.  
However, e does not track h: Suppose that 
Jill is a careful, intelligent person and if she 
24 This follows from the "transitivity enough" property of the tracking relation (Roush, 2005, 151-152).
25 The bounds are derived as follows.  First, LR = P(e|h)/P(e|¬h), so P(e|¬h) = P(e|h)/LR.  But since P(e|h) ≤ 1, it follows that 
P(e|¬h) ≤ 1/LR.  Second, P(e|h) = P(e&h)/P(h), but P(e&h) ≤ P(e) because e&h => e, so P(e|h) ≤ P(e)/P(h).  Finally because LR>1, 
it follows that P(e|h) > P(e).
26 When LR>1, 1 ≥ P(e|h)-P(e|¬h) > 0.  But given P(h)=[P(e)-P(e|¬h)]/[P(e|h)-P(e|¬h)] it follows that P(h) ≥ P(e) – P(e|¬h).  Since 
high P(e) ensures tracking,  P(e|¬h) is low and thus P(h) must be at least almost as high as P(e).
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had decided to murder someone she would 
have used gloves, so P(e|h) is low. Given a 
plausible probability distribution assignment 
to e and h here, e would be good evidence 
for h. So Roush’s concept of evidence models 
this situation well. In contrast, the tracking 
concept is overly strong and rules the 
fingerprints out as evidence.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have clarified Roush’s 
definition of evidence and critically analyzed 
her arguments that evidence should be 
probable.  Roush’s first argument, based 
on formula A and the associated graphs, 
we think is weak.  These show that high 
P(e) is sufficient but not necessary for e to 
be evidence. As we have shown, both of 
Roush’s criteria for evidence can be met 
maximally and P(e) take any value at all. Our 
attempts to reconcile Roush’s arguments 
for probable evidence with Bayesianism at 
best show that probable evidence makes for 
better grounds-for-knowledge evidence. In 
our analysis only a frequentist interpretation 
supports an argument that more probable 
evidence makes for better relevance evidence, 
but this is limited to cases where frequentist 
probabilities can be applied.
The latter part of our paper discussed the 
role of leveraging and the relationship 
between evidence and tracking. We strongly 
agree with Roush on the importance of 
leveraging, particularly when using evidence 
in policy. We have argued, however, that 
Roush’s two criteria for evidence are unduly 
restrictive from a leveraging view.  Almost 
any constraint on P(e) imposes a constraint on 
P(h) and thus serves the purpose of leveraging 
P(h).  As regards tracking we showed that 
evidence as Roush defines it can fail to 
tracks the hypothesis.  If Roush’s definition 
is supplemented with a requirement that 
evidence be probable then evidence does 
track the hypothesis. This suggests another 
reason why Roush may see probable evidence 
as ideal.  However, since the concept of 
tracking evidence is restrictive this provides 
weak grounds at best for taking probable 
evidence as ideal.
In sum it may be the case that high probability 
is a good thing to require of evidence if 
evidence is to be a ground for knowledge, 
but when the aim is to assess more accessible 
probabilities to leverage to P(h), high P(e) 
has no special advantage. And when a two-
place relevance relation is at stake, we think a 
convincing argument has not yet been made.
Appendix
Theorem 1
LR > 1 and P(h|e) > a > 0 if and only if there 
exist x>1, 1 > y > 0 and 0 <z ≤ 1 such that
(i)LR    ≥  x  
(ii) P(e) >  y  
(iii) P(e|h)  ≤  z 
(iv) x – z/y  = a > 0
      x – 1
Proof "if"
First, (i) and x>1 imply LR > 1.  
Roush derives the following useful formula 
from the axioms of probability:
P(h|e) =  LR - P(e|h)/P(e) … (1)
                 LR – 1
Solving for P(e) yields
P(e) =          P(e|h)  
     LR (1-P(h|e)) + P(h|e)
which with (ii) implies
 
          P(e|h)                  >  y
 LR (1-P(h|e)) + P(h|e)
=> P(e|h) > yLR(1-P(h|e)) + yP(h|e)
which with (iii) implies
 z > yLR(1-P(h|e)) + yP(h|e)
=> [z/y – P(h|e)]/(1-P(h|e)) > LR
Given (i), this then implies that
 [z/y – P(h|e)]/(1-P(h|e)) > x
=> z/y > x(1-P(h|e)) + P(h|e)
=> z/y > x - P(h|e)(x – 1)
=>  P(h|e)(x-1) > x – z/y
=> P(h|e) > (x – z/y)/(x -1)
Finally, (iv) then implies that 
 P(h|e) > a > 0
"only if"
Let z = P(e|h) so (iii) holds.  From (1) it follows 
that
P(h|e) =  LR – z/P(e)   … (2)
 LR – 1
Define the following function
f(p,q) = p – z/q  for  LR ≥ p > 1,  P(e) > q > 0.
              p – 1
Given the continuity of the right hand side 
of (2), as p à LR and q à P(e) then G(p,q) 
à P(h|e).  Since P(h|e) > a, it follows by the 
definition of the limit there exist x and y* such 
that  LR ≥ x  > 1 and P(e) > y* > 0 and 
 x - z/y* > a
 x - 1
=>  x- z/y* > a(x-1)
=> x - a(x-1) > z/y*
=>  y* > z/[x-a(x-1)] … (3)
Now define y by y = z/[x-a(x-1)].  
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Given x >1, 0 < z ≤ 1 and 0 <a <1 it follows 
that y > 0, and given (3)  y* > y follows.  
Since P(e) > y* it follows that P(e) > y.    
We have shown that LR ≥ x > 1 and P(e) > y > 
0 and y = z/[(1-a)x + a]. Solving for a yields 
x – z/y  =  a
x – 1
The result follows. ■
Corollary 1
Given LR > 1, P(h|e) > a > 0 if and only if  P(e) 
> P(e|h)/[(1-a)LR + a] > 0.
Proof  
Let x = LR, z = P(e|h) and y = z/[(1-a)x + a].  
For any LR and P(e|h) (i) and (iii) are met and 
(iv) is met by definition of y.   By the theorem 
therefore, P(e) > y if and only if P(h|e) > a > 0.   
The result follows from substitution of P(e|h)/
[(1-a)LR + a] for y. ■
Corollary 2
Given LR > 1, P(h|e) > ½ if and only if and 
P(e)> 2P(e|h)/(LR + 1)
Proof 
Follows from corollary 1 for a = ½. ■
Corollary 3
LR > 1 and P(e) > 1/[(1-a)LR + a] > 0 => P(h|e) 
> a > 0
Proof  
Since 1 ≥  P(e|h),  P(e) > 1/[(1-a)LR + a] > 0 => 
P(e)  > P(e|h)/[(1-a)LR + a] > 0, the result then 
follows from corollary 1. ■
Corollary 4
LR > 1 and P(e)> 2/(LR + 1) =>  P(h|e) > ½ 
Proof 
Follows from corollary 3 for a = ½. ■
Theorem 2
Given LR > 1, for any x > 1 there do not exist 
a and y such that P(h|e) > a and P(e) > y => 
LR > x.   
Proof:   Solving (1) for LR yields
            LR = [P(e|h)/P(e) - P(h|e)]/[1- P(h|e)]
The right hand side is continuous in P(e)  for 
any fixed value of P(e|h) and fixed non-unitary 
value of P(h|e).  Given this it follows that as 
P(e) à P(e|h), LR à 1.  Therefore imposing 
restrictions P(h|e) > a and P(e) > y can not 
imply LR > x for any given x > 1, since one can 
always find a value of P(e) sufficiently close to 
P(e|h) such that x > LR > 1 by the definition of 
the limit.   ■
Theorem 3
Given LR>1, P(e|h) and P(e|¬h) fixed, P(h|¬e) 
strictly increases with P(e).
Proof:
P(h|¬e)= P(h & ¬e)/P(¬e)
        = [P(h) – P(h&e)]/[1-P(e)]
        = [P(h) – P(e)P(h|e)]/[1–P(e)] 
But by Bayes theorem, P(h) = [P(h|e)P(e)]/P(e|h) 
so substituting
P(h|¬e)= P(e)P(h|e)[ 1/P(e|h)  - 1]/[1-P(e)] …  (4)
All the terms in the numerator increase, 
strictly increase or stay constant with 
increasing P(e) given fixed P(e|h), P(e|¬h), 
while the denominator strictly decreases.  
Therefore, P(h|¬e) is a strictly increasing 
function of P(e). ■
Theorem 4
Consider two possible posterior situations 
after updating using Jeffrey conditionalization 
on e.  In one case one updates one’s degrees 
of belief on e to the posterior Pf(e), in the 
other to Pf*(e), where Pf(e) < Pf*(e).
Notation:
Let Pf(●) denote the posteriors obtained by 
updating on Pf(e).
Let Pi(●) denote the priors before updating 
on Pf(e).
Let Pf*(●) denote the posteriors obtained by 
updating on Pf*(e).
Let Pi*(●) denote the priors before updating 
to Pf*(e).
If  
(a) Pf(e|h) = Pf*(e|h)
(b) Pf(e|¬h)=Pf*(e|¬h)
(c) LR=LR*>1.
(d) Pi(e) = Pi*(e).
Then Pi(h) < Pi*(h).
Proof:
General result: in Jeffrey conditionalization 
P(h|e) and P(h|¬e) remain unchanged on 
updating on e.
So Pi(h|e) = Pf(h|e), Pi(h|¬e)=Pf(h|¬e), Pi*(h|e) = 
Pf*(h|e) and Pi*(h|¬e) = Pf*(h|¬e).
By the axioms of probability:
Pi(h) = Pi(h|e)Pi(e) + Pi(h|¬e)Pi(¬e)
and
Pi*(h) = Pi*(h|e)Pi*(e) + Pi*(h|¬e)Pi*(¬e)
Substituting it follows that
Pi(h) = Pf(h|e)Pi(e) + Pf(h|¬e)Pi(¬e)
and
Pi*(h) = Pf*(h|e)Pi*(e) + Pf*(h|¬e)Pi*(¬e)
And by (d) it follows that
 
Pi*(h) = Pf*(h|e)Pi(e) + Pf*(h|¬e)Pi(¬e)
Since Pf(e)< Pf*(e), by Roush’s analysis it 
follows that Pf(h|e)<Pf*(h|e) and by theorem 
3 that Pf(h|¬e) <  Pf*(h|¬e).  It follows by 
substitution of these inequalities into the 
above that Pi(h) < Pi*(h).  ■
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1. Introduction1
When does one fact speak for another? 
That is the problem of evidential relevance. 
Peter Achinstein’s answer, in brief: Evidential 
relevance = explanatory relevance.2 My 
own recent work investigates evidence 
for effectiveness predictions, which are at 
the core of the currently heavily mandated 
evidence-based policy and practice (EBPP): 
predictions of the form "Policy treatment T 
implemented as, when and how it would 
be implemented by us will result in targeted 
outcome O." RCTs, or randomized controlled 
trials, for T and O are taken to be the gold 
standard for evidence for effectiveness 
predictions. I question this: Not just whether 
they are gold-standard evidence, but more, 
How can they be evidence at all? What makes 
them relevant to the truth of the prediction 
that T will work for us?  
I am going to follow Achinstein’s lead 
here and suppose that evidential relevance 
= explanatory relevance, where A is 
explanatorily relevant to B just in case A is 
an ineliminable part of a correct explanation 
of B, or the reverse or A is indirectly relevant 
to B: There is some common fact that is an 
ineliminable part of correct explanations for A 
and B. I shall argue:
1. It’s not evidence for us without 
evidence that it’s evidence.
2. Evidential relevance is a conditional 
relation: E is evidence for H conditional 
on the non-shared factors that fill 
out explanations for E and H. Finding 
these involves a horizontal search.
3. To get shared explanatory elements 
we need a vertical search, up and 
down the ladder of abstraction. If we 
haven’t climbed the right ladder in the 
right way, an RCT may not show what 
we think it does. 
It follows from my discussion that RCTs cannot 
play anything like the central evidential role 
for effectiveness predictions that they are 
standardly awarded in EBPP literature.
I begin with some terminology, some 
assumptions, and some simplifying 
procedures. First, the fact that effectiveness 
predictions are predictions should not put us 
off an explanatory relevance account. Just 
suppose that the predictions are true. Then 
look for explanatory relevance. 
Second, I adopt the probabilistic theory of 
causality. I suppose that for each effect-type 
at a time t, Ot, and for each time t’ before 
t, there is a set of factors {C1
t’,…,Cn
t’} – the 
causes at t’ of O at t – whose values in 
3.2 EViDENCE, ExTErNAl VAliDiTy  
AND ExPlANATOry rElEVANCE
1  Research for this paper was supported by grants from the British Academy to study evidence for use, the LSE ESRC Centre 
for Climate Change, Economics and Policy and the associated Grantham Centre and a UK AHRC grant to study evidence 
related to child welfare policies. I am grateful to all three for financial support and to collaborators on them for intellectual 
support. I am also grateful to Eileen Munro for help with the child welfare example and to Adam Spray and Ravit Alfandari 
for help in editing.
2 The ideas of Peter Achinstein I draw on here are primarily from Achinstein 2001, 1983. But of course also from his long 
series of works over three decades from Achinstein 1978 onwards.
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combination fix the objective chance at t’ that 
O takes value o for any o in its allowed range. 
A causal structure, CSt’(Ot), for Ot is  such a 
set along with the related objective chances 
for all values of Ot for all combinations of 
allowed values, Lj
t’, of the causes in the set: 
Prob(Ot = o/Lj
t’). For simplicity I will usually 
suppress time and other indices and also 
restrict attention to two-valued variables. So 
a causal structure looks like this: CSt’(Ot) = 
<{C1
t’,…,Cn
t’}, {Prob(Ot/L1
t’),…,Prob(Ot/Lm
t’)}>. 
Third, I follow the EBPP literature and 
concentrate on the effect size of T for O in a 
population: Prob(O/T) – Prob(O/-T).3 Fourth, 
I restrict attention to predictions about the 
effects of policies on populations and not 
on single units. Fifth, I consider only positive 
relevance since that fits in a simple way within 
Achinstein’s explanatory account. Sixth, I 
concentrate on cases where E is indirectly 
relevant to H because these are the most 
complicated cases. Finally, for simplicity I 
assume that the evidence claims in question 
are well-confirmed – we can reasonably take 
them as true. 
2. Relevance is conditional on  
unshared factors
The relevance relation I focus on is objective: 
One fact (E) bears on the truth of another 
(H). This relation holds between facts because 
of the way nature and society operate; it 
does not depend on our knowledge of this 
operation. There are corresponding epistemic 
notions – like our reasoned judgments about 
what is relevant to what. These do depend on 
the state of our knowledge and a variety of 
other factors as well, such as time and resource 
constraints or level and type of expertise. 
Objective relevance is important for policy 
deliberation predictions: Gathering, discovering, 
and surveying facts are all costly. We’d like to 
confine our attentions to facts that matter to 
the truth of the policy prediction.
"Bears on the truth of" can seem hopelessly 
vague. So there are various well-known 
attempts to explicate it with more familiar 
notions. One takes relevance to be some kind 
of causal relation. That’s too narrow. So too 
are various kinds of probabilistic relations: 
There just aren’t enough of these in the 
world to account for all the obvious evidential 
relevance.4 Moreover, relying on probabilities 
puts the cart before the horse when it comes 
to the needs of estimating if a policy will 
work. Achinstein’s explanatory relevance by 
contrast fits the bill nicely. 
Why should explanatory relevance be a good 
stand-in for the more abstract concept "bears 
on the truth of"? My answer is a mix of views 
of Achinstein and of my own. Just as the 
relevance relation aimed for is objective, so 
must the explanatory relation be in order to 
serve as a marker for relevance. "Explanation" 
as I use it, then, doesn’t mean something 
that has the right form and is proffered as 
an explanation; it means something that is 
an explanation. There will be many of these, 
some of them nested, which is why, as I 
argue in Sections 4 and 5, we need good 
vertical searches to find the widest scope of 
evidential relevance a result can have.
Achinstein has been criticized for using 
explanatory relevance because this concept 
itself, it is argued, is in need of explication. I 
disagree that we need an explication for the 
task at hand.5 There are a host of different 
"thick" relations in nature we label "causal" 
(like pushing, feeding, lapping up, mailing,…). 
So too there are a host of relations that we 
lump together under the label "explains" 
when explanation serves as a guide to "bears 
on the truth of". The fact that we cannot 
give an interesting non-circular explication of 
"explains" as an objective relation  does not 
mean that we cannot recognize it when we 
see it – Newton’s laws explain Kepler’s and 
my taking an aspirin  explains my headache 
getting better. Nor does it mean that we 
cannot take certain claims to be generally  
true of it. 
There is good reason why the Achinstein 
slogan should work for EBPP. To start with, 
a correct explanation is always evidentially 
relevant to its explanandum and vice versa. 
The first follows trivially if one adopts a 
deductive nomological account of explanation 
since the explanans cannot hold without the 
explanandum doing so as well. But, even 
if one follows GEM Anscombe (1993) in 
maintaining that an explanans can be enough 
– it can be as full an explanation as nature 
allows – without the explanandum obtaining, 
nevertheless the occurrence of the explanans 
is undoubtedly evidentially relevant to the 
occurrence of the explanandum. The converse 
is trivial since "explanation" is meant to be 
"correct explanation". 
Indirect evidence is harder. E is (indirectly) 
relevant to H if there is a correct explanation 
for H that shares a common element, X, 
with some correct explanation for E. X + 
Xu
E correctly explains E and X + Xu
H correctly 
explains H.6 E is evidence that X obtains. 
But obtaining X cannot be part of a correct 
explanation for H unless Xu
H obtains. If Xu
H 
is not the case, then X and Xu
H cannot be a 
correct explanation for H – it doesn’t matter 
how well-confirmed X is. The relevance of E’s 
truth to the truth of H flows through X and it 
can only do that given Xu
H. E’s truth is of no 
matter at all to H’s where Xu
H fails. 
Suppose your interest is in whether H is 
true. But you know that Xu
H is false.7 Would 
you pay to learn E? No. Or take a stock 
philosopher’s case: You are asked to predict 
the color of a bird in the river. Is the bevy of 
observed white swans relevant? It is if "All 
swans are white" is part of the explanation 
of both your bird’s color and theirs. But if 
you are told that your bird is certainly not a 
swan, all those observations of swan color are 
worthless to you.
3 See Coe, 2002
4 For Anchinstein’s views on why purely probabilistic characterizations of evidence do not work, see inter alia Achinstein 
2004, 1996, 1981.
5 For Anchinstein’s views on this issue see especially Anchinstein 1981.
6 Subscript "u" marks the unshared elements of the explanations.
7 I suppose here that X would not figure in any other correct explanation for H were H to obtain.
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So: When the topic is evidence for policy 
predictions, the relevant concept of relevance 
is a conditional one: The relevance of a fact 
E that would have a shared explanatory 
element with H were H to be true is 
conditional on the obtaining of the unshared 
portion of the explanation H would have. 
Moreover, the epistemic probability awarded 
to E being relevant should be no higher than 
the epistemic probability that appropriate 
unshared factors obtain.
3. External validity and the need for 
horizontal search
An ideal RCT is a study in which the population 
in the study, φ, divides into two groups that are 
identical with respect to all features casually 
relevant to the targeted outcome, O, except 
for the policy treatment, T, and its downstream 
consequences. Suppose the probability of O 
is greater in the T group than the –T group. 
Where can we go from there?  
Under the probabilistic theory of causality, 
the values of a full set of O’s causes fix the 
objective chance that O takes any value in its 
range.  That’s what prompts the attention to 
the conditional probabilities from the causal 
structure for φ, Prob(O/K&T) > P(O/K& –T), 
where K is an assignment of values to all 
the members of CSφ(O)  with the exception 
of T and its downstream effects. Whether 
T has a positive effect size in φ depends on 
the relative weights in φ of subpopulations in 
which T acts positively and those in which it 
acts negatively.
A study is said to be externally valid when 
"the conclusion established in the study holds 
elsewhere". Consider an ideal RCT for T,O on 
a large study population φ  that has a  
positive result: 
Study Conclusion (SC:)  Prob(O/T) > 
Prob (O/–T) in φ. 
The study has external validity for target 
population θ if 
Target Conclusion (TC): Prob(O/T) > 
Prob (O/–T) in θ.
(Recall, θ describes the target population 
supposing the implementation that would in 
fact occur given the policy in question.) 
When is SC evidence for TC? 
Since neither SC explains TC nor the 
reverse, if SC is to be evidence for TC 
there must be some shared part in their 
separate explanations.  The explanation for 
the successful RCT results in φ under the 
probabilistic theory of causality look like this 
for some specific causal structure, CS(O), and 
some specific set of causally homogeneous 
subpopulations from CS(O), K = {…,Kj,… },
Study Conclusion Explanation (SCE):  
SCE1: The causal structure for O of φ 
is CS(O).
SCE2: For KJ  in K Prob(O/KJ & T) > 
Prob(O/KJ & –T ) according to CS(O).
SCE3: The possible negative effects of 
T on O in other subpopulations are not 
enough to outweigh this increase.8 
The explanations for the predicted hypothesis 
TC are the same in form and must refer to the 
very same causal structure and the very same 
causally homogeneous subpopulations if there 
are to be shared factors:
Target Conclusion Explanation (TCE):  
TCE1: The causal structure for O of θ 
is CS(O). 
TCE2: Some member(s), KJ,KJ’,… of K 
are  subpopulation of θ.
TCE3: For these KJ,  Prob(O/KJ & T) > 
Prob(O/KJ & –T) according to CS(O).
TCE4: The possible negative effects 
of T on O in other subpopulations of 
θ are not enough to outweigh the 
increase due to these.
Since most of the claims in both explanations 
are indexed to the population, the only shared 
element is the claim that CS(O) implies that 
Prob(O/KJ & T) > Prob(O/KJ & –T) for the KJ of 
TCE3. It is this – and only this – one shared 
explanatory element that makes the RCT 
result relevant to the policy prediction. But it 
is shared only supposing that TCE is a correct 
explanation for the prediction about θ. That 
is, the RCT is explanatorily relevant, and thus 
evidentially relevant, only relative to the truth 
of TCE1,2,&4. What then should be required 
for the RCT to be accepted as evidence? My 
dictum: It’s not evidence for us unless we 
have evidence that it’s evidence. That means 
having evidence for TCE1,2,&4. And what 
reasons do we have to accept these?
To start, what supports TC1 – that φ has the 
same causal structure for O as φ? Common 
causal structures are not all that typical. The 
refurbished Cuisinart Classic 4-slice toaster 
that I almost bought for £41.46 has a 
different causal structure than does the Dualit 
3-slice stainless steel toaster at £158.03, 
which has a different structure again from 
the new Krups expert black and stainless steel 
toaster at £44.99. Perhaps you think – as 
many economists and medical RCT advocates 
seem to – that your two populations are more 
likely to share causal structure than are the 
toasters on offer in Oxford. That’s fine. But for 
EBPP you should have good evidence-backed 
reason for that.
Supposing that the two populations do have 
a common causal structure, what assures 
that some of the very subpopulations KJ of 
φ in which Prob(O/KJ & T) > Prob(O/KJ & –T) 
are subpopulations of θ? The mix of causal 
factors that obtain shifts all the time, both 
across situations and across time. Worse, 
no matter what mix was there before, in 
implementing policy we all too often alter 
that mix. Consider the California class-size 
reduction program. Reduced class sizes did 
not improve educational outcomes because 
the program was rolled out over a short time; 
the need for teachers doubled within a year 
but the availability of trained teachers did not. 
Teaching quality went down, offsetting the 
good influence of class size.9
8  One can express this more formally, but that seems needlessly complicated for our purposes.
9 Elsewhere I describe this case in terms of capacities. The same kinds of problems arise in both cases.
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Finally, why suppose that were T to increase 
the probability of O in θ as predicted, that 
would be due to the positive effects in the 
shared subpopulations rather than in some 
subpopulations of θ not shared with φ? 
These questions need answers, and for EBPP, 
answers reasonably underpinned by empirical 
and theoretical support. One cannot just plop 
SC on the table and say that it is relevant 
to TC. Whether it is relevant depends on 
common explanatory factors, and presuming 
that common factors obtain requires good 
evidence. "It can’t count as evidence unless 
there’s evidence that it’s evidence".
Clearly this dictum can create a regress. That, 
however, is the human condition. We have to 
stop somewhere. But it should be somewhere 
reasonable and defensible. Consider CCTV 
cameras.10 Are they working? A glance at the 
monitor is generally enough to be reasonably 
certain, despite the fact that in heist movies 
elaborate techniques are undertaken to make 
the monitors lie.  For relevance, too, we need 
reasonable and defensible stopping points 
for the chain of evidence that shows that 
evidence offerings are evidence. Consider for 
a moment not the relevance but the credibility 
of evidence offerings. Where detailed scientific 
argument and experiment are involved, this 
is going to be hard for policy analysts and 
practitioners to judge. That is why institutions 
like the Cochrane and Campbell Collaborations 
or the What Works Clearing House have been 
set up. If they give a study result high marks, 
it is generally reasonable for a practitioner to 
take that on faith.11
What then of the evidence for the relevance 
of SC for TC? Sometimes we can assemble 
some body of facts that are reasonably well 
attested and that provide good reasons in 
favor of claims like TCE1,2,&4. But it is hard. 
And the very cases in which one most wants 
to perform an RCT are the cases where there 
will be least evidence that a positive RCT 
result for the policy treatment is evidence 
that the policy will work for us. RCTs are 
touted as gold standard because only they 
"control for unknowns", for the factors in 
the causal structure for O that we don’t know 
are there and hence can’t check explicitly are 
distributed the same in the two groups. 
So RCTs come into their own when we 
suspect that a good many factors in the 
causal structure for the study population are 
unknown. But then how are we supposed to 
produce evidence that those very unknown 
factors are causal factors according to 
the causal structure for θ? And that θ has 
some of the same causally homogeneous 
subpopulations in which T is positive for O 
as does φ? Finally, how do we estimate that 
in other subpopulations of θ, T won’t have 
enough negative effects to decrease the 
chance of O there? The very same epistemic 
gaps that make the RCT the method of choice 
also make results practically useless  
for prediction. 
The problems discussed in this section demand 
horizontal search. T can increase the probability 
of O in some mixes of causal factors and not 
in others; it can even decrease the probability 
in some while increasing it in others. A positive 
RCT result is relevant to a policy prediction 
only relative to assumptions about the mixes 
of factors operating in the study population 
and in the target population. To be justified in 
taking the RCT as evidence we need to gather 
information about what other factors operate 
with T in the two populations. That’s what I 
mean by a "horizontal search". To increase the 
range of relevance of the RCT we also need a 
"vertical search", which reviews causes across 
levels of abstraction.
4. External validity and vertical search
The causes in a causal structure can be more or 
less abstract; and structures involving factors at 
different levels of abstraction can all obtain at 
once. "The trajectories of bodies moving on a 
sphere subject only to inertia are great circles" 
is true; so too is "The trajectories of bodies 
moving on a sphere subject only to inertia are 
geodesics (ie, the shortest distance between 
two points)". They are equally true because 
on a sphere, a great circle is a geodesic.12 
Generally the higher the level of abstraction of 
a causal structure, the more widely it is shared 
across populations. For example, bodies on 
Euclidean planes subject only to inertia follow 
geodesics but not great circles. This matters for 
explanatory relevance.
An easy way to get a grip on how it matters 
is to consider some examples. The first 
is from climate-change modeling, where 
development economists argue that many of 
the policies that can help alleviate harmful 
effects of climate change are things that 
should be done in developing countries 
anyway. This is the case of the Bangladesh 
Integrated Nutrition program (BINP) for 
providing pregnant women with nutritional 
counseling, with the idea that poor nutrition 
is not only due to poverty but also to 
ignorance, for instance to belief in "eating 
down" during pregnancy. (White 2009) Of 
course knowledge by itself is not enough, 
resources are required too, so the counseling 
was joined by a supplementary feeding 
program. This is the kind of factor that comes 
up in a horizontal search. 
An analysis by the World Bank’s Operations 
Evaluation Department found no significant 
impact on infants’ nutritional status. This 
despite the fact that the program had 
"worked" elsewhere. What went wrong?
A number of reasons suggest that the results 
elsewhere were not evidentially relevant to 
the success of the policy in Bangladesh. They 
might have been. It is natural to expect that 
10 See Pawson and Tilley 1997 for a good use of the example of CCTV cameras in parking lots discouraging car theft to 
argue the need for what I here call "horizontal search" and to show how understanding the mechanism at work can help 
with that.
11 I think, however, that negative judgements by these organizations are often made on bad premises. They tend to presume 
that trusting to pure method is always better than supposing substantive knowledge claims. That, for example, is why RCTs 
are gold standard and econometric modelling doesn’t get a look in. See Cartwright 2007 for more details.
12 I shall here be relatively cavalier about the metaphysics of properties. I treat abstract features and concrete ones both 
as real and I treat them as different features even if having one of these (the more concrete feature) is what constitutes 
having the more abstract one on any occasion. I take it that claims like this can be rendered appropriately, though probably 
differently, in different metaphysical accounts of properties.
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explanations for the results elsewhere and for 
Bangladesh success would share an important 
common element: A general principle 
Principle 1: Better nutritional 
knowledge in mothers plus 
supplemental feeding improves the 
nutritional status of their children. 
In fact the two populations did not share  
this principle. 
The first reason for the lack of impact, 
it seems, is that there was "leakage": In 
Bangladesh the food was often not used as 
a supplement but as a substitute, with the 
usual food allocation for that child passing 
to another member of the family. (Save 
the Children 2003) The principle "Better 
nutritional knowledge in mothers plus 
supplemental feeding improves children’s 
nutrition" was true in the original successful 
cases but not in Bangladesh. A better 
candidate for a shared explanatory element is
Principle 2: Better nutritional 
knowledge in mothers with sufficient 
resources to use that knowledge 
improves children’s nutrition.
This principle uses concepts at a higher level of 
abstraction. In the successful cases the more 
concrete description "food supplied by the 
supplementary feeding program" counted as an 
instance of the more abstract concept "sufficient 
resources", but not in Bangladesh. Not getting 
this straight is a failure of vertical search: A failure 
to identify the right level of abstraction to find 
common explanatory elements. 
A second reason for the lack of positive 
impact is also a problem with vertical search.
The program targeted the mothers 
of young children. But mothers are 
frequently not the decision makers, 
and rarely the sole decision makers, 
with respect to the health and 
nutrition of their children. For a start, 
women do not go to market in rural 
Bangladesh; it is men who do the
shopping. And for women in joint 
households – meaning they live with 
their mother-in-law – as a sizeable 
minority do, then the mother-in-
law heads the women’s domain. 
Indeed, project participation rates are 
significantly lower for women living 
with their mother-in-law in more 
conservative parts of the country. 
(White 2009, 6)
This suggests yet another vertical move to 
secure a shared principle:
Principle 3: Better nutritional 
knowledge results in better nutrition 
for a child in those who
1. Have sufficient resources to use 
that knowledge to improve the child’s 
nutrition,
2. Control what food is procured with 
those resources,
3. Control how food gets dispensed, 
and
4. Hold the child’s interests as central 
in performing 2. and 3.
Just as supplementary food did not count as 
sufficient resources in the BINP, mothers in 
that program did not in general satisfy the 
more abstract descriptions in 2. and 3. 
The previous successes of the program are 
relevant to predictions about the BINP only 
relative to the vertical identification of mothers 
with the abstract descriptions in 2., 3., and 4. 
But not all of these identifications hold. So the 
previous successes are not evidentially relevant. 
For an RCT to be relevant, and to be justifiably 
taken as such, we need good reasons to back up 
the claims that the characteristics referred to in 
study conclusions, which are often fairly concrete, 
are the same as the characteristics appearing 
in principles shared across study and target 
populations, which are often relatively abstract.
Consider another possible example, this 
from UK child-welfare policy. In many cases 
a child’s care-givers, though not legally 
compelled, are heavily encouraged, perhaps 
even badgered, into attending parenting 
classes. Consider in this context making 
fathers attend parenting classes. 
First, is "father" to be instantiated by 
"biological father" or, eg, "male partner 
of the mother who lives in the household 
with the child", or maybe "male care-
giver"? It may well be that the policy would 
be effective if the male care-givers or men 
living with the mother are the target but not 
biological fathers who are neither on site 
nor care-givers. If so, to focus on "being a 
father" would be to move to too high a level 
of abstraction since only the more specific 
feature, "male care-giver" or "male partner 
of mother who shares the child’s household", 
enters into a reasonably reliable principle. 
On the other hand "compelling father" 
or "compelling male care-giver" can 
simultaneously be too concrete. Different 
cultures in the UK have widely different 
views about the roles fathers should play 
in parenting. Compelling fathers to attend 
classes can fall under the more abstract 
description, "ensuring care-givers are better 
informed about ways to help the child", 
in which case it could be expected to be 
positively effective for improving the child’s 
welfare. But it may also instantiate the more 
abstract feature "public humiliation", in 
which case it could act oppositely. And of 
course it can fall under both at once. In any 
case, if the two more abstract features pull in 
opposite directions, there will be no reliable 
principle to formulate at the more concrete 
level involving "fathers". Nor is this pull in 
opposite directions an unrealistic hypothesis.  
We know from empirical research that 
there are varying outcomes associated with 
compelling/strongly encouraging parents to 
attend parenting classes and also that these 
are correlated with varying motivations. 
(Barlow et al. 2006) Unfortunately we do 
not yet have sufficient theoretical probing to 
explain the variation and the correlations.
5. Troubles for vertical search
To secure explanatory relevance in cases 
like the BINP, it is necessary first to find and 
defend a shared explanatory principle. This 
involves finding the right ladder of abstraction 
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to climb and knowing just when to stop.13 But 
a principle can only be shared between study 
and target if it applies to both. So it is equally 
necessary to defend that what happens in the 
study and what is predicted to happen in the 
target instantiate the abstract concepts in the 
putatively shared principle.
This is no easy matter since what in the 
concrete an abstract property consists in often 
differs dramatically from circumstance to 
circumstance. This problem arises regularly in 
economic climate mitigation and adaptation 
models (and many other economic models 
as well). Consider studies of how to change 
American insurance schemes to provide 
financial incentives for those living in high 
risk areas, like the chic Florida coast, to make 
their homes less prone to risk, for instance 
by changing the roof construction. (Cf., 
Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2009 plus 
references therein.) The models often rely 
on game theory assumptions that rational 
agents act to maximize their expected utility.. 
Here we have to worry about misplaced 
concretization of the abstract feature "utility". 
The models typically take money to instantiate 
utility. But there is a good chance that the 
targeted agents – say rich owners of beach-
front residences – will be more moved by the 
disruption to their domestic arrangements 
of having builders at work for months than 
by any contrary financial incentive that could 
realistically get built into an insurance scheme.
The same problem of context dependence 
resurfaces when it comes to measurement, 
where we see a familiar trade-off: Shared 
principles require higher levels of abstraction; 
good measurement, lower. For good comparable 
measurements, we want specific operational 
procedures that are carried out in the same way 
each time the measurement is performed. By 
contract, the methods for measuring an abstract 
feature generally differ depending on what more 
concrete features it consists in, which is not the 
same from case to case.
We are pulled in two directions here. One: 
Plump for a false universal concretization 
in order to secure a universal measure. 
For instance, measure "educational value 
added" in new British inner-city academies 
by counting the number of GCSE’s passed 
at a grade of C or better. Or, devise a 
measurement definition that more correctly 
captures the abstract feature of interest 
across its various concrete instantiations. 
The danger then is that the definition will 
be so abstract that we don’t know what it 
consists in from situation to situation. For 
example, what constitutes human flourishing 
differs dramatically according to individual 
circumstances and abilities, natural resources, 
availability of public goods, need, and the 
like. So the capability approach of Amartya 
Sen (1985, 1999) proposes as a measure 
"the number of lives worth living open to 
the individual". Or, some propose to measure 
the economic freedom individuals enjoy by 
the size of their choice sets. Neither of these 
provides much of a clue about what we are 
actually to do to assign numbers or ranks to 
the individuals to be measured. 
For EBPP we look to science for advice. 
Unfortunately when it comes to fixing what 
constitutes abstract features in the concrete, 
science offers at best rules of thumb that 
are highly defeasible. In particular they are 
beset by what John Perry (2010) dubs "the 
failure of enrichment": That A consists in 
M in circumstances C does not imply that 
A consists in M in circumstances C & C’ for 
every C’ consistent with C. 
The moral particularism literature is rife with 
examples where A is a moral feature. Stuart 
Hampshire (2000), for instance, describes 
telling stories to philosophical audiences. The 
stories involve a young intellectual French 
Fascist, a reader of Celine, held by the Free 
French, whom Hampshire is sent by the British 
to interrogate. The French will execute the 
young man; but they tell Hampshire that he 
can certainly promise the prisoner – falsely  
– that he will not be executed in exchange 
for information. Is it acceptable, or even 
required, for Hampshire to lie to the young 
man? Hampshire tells the story differently on 
different occasions. Often the descriptions 
can be nested, the more detailed descriptions 
containing the previous, plus more. Depending 
on how Hampshire tells the story, the audience 
is in general agreement about what he should 
do – but the verdict changes as he shifts from 
level to level. Enrichment fails. 
Hampshire’s stories involve highly abstract 
features – morally acceptable, morally 
required. Perry’s own example involves specific 
motions that may or may not instantiate 
his eating a Brussel sprout at his Dewey 
lecture, depending on the level of detail of 
the description of the circumstances. So the 
abstract feature need not be very abstract at 
all for the failure of enrichment to appear.
Where then can we find help in science either 
with the problem of settling on the right level 
of abstraction to find shared explanatory 
principles or of ascertaining what the abstract 
features in these principles consist in for both 
study and target populations? I don’t know an 
answer. But I am sure it takes both theory and 
local knowledge, neither of which are much 
in favor in EBPP communities. Without these, 
scientific studies like RCTs, which are so highly 
prized for the credibility they confer on their 
results, will not be explanatorily relevant to the 
predictions about what will work for us that 
we need for practice and policy. And I am sure 
Achinstein is right for these kinds of cases: 
If explanatory relevance goes, so too goes 
evidential relevance. Then we have no scientific 
evidence to bring to bear and evidence-based 
policy and practice is out the window. 
13 Stopping matters. Increased abstraction generally goes along with increased generality. So the more abstract the 
principles you embrace, the more so-far-unexplored concrete predictions you are committed to. My own advice has always 
been: Don’t commit to anything more than you need. That is why I have always urged sticking to the numerous more 
concrete, detailed laws that explain – and explain in proper detail – the various natural and experimental results we observe 
rather than committing to the super-abstract laws of high theory.
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3.3 EViDENCE, ArgumENT AND PrEDiCTiON
(Forthcoming in V. Karakostas and D. Dieks 
(eds.), EPSA11 Perspectives and Foundational
Problems in Philosophy of Science, The 
European Philosophy of Science
Association Proceedings 2)
1. The Context and the Problem
This paper is about evidence, specifically 
about evidence for effectiveness predictions:  
predictions that a well-described programme, 
policy or treatment will work for us, ie, that 
the programme will result in an improvement 
in a well-specified outcome if we were to 
implement it in a targeted situation in a specific 
way – the way we would in fact implement it. 
Evidence-based policy advocates have invested 
a great deal of effort over the last few years in 
evaluating and providing warehouses for storing 
what they offer as evidence for hypotheses 
of this form in various areas of concern, 
warehouses to be visited by "ordinary" policy 
makers and analysts. There includes for instance 
the Cochrane Collaboration for medical studies, 
the Campbell Collaboration for general social 
policy, the US Department of Education’s What 
Works Clearinghouse, the George Mason 
University Centre for issues in  criminology and 
the greater London Authority’s new Project 
Oracle for "Understanding and sharing what 
really works" against youth violence. 
These warehouses advertise that they store 
programmes that "work" to produce targeted 
results. We as philosophers know to be wary 
of sloppy language like that. What they store 
are programmes for which there is very good 
evidence that they work somewhere, and, if 
we are very lucky, in a few somewheres. The 
warehouse keepers police certain kinds of 
scientific studies, studies that aim to establish 
causal connections between a programme 
and a targeted outcome. Programmes that 
make it onto the shelves in the warehouse 
are ones that have been tested in what 
the warehouse regulations regard as very 
good studies. In particular the warehouse 
purchasing rules strongly favour RCT study 
designs – that is, randomized controlled trials. 
What an RCT can evidence directly is that the 
programme worked there, then, in the study 
population.  What makes that evidence for 
the effectiveness claim of concern to policy 
analysts: "It will work here, now, as we would 
implement it?" What does it take for the RCT 
result to play a part in a support structure 
that argues for the truth of the effectiveness 
prediction? That’s my question.
I propose the same answer I urge for claims 
in any domain where the demands for rigor 
and explicitness are high, as in warranting 
conclusions in science or for evidence-based 
policy, namely what I call the Argument 
Theory of Evidence: conclusions are warranted 
by good arguments, arguments that are both 
valid and sound. It is surely trivial to remark 
that a conclusion is warranted by a good 
argument. But this reminder helps underline 
two important facts that are not currently at 
centre stage in discussions about evidence for 
effectiveness predictions:
1. Evidence is a 3-place relation: e is 
evidence for h relative to a specific 
argument A for h. Failing the rest 
of the premises in A, or relative to a 
different argument A’, the very same 
fact, e, can be totally irrelevant to the 
very same hypothesis h.
2. Arguments are like chains: they 
are only as strong as their weakest 
premise. Focusing on the argument 
forces the premises to the fore. Often 
it is just the ones that aren’t generally 
stated that turn out to be most dicey.
 
2. The Argument Theory of Evidence
2.1 The Theory and the Reasons for It
What is evidence? More specifically, under 
what conditions is one empirical claim e 
evidence for a second empirical claim h?
I note from the start that evidence is not a 
natural kind. There is no "correct" theory of 
what evidence is, as there might be a correct 
theory of what an electron is. When this is the 
case our account of what makes for a good 
theory should be responsive to what needs the 
theory addresses. The theory I propose started 
as a theory of "evidence for use", in particular 
for use in making reliable predictions about 
what results will be produced by actions we 
consider taking. The Argument Theory is not 
confined to this context, however, but should 
fit anywhere we face the same needs. 
A central problem I see everywhere that 
evidence-based policy is on the tapis is that 
the way the term "evidence" is usually used 
lets in far too much. And it does so while at 
the same time purporting to be very restrictive 
by subscribing to the highest standards of 
rigour. In response my theory of evidence is 
demanding. That is because I agree with a 
common supposition. It is commonly – and I 
think reasonably – supposed that 
Desideratum
A piece of evidence for a hypothesis 
should speak for the truth of the 
hypothesis. 
 
It is with this in mind that I offer stringent 
criteria. I want criteria such that, once a fact 
meets those criteria, we should be happy to 
allow it to weigh in.  
Here is what the Argument Theory 
demands of evidence: 
A well-established empirical claim e is 
evidence for hypothesis h relative to a 
good argument A (or A,A’,A””…) if 
and only if e is a premise in A, which 
is itself a good argument for h (or, is a 
premise in A’ which is a good argument 
for a premise in a good argument A for 
h, etc.), where a good argument has 
true premises and is deductively valid.
The Argument Theory is akin to Clark 
Glymour’s bootstrapping theory of confirmation 
(Glymour and Stalker 1980) in which we 
bootstrap from evidence to hypothesis using 
background assumptions and inductive logic. 
On the Argument account, given the other 
premises – which are like Glymour’s background 
assumptions, h follows deductively from e. For 
Glymour, by contrast, the conclusion we derive 
from e and the background assumptions is 
an instance of h. Then we must use inductive 
principles to get from "instance of h" to h. 
98 99
For me h itself is the fixed point that we 
wish to arrive at. The Argument Theory 
requires that we do so by a good deductive 
argument. So I need far stronger background 
assumptions than Glymour. This, I urge, is 
all to the good. Science and evidence-based 
policy gain their high status in large part 
because they lay claim to being rigorous, 
public and explicit. These were the demands 
of Popper and of the Positivists and ones 
that we should insist on adhering to. There is 
in principle no objection to inferring h from 
instances of h in particular cases – so long 
as it is clear what it is about h and these 
instances that warrant this inference in this 
case. Are all the instances the same always? 
Are they at least all the same in this situation? 
Does the instance in question have special 
features that make it characteristic, so that if 
it holds, h holds? Or…? The Argument Theory 
demands that the assumption that warrants 
the inductive leap be explicit in each case so it 
too can be subject to scrutiny. That’s because 
hiding what it takes for the conclusion 
genuinely to follow from the evidence is both 
morally and intellectually culpable in any 
enterprise that sails under the flags of science 
or of evidence-based policy.
 
Two parallel lines of defence support the 
Argument Theory, one ontological, the other 
epistemological. That’s because evidence is 
Janus-faced. On the one hand it has to do 
with truth and truth trackers: with what facts 
of Nature there are and what other facts can 
ensure they obtain. I should note that here 
I take a generous view of what the facts of 
Nature include. In particular, facts can be 
expressed by general claims, like Maxwell’s 
equations or the claims of general equilibrium 
theory in economics, as well as by singular 
claims, like "The cat is on the mat." On 
the other hand, evidence has to do with 
our attempts to arrive at truths: with our 
hypotheses about what facts obtain and the 
further hypotheses that provide warrant for 
them. The two lines of reasoning are obverse 
sides of the same coin, one expressed – to use 
Carnap’s terminology – in the material mode, 
the other in the formal mode. 
Begin with the material mode. Some facts or 
sets of facts are sufficient for others: if the first 
obtains, the second cannot fail to obtain. One 
fact, fe, is evidence for a second, fh, then if fe is 
a necessary member of a set of facts sufficient 
to ensure fh obtains. Note that "sufficient to 
ensure X obtains" is not the same as "brings X 
about". It means just what it says: the one set 
cannot obtain if the other fails.
If you were brought up in the tradition of 
Hempel and Nagel you may well be more 
comfortable with the formal mode version of 
the parallel lines of defence. Evidence for a 
claim is supposed to contribute to warrant for 
the truth of the claim. What contributes to 
warrant for the truth of a claim are reasons, 
and what makes some claim e a reason for 
another h is that e figures in a good argument 
for h. "Good" here = valid and sound; 
the premises are true and the conclusion 
genuinely follows from them. Deduction 
provides a clear sense to what it means for a 
conclusion to follow from a set of premises. It 
is the formal mode counterpart to one set of 
facts being sufficient in Nature to ensure that 
a second obtains. 
Beware the formal mode though. We are 
looking for a formal mode counterpart of 
the relationship in Nature where one set 
of facts is sufficient for another to obtain. 
Then evidence can satisfy the Desideratum 
that a piece of evidence for a hypothesis 
genuinely speaks for its truth. That is the 
sense of "warrant" involved in the formal 
mode account of evidence. Alternatively 
"warrant for h" sometimes means "justifying 
a belief in h". That is not the sense at stake 
here. Belief is an attitude or an action, and, I 
would argue, there is no context-independent 
sense of justification for it. Whether it is 
justified to hold a belief in h depends on 
what is consequent upon believing it. Will 
God send me to hell for it? Will I build a 
bridge supposing h is true, which bridge will 
fall down if h is false? Will I teach it to my 
graduate students who might then win a 
Nobel Prize by taking it as the basis for their 
research or alternatively, fail to get their PhD 
because their research went nowhere. Still 
what I think about justifying belief is an aside 
since belief is irrelevant to my topic.
Evidence in the sense supposed in the 
evidence-based policy literature and in the 
sense required for establishing scientific 
hypotheses has nothing to do with belief. It 
has to do with the truth of empirical claims 
and with what facts ensure that truth. So 
inductive logics and subjective probabilities 
have no place in the characterization of 
evidence for these purposes. Of course they 
may, if you believe in them, play a legitimate 
role when it comes to our estimates of 
whether one claim is evidence for another.
The demand that an evidence claim figure in a 
good argument – both valid and sound – may 
seem excessively strong. I actually make a 
stronger demand. Not only should there be a 
good argument from e to h if e is evidence for 
h, but we should not count e as evidence until 
that argument is displayed. I sometime express 
this in the slogan "It’s not evidence till there’s 
evidence it’s evidence." C.G. Hempel’s account 
of explanation also demanded validity and it 
also majored on deductive arguments. Hempel 
though allowed that many good explanations 
in science are enthymematic, in particular they 
are often not completely laid out. When it 
comes to evidence for scientific claims or policy 
predictions, I think it can be a bad mistake to 
allow this. Both science and evidence-based 
policy get their status in part from their claims 
to rigor. As a way to ensure rigor nothing beats 
laying out the arguments and looking to see 
how good they actually are. 
2.2 Some Objections and Answers
There are a few objections philosophers may 
have right away to the Argument Theory of 
evidence. None, I urge, undermines the account. 
•   On this account of evidence we never 
know that a claim is evidence because 
that would require knowing that the claim 
is a necessary part of a good argument. 
To know the argument is good you need 
warrant for the other premises. To warrant 
those premises you need good arguments; 
to warrant that these arguments are 
good you need warrant for the premises 
in them. Etc, etc. That does not seem 
to me a problem: it’s what good honest 
evaluation requires. Of course we stop 
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somewhere; we have to. In the best of 
cases we stop with claims that can be 
taken as well established. To the extent 
that our stopping points are not ones we 
can take for granted, to that extent we 
should be cautious about our supposition 
that a proffered evidence claim really is 
evidence after all. We know from Otto 
Neurath that in reasoning we are like sailors 
who must repair our boats at sea without 
ever putting in to dry dock to build from 
firm foundations. So we will always have 
to trust to some claims we take as true, 
at least for the nonce. But we should not 
make our situation worse by neglecting 
our arguments: without laying out all the 
premises in all the arguments we don’t 
know how leaky our boat is.
•   The Argument Theory implies a number of 
what might be thought oddities, to all of 
which I have the same answer. Yes these 
facts are indeed evidence but they are not 
usually very useful pieces of evidence for us.
–   Anything true is evidence for a 
logical truth since anything – any 
claim at all – is a premise in a 
good argument for a logical truth. 
Yes, and so, I maintain, it should 
be. Anything is evidence for a 
logical truth. Still I wouldn’t advise 
spending much to buy information 
about other facts to warrant a 
logical truth.  If you know a claim 
is a logical truth you don’t need 
to buy information about other 
facts to warrant the claim. And if 
you don’t know that the claim is a 
logical truth, you will have trouble 
warranting that the claim is implied 
by the fact you buy. Still, if I don’t 
know h is a logical truth but I am 
assured that if e then h, then e is 
surely worth learning. 
–   A&B is evidence for A; A > B & A is 
evidence for B; etc. Yes, they are. 
But we know that conclusions of 
arguments are no more warranted 
by the argument than the premises, 
so we won’t be led astray here 
in evaluating the warrant for the 
conclusion
–   Everything is evidence for itself. 
That’s ok. Any claim does speak for 
itself. Again though, we know that 
conclusions of arguments are no 
more warranted by the argument 
than the premises, so we won’t be 
led astray here either.
•   The Argument Theory employs a flawed 
theory of relevance. It lets in as evidentially 
relevant just the kinds of things philosophers 
have been at pains to rule out. Consider the 
canonical example: "John Jones takes birth 
control pills." Surely this is not evidence 
for his non-pregnancy. But I think, to the 
contrary, that it is excellent evidence: 
1. Nobody who takes birth 
control pills gets pregnant. 
2. John Jones takes birth  
control pills.
Therefore: John Jones does not  
get pregnant.
Given 1., 2. speaks –  and speaks 
compellingly – for the truth of the claim 
that John Jones does not get pregnant. 
What better basis could the truth of 
this claim have? To suppose that John 
Jones’s taking birth control pills is not 
evidence for his failure to get pregnant is 
to confuse the task of providing evidence 
that a fact obtains with the task of 
explaining why it obtains.
•   If all arguments are deductive then on the 
Argument Theory 
–   There can’t be both evidence for a 
claim and evidence for its negation 
since evidence claims must be able 
to participate in good deductive 
arguments and there can’t be 
good deductive arguments for a 
hypothesis and its negation. That’s 
okay too. It can still be reasonable 
to say "We have evidence for h and 
evidence for not-h" when there are 
results that can figure in plausible 
arguments for h and results that can 
figure in plausible arguments for 
its opposite. What matters is that 
we recognize that the results only 
count as evidence relative to some 
good argument so that we don’t 
just let the result weigh in without 
commitment to the existence of 
these arguments. Of course if there 
are good arguments that are not 
deductive and hence the truth of 
the premises does not guarantee the 
truth of the conclusion, then it can 
be literally true that there is evidence 
for both h and evidence for not-h on 
the Argument Theory of evidence. 
But that is as it should be.
–   There can be no evidence for false 
claims. As soon as you know there 
is evidence for h by lights of the 
Argument Theory, you know that 
h is true. But that seems to me no 
problem. The problem is coming 
to know that e is evidence for h. 
This is a serious job and one of my 
concerns with the evidence-based 
policy literature, as I shall explain 
tomorrow, is that it does not take 
the job seriously enough, while all 
the while boasting that that is just 
what it does.
Although I don’t think our ordinary 
locutions count for much in efforts 
like mine here to make precise an 
everyday concept like evidence so 
that it can serve specific scientific 
purposes, I’ll just note that often 
we do use the term "evidence"  in 
a way that supposes that there’s 
no evidence for false claims. If I am 
accused of cooking the books or 
murdering Ackerly, I might very well 
respond, “But you couldn’t have 
evidence for that. I didn’t do it."
2.3 An Alternative Account of Objective 
Evidence and Why I Do Not Adopt It
My insistence that in science and policy we 
want a sense of evidence in which evidence 
for a hypothesis speaks for its truth echoes 
views of Sherrilyn Roush, who has done 
a great of very instructive thinking about 
evidence. In her book Tracking Truth (Roush 
2005), Roush links a theory of evidence with 
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her theory of knowledge – where the latter has 
to do with what we are entitled to claim for 
ourselves as knowledge. Her very first sentence 
in the chapter "What is Evidence?..." is on the 
knowledge side: "It is a truism that the better 
one’s evidence for a claim p the more likely one is 
to have knowledge that p." [p 149]. But like me 
Roush is keen to keep the enterprises of theory 
of knowledge and theory of evidence separate:
...the notions of evidence that I 
am aiming for are objective in the 
following sense. That e is evidence 
for h is understood as holding in 
virtue of a factual relation between 
the statement e’s being true and the 
statement h’s being true, not in virtue 
of anyone’s believing that this relation 
exists. [p 156] 
Her basic idea is this: "Intuitively, good 
evidence for a hypothesis is a discriminating 
indicator of the truth of the hypothesis," [p 
154] where "discriminating indicator" means 
some appropriate probabilistic analogue of "h 
is true if e is true and false if e is false". 
Formally Roush’s account of evidence requires 
that for good evidence:
•   P(h/e) be high.
In order to satisfy what she calls the leverage 
condition, Roush in addition requires
•    the likelihood ratio [P(e/h)/P(E/-h)] be 
greater than 1
Moreover it is highly desirable that
•   P(e) be high. 
There are a number of reasons that I do not 
adopt Roush’s account, hinging primarily on 
the fact that it is still too much of a hybrid 
between a theory of evidence and an account 
of how to justify our claims to knowledge.
•    Where our accounts part company at the 
start is over what Rush calls "Bayesianism". 
For her this does not mean a subjective 
interpretation of probability. Rather – "the 
Bayesian makes the idealizing assumption 
that all statements of the language in 
question possess probabilities. This is 
in contrast to the approach of classical 
statistics in which it is denied, for instance, 
that hypotheses have probabilities." [p 155] 
For the objective notion of evidence that 
Roush and I both have in view, though, it 
cannot be probabilities of statements that 
matter but rather probabilities of facts. I 
do not see that there generally are such 
probabilities. Probabilities for facts arise 
from chance set-ups, which are a special 
kind of nomological machine (Cartwright 
1999), and while nomological machines are 
not all that rare, those that count as chance 
set-ups appear to be a small subset. 
Then I disagree with each of her conditions 
in turn.
•    P(e) is high. Roush insists on this in a 
debate about whether evidence should 
be surprising, which many, Bayesians 
especially, require. Her discussion at this 
point repeatedly refers to degrees of 
belief despite the fact that she means to 
be embarked on an objective theory of 
evidence. And I think that’s a clue. If we 
are thinking about a license to "accept" 
h, there are a variety of reasons to value 
observing consequences of h that were 
not expected beforehand: like worries 
about accommodation rather than novel 
prediction, or the demand that h have 
content that goes beyond summarizing 
what’s already known. 
•    Notice I say here "expected" – that has 
to do with subjective probabilities which 
are not relevant to the objective notion of 
evidence. On the objective side, I urge that 
e should be true, not objectively probable. 
High probability of e only comes in as a 
demand when we consider whether we 
should "accept" that e is evidence.
Consider an example where we might all 
be willing to suppose there are objective 
probabilities. We have 3 coins:
•    For C(1), P(h) = .2
•    For C(2), P(h) = 1….it is two-headed.
•    For C(3), P(h) = .2
Imagine that the following chance-se-up is in 
place from time t(1) through time t(3):
•    At t(1), flip coin1
•    At t(2), if C(1) = h, at t(2) flip C(2)
     At t(2) if C(1) = t, flip C(3)
•    At t(3) either h occurs on C(1) or either 
heads or tails on C(2).
Now consider e = "c(1) = h at t(2)" and h = 
"heads occurs at t(3)". P(e) = .2. That is low.  
But e is compelling evidence for h. What I want 
to underline is that it is compelling evidence 
not despite its low probability but regardless of 
its probability. It would be evidence no matter 
what its probability. Even though e has an 
objective probability, that objective probability 
is irrelevant to its status as evidence. This claim 
is true in general I maintain. 
What I would say about e is this: "C(1) = h at 
t(2)", if true, is evidence not for h but for h’ =  
"At t(2) the objective probability of heads at t(3) 
is .2". This I think is the right thing to say and it 
is what follows on the Argument Theory.
•    The likelihood ratio is high. This is in aid 
of leverage. Roush tells us: "…evidence 
provides leverage on the truth of claims 
about the world. Specifically, knowing 
that the evidence statement is true is 
usually a lot easier than knowing that 
the hypothesis statement is true, and we 
use the former to help us make progress 
on the latter where we could not have 
made progress directly." [p 158] Damien 
Fennell and I have elsewhere (Cartwright 
and Fennell 2009) explained problems we 
have with thinking the likelihood ratio 
can do provide leverage in the way Roush 
wants. I won’t rehearse those worries here 
but rather make a more general point. 
I don’t see how to justify any condition 
that demands leverage in this sense for 
an objective notion of evidence. Leverage 
clearly makes sense when we are in 
the business of justifying our claims to 
knowledge or trying to estimate what to 
expect in the future. Suppose e, if true, 
is evidence for h. There is no point in 
spending a lot of money to learn whether 
e is true or not as an aid to deciding 
whether h is true when it is a lot cheaper 
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just to learn h directly. But that has 
nothing to do with whether e is evidence 
for h or not.
•    P(h/e) is high.  Suppose this is so and P 
is an objective probability and e is true. 
Then the objective probability of h is P(h) 
= P(h/e) and on the argument account e 
is good evidence for this – and that is so 
whether P(h) is high or not. For Roush it 
is also evidence for h. One could make 
this stipulation as part of an objective 
account of evidence but I think it is 
misleading. We don’t have evidence that 
h will obtain, just that it can, or might 
or might well; more precisely, that it has 
probability P(h) of obtaining. There may 
be no harm in adding Roush’s requirement 
to the argument account but it will mean 
that there can be good evidence – in 
the fully objective sense – for false h’s, 
not just evidence we mistakenly thought 
was good. Evidence does not provide the 
same assurance as it does on the basic 
Argument Theory. 
Also, note that if it is added as an allowance 
on the Argument Theory it would play a 
different role than in Roush’s. For Roush this 
is what secures the relevance of e to h. On 
the Argument Theory, that is secured by 
arguments linking e and h. And that demand 
should be enforced here as well. We should 
still demand a good argument – valid and 
sound – for the claim that P(h) = φ. 
•    There is one other feature on which Roush 
and I differ but not, I think, disagree. 
That is on discrimination. For Roush e 
should track h; bracketing issues about 
probabilities, e should be true iff h is. The 
Argument Theory requires only that h be 
true if e is. One could perfectly well add 
this. "Evidence" even "objective evidence" 
is not a natural kind with a fixed criteria 
or a fixed extension. I do not wish to 
opt for this stronger notion since it is far 
stronger than what seems supposed in 
the evidence-based policy literature and 
in the bulk of scientific cases I am familiar 
with. In particular it would undercut the 
claim that positive results in ideal RCTs are 
evidence for causal claims since positive 
results imply a causal connection between 
treatment and outcome but negative 
results do not show there is none.
•    I also have a worry about probabilistic 
characterizations of evidence like Roush’s 
even when the topic is not objective 
evidence but rather our entitlement 
to hold some cognitive attitude to a 
hypothesis or to use it in some way: 
probabilistic characterizations put the cart 
before the horse. Subjective probabilities, 
at least when we employ them in serious 
decision making, should have reasons 
behind them. Like what? Conditional 
probabilities generally play an important 
role, like P(h/e). How do we set that? One 
standard way is look to see if e is evidence 
for h and how strongly it speaks for h’s 
truth, then set the probability of h given 
e accordingly. But to do that, we need 
some independent way of characterizing 
evidence that does not depend on our 
subjective probabilities.
3. What Makes RCTs Evidence for 
Effectiveness?
I have rehearsed the Argument Theory of 
Evidence because it can provide us with an 
answer to this question and an answer that 
matters to getting out predictions right in 
evidence-based policy.
The current evidence-based policy literature 
rates positive outcomes in well-conducted 
randomized controlled trials as gold standard 
evidence for predictions that the treatment 
in the trail will work if we implement it in our 
setting. So, what’s the argument?
RCT results are normally effect sizes: ES 
=df the difference in the expectation of the 
outcome (y) in treatment group and in the 
control group (Exp(y)T  - Exp(y)C). Causes do 
not, we suppose, produce their effects willy 
nilly, at least not here prediction is possible. 
Rather these effects are generated in accord 
with causal principles. We can without loss of 
generality suppose that these principles are of 
this form:1
CP: y(i) = a + b(i)x(i) + z(i)
where y(i) is the outcome for individual i in 
the population where the principle holds, x(i) 
is the treatment variable, a is a constant and 
z(i) represents all the other casual clusters that 
contribute linearly with x to produce the value 
of y in i. It is apparent from this principle that 
x is a genuine contributor to y for at least 
some individuals i in this setting iff b(i) ≠ 0 
for some i. A well-known argument – which 
I shall call the RCT Argument – shows that, 
under usual assumptions about ideal RCTs, 
ES = Exp(b) (X – X’)
where X = the value of the treatment variable 
in the treatment group and X’, the value in 
the control group. 
RCT Argument
1. y(i) = a + b(i)x(i) + z(i)
2. ES = Exp(y(i)/x(i)=X) – Exp(y(i)/x(i)=X’) 
 =  Exp(a/x(i) = X) -  Exp(a/x(i) = X’) + 
Exp(b(i)/x(i) = X)X – Exp(b(i)/x(i) = X’)
X’ + 
Exp(z(i)/x(i) = X) - Exp(z(i)/x(i) = X’)
3. x is probabilistically independent of 
b and w. 
Therefore ES = Exp(b(i))(X – X’)
Premise 3 is supposed to be guaranteed 
by random assignment of individuals to 
the treatment and control groups and by 
masking, quadruple masking if possible. I shall 
suppose that it holds by definition in an ideal 
RCT and henceforth consider only ideal RCTs. 
We should remember of course that real 
RCTs are generally far from the ideal and that 
randomization only assures the independence 
assumptions in the long run were the same 
experiment repeated indefinitely.
So for an ideal RCT, if the effect size is 
positive, so is Exp(b) which means that  b is 
positive for at least some i. So x is a genuine 
1 The results I shall describe are essentially the same for more complicated functional forms.
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contributor to y for some individuals in a 
population subject to CP.  This shows that 
there is a good argument,  A’, that has among 
its premises the evidence claim 
e =df "The effect size of x for y in the 
population in a well-conducted RCT is 
ES > 0."
and has as its conclusion
h1 =df "x is contributes to the 
production of y for some individuals in 
the population in that study." 
So e is evidence for h1 relative to the RCT 
Argument and thereby relative to the other 
premises in that argument (including especially 
the assumption that conducting the experiment 
well – randomizing, masking, etc. –delivered the 
features an ideal RCT is supposed to have). To 
establish e’s evidential relevance to effectiveness 
prediction h, we now need to find an argument 
– a good argument – that I shall call the 
Effectiveness Argument, in which h1 figures 
essentially as a premise and h as conclusion. 
Before I propose one, I want to point out 
something about CP, which is often subject 
to a grave misunderstanding, one that I hope 
the reader won’t have been led into because 
I was careful with the notation. Often CP is 
written with the reference to the i’s implicit, 
so it looks like this:
CP’: y = a + bx + z.
In this case it is easy to suppose that b is 
a constant. But there are few treatment 
variables x for which this is likely be the 
case. After all, the treatment is usually only 
the salient factor, or the factor of focus, in a 
cluster of factors that together are sufficient 
to produce a contribution, that is, sufficient 
when they all take the right values at once. 
To use the terminology of JL Mackie (Mackie 
1965), x is cause, yes; but it is an INUS cause 
of contributions to y: it contributes to y, but 
only when operating in cooperation with 
helping factors and often a great many of 
these. In CP, b(i) represents in one fell swoop 
the values for i of all the helping factors 
that are necessary along with x to ensure a 
contribution to y.
Now to the argument. First we need to 
formulate a conclusion properly. One version 
would be 
hES  =df "If x = X were introduced 
in our setting, as opposed to x = X’, 
keeping fixed all the other causes 
of y in our situation [except those 
downstream from x], the effect size 
would be ES for us too."
So, will x make the same average contribution; 
that is, is the efficacy, which is measured by 
the treatment effect in the study situation, 
the same there as here. Certainly if the same 
principle holds there as here, a will be the same 
since it is constant. But b is not a constant; and 
the effect size is its expectation – that is, the 
effect size is an average over x’s supporting 
factors. The average in each situation depends 
on the distribution of these in that situation. 
Even if the same principles govern the two, 
that is no reason to suppose the distributions 
of support factors would be the same. To the 
contrary in fact, this distribution very often 
heavily depends on local circumstances so it is 
unlikely to be the same. 
Anyway, the same distribution is not really 
what you hope for. What you’d really like is 
that you have – or can arrange to have – a 
distribution that favours the good values 
of b – the ones that provide the largest 
contribution from the programme. At the 
least, you will want to have some values for 
which x’s contribution is positive and these 
should outweigh the effects of those that 
make x’s contribution negative; and if getting 
negative contributions in some individuals in 
your setting is to be avoided, then you don’t 
want any of these at all.
Suppose though we can lay aside worries 
about negative contributions in some 
individuals. Suppose we want to predict simply 
hcont =df "If x = X were introduced 
in our setting, as opposed to x = X’, 
keeping fixed all the other causes 
of y in our setting [except those 
downstream from x], a positive 
contribution would result for some 
members of  our population."
What does it take to make ideal RCT evidence 
relevant? I am going to talk, for short, about 
whether x can play a causal role in the 
production of y – is it genuinely there in the 
principle for the production of y for some 
individuals? Here then is what I take it is the 
weakest valid argument that uses the results 
we can get from an RCT there as a premise 
and concludes that the programme or 
treatment will contribute positively for some 
individuals here.
Effectiveness Argument
1. x can play a causal role in the 
principles that govern y’s production 
there.
2. x can play a causal role in the 
production of y here if it does so there.
3. The support factors necessary for x to 
make a positive contribution are present 
for at least some individuals here.
________________________________
Therefore, x can play a causal role in 
the production of y in some individuals 
here and the support factors 
necessary for x to make a positive 
contribution are present for at least 
some individuals here (ie, x contributes 
to the production of y for some 
individuals here).
Where then does the RCT come in? It enters 
in a different argument, an argument that 
supports premise 1. That is why I talked 
earlier about what a study can evidence 
directly. As I use this term, a well-warranted 
empirical claim e is direct evidence for a 
hypothesis h iff e figures essentially in a good 
argument for h – a valid argument with well-
warranted premises. Now the RCT Argumnet 
is a valid argument that takes as premise a 
positive effect size in an experiment and as 
conclusion, that the programme contributes 
to the targeted outcome there in the study 
situation (post implementation). The other 
premises in the RCT Argument have to do 
with further features of the study; for instance 
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that confounding factors are independent of 
x. The keepers of the evidence warehouses 
police these premises for particular studies: 
they judge how well-warranted the other 
premises in an argument like the RCT 
Argument are, mostly on the basis of the 
study design. So if we find a programme in 
a conscientious warehouse, we have good 
reason to think there is a good (valid and 
sound) argument like A’ to warrant the claim 
that x plays a causal role somewhere – there 
in the study setting. And that is the first 
premise in the Effectiveness Argument.  
So the RCT result can be evidence for 
effectiveness here, but it is only indirect. 
It is not a premise in an argument for 
effectiveness but rather a premise in an 
argument for a premise. Moreover, its 
relevance is conditional, highly conditional, 
since it depends on the validity and the 
soundness of both the RCT and the 
Effectiveness Arguments. As in this picture, 
a positive effect size in an RCT is leveraged 
into evidence that the program works there 
(in the RCT setting) by argument the RCT 
Argument; and "it works there" is leveraged 
into evidence for "it works here" by the 
Effectiveness Argument; if either argument 
fails, the lever drops and evidential relevance 
disappears with a thud. 
Both the RCT and the Effectiveness 
Arguments  are valid, so what really matters is 
their soundness. We may take it for granted 
that the RCT Argument is pretty good if 
we find the programme in a reputable 
warehouse. What about the Effectiveness 
Argument? What ensures that its premises 
are well-warranted? Recall, the two additional 
premises necessary are:
2. x can play a causal role in the 
production of y here if it does so there.
3. The support factors necessary for x to 
make a positive contribution are present 
for at least some individuals here.
What further arguments support these 
premises? That’s the problem. There are no 
warehouses for information like this, and the 
kind of information needed is really hard to 
come by. I don’t see how 2. can be supported 
without a great deal of theory; so too with 3., 
in order to identify what the requisite support 
factors are. Then, in addition, 3. will require 
a good deal of local knowledge to determine 
if we have here even some of the right values 
for the support factors, let alone a desirable 
distribution of them.
Before returning to my overarching message, 
let me take up two objections to my account 
of what can count as warrant for an 
effectiveness prediction beyond the earlier 
objections to the Argument Theory in general. 
First: RCTs are often advocated by people 
who don’t like theory – they think our claims 
to theoretical knowledge are too slippery; 
they just don’t want to trust to them. That 
means they don’t like my view about how 
2. gets warranted. They have an alternative 
proposal: more and more RCTs, with as much 
variation in circumstances as possible. I agree 
that more RCTs, and especially across a variety 
of circumstances can improve the warrant 
for an effectiveness prediction. It does so by 
supporting a premise like 2.: the program 
plays a causal role here. How? That’s the rub. 
The argument could be by simple enumerative 
induction: swan 1 is white, swan 2 is white…; 
x can play a causal role in situation 1, x can 
play a causal role in situation 2, …  
And how good is that argument? For 
induction we need not only a large and 
varied inductive base – lots of swans from 
lots of places; lots of RCTs from different 
populations. We also need reason to 
believe the observations are projectable, 
plus an account of the range across which 
they project. Electron charge is projectable 
everywhere – one good experiment is enough 
to generalise to all electrons; bird colour 
sometimes is; causality is dicey. Many causal 
connections depend on intimate, complex 
interactions among factors present so that no 
special role for the factor of interest can be 
prised out and projected to new situations.
I urge that rather than some weak inductive 
argument, we need a rigorous deductive 
argument. Then we know just what we are 
betting on when we bet on the conclusion. 
So I would add a premise to the effect that 
x can play the same causal role here as in 
all those other places, add it so that the 
challenge is clear: just what is the warrant for 
this very strong claim. That matters because 
of the weakest link principle: the conclusion 
can never have any more warrant than each 
of its premises individually.
The second objection is this. Surely the best 
evidence that the program will work here 
is an RCT here. I agree this would be good 
evidence – let’s not quarrel about "best". 
Would be were it possible. But we never 
do an RCT here really, here on the same 
population at the same time. And both 
matter. A sample is almost never going to be 
a representative. Representative: that means 
governed by the same causal principles and 
having the same probability distribution 
over the causally relevant factors. And time 
certainly cannot be ignored. Are the causes 
the same now as they were when the study 
was done? That’s a particularly pressing 
question for socioeconomic programme since 
economists from JS Mill to the distinguished 
British econometrician David Hendry have 
worried that past regularities are a poor 
guide to the future in economics, just 
because the background arrangement of 
cause shifts so often, and so unpredictably. 
Of course the experimental population could 
be representative enough and the causes at 
work stable enough. Let’s just get this stated 
explicitly as one of our premises. Then we can 
think about what warrant there is for these 
assumptions in our case.
Conclusion
That returns us to my overarching point. 
Evidence is a 3-place relation. e is evidence 
for h only relative to some argument or other. 
That is not a new idea at all, and it may not 
be very controversial. But taking it seriously 
matters. It is altogether too easy, when we 
do not keep the arguments to the fore, to 
overestimate the warrant that our studies can 
deliver. The RCT is a good example. It is widely 
taken in the evidence-based policy literature 
as gold standard evidence for effectiveness 
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claims. Though perhaps with a caution. The US 
Department of Education, for example, warns 
that trials on white suburban populations do 
not constitute strong evidence for large inner 
city schools serving primarily minority students. 
This kind of warning simply conceals what 
needs to be exposed. What is the argument 
that makes a particular RCT result evidence for 
a particular effectiveness prediction? As we 
have seen, if evidence, it is indirect evidence – 
there are layers of arguments to get from the 
study result to the effectiveness conclusion.  
And they all have additional premises, every 
one of which, along the way, is essential for 
the security of the final conclusion. No matter 
how firm the RCT result is, the effectiveness 
conclusion – for which it is supposed to be 
gold standard evidence – can have no greater 
claim to knowledge than the shakiest of these. 
Nor is this unusual. Most of our knowledge 
claims, even in our securest branches of science, 
rest on far more premises than we would like 
to imagine, and far shakier. This recommends 
a dramatic degree of epistemic modesty. Most 
of us have adjusted to Neurath’s lesson that 
we are like sailors rebuilding our boat at sea. 
The conclusions I draw about evidence and the 
amount of warrant it can confer point to his less 
familiar warning: the boat is far leakier than we 
like to think. 
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Section iV
PuTTiNg EViDENCE TO WOrK
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4.1 ThE ThEOry ThAT bACKS uP WhAT WE SAy
(From Evidence Based Policy: A Practical Guide 
to Doing it Better, 2012)
Nancy Cartwright and Jeremy Hardie
1. Why Do We Want Theory?
We began I.A with the examples of 
Bangladesh and California to show how 
carefully and intelligently chosen policies 
can fail, even though they are based on 
excellent evidence that the same policy has 
worked well elsewhere. The journey from 
"It worked there" to "It will work here" 
is not easy. In this chapter we want to set 
out the theory that lies behind our practical 
recommendations. 
We do so because we want to show that our 
ideas about deciding policy are principled. 
Our approach is not just bluff and practical 
– the plain man’s way of cutting through the 
complexity of statistical evidence, probability 
theory, and so on to hard, coal-face facts that 
will lead to realistic predictions. Our advice is 
rooted in a theory, a theory of evidence for 
use. This is a theory designed specifically for 
the user’s problem of understanding what 
kinds of knowledge are good for reliable 
predictions about whether policies will work 
for you as you would implement them.
 
For evidence-based policy you need evidence 
that is both trustworthy and that speaks clearly 
for or against the policy. There are many sources 
available to help with the first of these: "When 
is an evidence claim trustworthy?" Various 
evidence-ranking schemes tell you how to sort 
evidence claims that can be trusted, claims that 
are very well-established, from ones that are 
more doubtful. Most of these schemes focus on 
one special kind of claim, that the policy works 
somewhere. They tell you what kind of study 
can nail that down – generally with RCTs and 
meta analyses of RCTs as their gold standard 
for this – and what kind of studies lend some, 
but far less, credibility to a claim that the policy 
worked somewhere. And various policy clearing 
houses – policy warehouses – will vet policies for 
you, to ensure that they are well evidenced to 
work somewhere. 
We will not duplicate these efforts here. We 
are engaged in a different enterprise, one that 
helps carry you beyond the knowledge that 
the policy has indeed worked somewhere. 
Which facts speak for or against the policy 
working for you – meaning, do or don’t lend 
credibility to it – and under what conditions?
We build our recommendations from a theory 
of relevance. Relevance matters because 
knowing the facts is not enough when it 
comes to assembling evidence. You need to 
know facts that bear on the truth of the policy 
prediction. Which facts speak for or against 
it? Suppose you had an encyclopedia with all 
the facts about the world in it, forgetting what 
that could possibly mean, including the facts 
that you get from RCTs. Which ones should 
you take note of? The encyclopedia would tell 
you what is true. It would not tell you what 
is relevant. Getting the right answers about 
relevance is important, and ensuring that these 
answers are well-grounded and defensible is 
essential if policy is to be evidence-based. That 
is why we need a theory of relevance.
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2. Two Assumptions
Our treatment of relevance for effectiveness 
predictions is based on two assumptions. One 
relates to evidence in general; the other is 
special to the use of evidence that it works 
somewhere to support predictions that it will 
work here. It will take some explaining before 
we can tell you what they are.
2.1 Assumption 1 
2.1.a What Makes for Warrant?
To warrant a claim is to justify taking it to be 
true. So, how do you warrant the prediction 
that your proposed policy will work here, 
where you are? Warranting a claim, any claim, 
means marshaling reasons for it so that it 
is transparent why you have the right to be 
confident that the claim is true. It follows 
that warrant requires a good argument. 
An argument here is a set of propositions, 
called its premises, and a proposition, called 
its conclusion, not, as typically in ordinary 
language, just a reason ("My argument for 
buying this wine is that it is cheap"). The 
reasons you marshal must themselves be 
trustworthy and together they should compel 
the conclusion, or at least make it likely. That’s 
what we mean by a good argument. A good 
argument is both sound and valid. Sound 
means that the premises are trustworthy; valid, 
that the conclusion is genuinely implied by 
the premises. Good arguments provide strong 
warrant for their conclusions; the weaker the 
argument, the weaker the warrant.
If the conclusion of an argument is to be 
well-warranted, each of its premises must be 
well-warranted as well. Some premises may 
be self-evident, or already well established, 
or attested to by a reliable expert, or just 
easy to tell by looking. For instance, from our 
discussion of CCTV cameras and car crime 
in III.B.3.1, it does not take a major study 
to support the claim that your parking lot 
is surrounded by an 8-foot high wall, nor 
an intimate knowledge of physiology and 
criminal sociology to know that most car 
thieves cannot readily leap 8-foot walls. To 
know whether CCTV footage is admissible in 
court, ask a lawyer. And if it happens that a 
premise in your argument is that a policy has 
worked somewhere, for warrant you can take 
the word of a good policy warehouse, like 
What Works or the Campbell Collaboration. 
Often, however, the premises in your main 
argument – call these major premises – will 
themselves need serious support. So you 
will need subarguments, each with its own 
premises, to support the major premises. 
Maybe you will even need subarguments to 
the subarguments. Each argument and each 
subargument must be a good one – valid and 
sound – or the whole structure is threatened. 
Sometimes a variety of different arguments 
can be offered in support of the same 
conclusion. This is typical when premises are 
insecure. You hope that at least one of your 
arguments can stand firm. What’s doing the 
justificatory work in this case is yet another 
argument with yet further premises. It look 
like this: "The premises of Argument 1, if 
true, make the conclusion probable; the 
premises of Argument 2, if true, make the 
conclusion probable; …. the premises of 
Argument N, if true, make the conclusion 
probable. Probably the premises of at least 
one of Arguments 1, 2, …, N are true. 
Therefore the conclusion is probably true." 
This is fine, so long as you are clear about 
just what the overall argument is and about 
how secure its premises are. Otherwise there 
is danger that you will over – or under – bid 
your cards.
To get clear on just what your argument 
is, one device you can employ is to build 
an argument pyramid, as in Figure I.2. The 
conclusion is at the top. The major premises 
are next layer down. Below each major 
premise are the premises in the subargument 
that supports it. And below each of those, 
the premises of the sub-subargument that 
supports it. Put blank boxes where you can 
see you need more premises to make a valid 
argument but don’t know just what they are. 
For instance, Inspector French’s argument 
that Carey killed Ackerly, which we discuss in 
I.B.2.1.b, might require a motive for the killing. 
If French suspects there is a good motive, but 
doesn’t have a good hypothesis what it is yet, 
he would leave the space for that premise 
blank. Stop when you run out of arguments or 
don’t need them anymore. From any premises 
that don’t need further serious support – like 
those that are self-evident or that you just see 
by looking or are already well established or 
attested to by a reliable expert – draw roots 
into the ground. This is to show that they can 
stand on their own.
[Figure I.2]
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There are two big advantages to taking 
seriously the connection between argument 
and warrant and to sketching argument 
pyramids like this. First, it helps you put order 
into your reasons. Second, it helps you assess 
the degree of confidence you should have in 
your conclusion. Ideally every box is filled in 
and every box stands on others and those on 
others until eventually all are rooted in the 
ground. Then you can have a high degree 
of confidence in your conclusion. If lots of 
boxes are hanging in the air and there are 
lots of blank boxes as well, your degree of 
confidence should be low. 
Often you will find the pyramid is shaky, but it 
doesn’t seem too implausible to think that the 
rest, with world enough and time, could be 
filled in and supplied with thick roots at the 
bottom. That justifies some confidence, but 
not a high degree. If you find yourself in this 
situation – as we suspect you very often will 
– you should not despair. This is the typical 
human condition; relative certainty is hard to 
come by. You can then decide whether the 
policy is worth pursuing given that it may well 
be effective, but then again, it may well not. 
And at least you will have a better estimate of 
how confident you should be.
There is one caution in the use of argument 
pyramids. The visual representation can be 
misleading. Suppose you have an argument 
with three major premises. If you take away 
the one that you have pictured in the middle, 
it can look as if the conclusion is still well 
supported. But, to the contrary. Where 
there are blank boxes there are holes in the 
argument, and an argument with holes 
provides no support at all. You only get 
some support if you hypothesize that these 
holes can be filled in. And your support for 
the conclusion can be no stronger than your 
justification for this hypothesis. 
2.1.b Evidence and Argument
We now turn to evidence. The evidence 
for a claim is supposed to help provide 
warrant for it; it is supposed to help justify 
your confidence that the claim is true. That 
means that evidence must figure in a good 
argument. The evidence claim must appear as 
a major premise – or a subpremise, or a sub-
subpremise – in an argument alongside other 
premises that together make the conclusion 
probable. That’s what secures relevance. It is 
the overall argument that turns one of those 
millions of trustworthy claims one can make 
about the world into a piece of evidence for 
the conclusion. This means that whether a 
particular claim is evidence for a conclusion 
depends on some specific argument for the 
conclusion in which that claim figures and on 
how good that argument is.
Evidential relevance then is a 3-place relation. 
It involves an evidence claim, a hypothesis 
(or conclusion), and an argument: Claim 
e is evidence for hypothesis h relative to 
some good argument A. Relative to the 
argument under consideration, some 
evidence claims will be what we call directly 
relevant; others only indirectly relevant. The 
claims expressed in the major premises of 
the argument are what we label directly 
relevant to the hypothesis. But we know that 
if the hypothesis is to be well-warranted, 
each of the major premises must itself be 
well-warranted, so each of these too must 
have a good argument to support it. Any 
of the claims offered as premises in one of 
these subarguments are, in our terminology, 
indirectly relevant to the original hypothesis. 
This carries on, generating evidence claims 
that are relevant to the original hypothesis, 
but more and more indirectly, and relative to 
a series of arguments connecting them to it. 
This gives us a good, succinct account of 
evidential relevance, that is, an account of 
what turns a trustworthy claim into a piece of 
evidence. It is the first assumption of our theory: 
Assumption 1
A well-established empirical claim e is 
evidence for h if and only if e can be 
rendered as a premise in an argument, 
A, and A is a good argument for h; or, 
e is a premise in A’, where A’ is a good 
argument for a premise in a good 
argument, A, for h; and so forth.
As we urged in the last section, it is important 
to be clear just what the arguments are for 
your conclusion and how well supported their 
premises are in order to assess how confident 
you can be that the conclusion is correct. An 
argument pyramid with gaps where you don’t 
know just what form one of the essential 
premises takes provides shaky support for 
your conclusion. It’s far worse when you have 
good reason to think one of the essential 
premises is false. We stress the importance of 
arguments because arguments, like chains, 
are only as strong as their weakest link. A 
valid argument with 9 premises known to 
be true and one known to be false does not 
make its conclusion 90 per cent probable. 
It provides no warrant at all. So a body of 
evidence that nails down nine of the premises 
is not enough for high warrant. Indeed, if 
the 10th premise is known to be false, the 
argument is no good at all and the proffered 
"evidence" is irrelevant to the truth of the 
conclusion. This is important to keep in mind 
for evidence-based policy, where some of the 
premises may be very well established but 
often others may be fairly dicey. In this case 
you must be careful not to overestimate the 
warrant you have for your policy predictions.
Mystery stories can provide good examples of 
the importance of each premise to the stability 
of the overall structure. Consider Freeman Wills 
Croft’s Inspector French, who is always at pains 
to lay out clearly the arguments that support his 
conclusions. In (Crofts 2001), Inspector French 
has become convinced, on the basis of a body of 
seemingly good evidence, that Carey murdered 
Ackerly. We reconstruct his warrant for this in the 
form we advocate – that of an argument with 
explicit premises and explicit subpremises.
Premise 1 in French’s argument concerns 
motive. Ackerly, French argued, had cottoned 
on to a major fraud that Carey was involved 
in. This was backed by compelling evidence 
for three claims: fraud had been committed; 
Ackerly had raised suspicions about it; and 
Carey was responsible for the fraud. This last 
was supported by evidence that Carey was 
in a position to perpetrate the fraud, that 
he had income otherwise unaccounted for, 
and, very importantly, that he had committed 
suicide when it looked as if the fraud might 
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be revealed despite Ackerly’s death.
There was equally good evidence for Premise 
2 concerning opportunity. Carey could have 
committed the murder. We won’t tell the 
whole story here: the check marks in Figure 
I.3 mean that French did indeed have good 
reasons to back his claim about Carey’s 
opportunity. But opportunity and motive by 
themselves do not support a conclusion of 
guilt. French, though, had a third premise. 
Premise 3 laid out the method. This was a 
step-by-step narrative, of the kind we discuss 
in III.B.2, of how Carey was supposed to 
have carried out the murder. This narrative 
was supported by good evidence that Carey 
was at some of the right places at the right 
times, and French had established, by timing 
distances and estimating speeds, that Carey 
could have been at the other places in the 
chain just when needed. We graph French’s 
reasoning in the argument pyramid picture in 
Figure I.3. French had a way to fill in all the 
boxes all the way down, but we won’t do so 
since the details for them do not matter to 
the story.
[Figure I.3]
Together French’s three major premises made 
a compelling argument for Carey’s guilt – 
seemingly both sound and valid. Then it 
was revealed that Carey had not committed 
suicide but rather was murdered. French 
immediately reported this to his superior. Here 
is a record of their conversation, beginning 
with a question from French’s superior (Crofts 
2001: 202).
"This is going to mean an upset to 
your theory, Inspector?" 
French nodded. "Complete. I’ve got to 
start from the beginning again."
"Is it as bad as that?"
"…I think so….This murder of Carey 
makes it unlikely that he killed Ackerly, 
and if he didn’t kill Ackerly, the whole 
of my theory goes west."
So, the whole theory falls. There is no longer 
compelling reason to think that Carey 
murdered Ackerly. 
But what about all that evidence that French 
had so painstakingly gathered? It was no 
longer evidence that Carey was the killer. 
The suicide was an essential prop for the 
assumption that Carey was responsible for the 
fraud. Without the suicide the other evidence 
for this was just far too weak to justify that 
assumption. But without it, Premise 1 fails 
– motive is not established. And without 
motive, opportunity and the existence of a 
possible method for carrying out the murder 
provide weak warrant, if any at all, that Carey 
was the murderer. It is still possible that he 
was guilty. But French no longer has evidence 
to support that. Evidence is a 3-place relation. 
The measurements of distances and times are 
evidence of Carey’s guilt, yes. But only relative 
to French’s entire argument. When one of 
the necessary premises in that argument fails, 
those measurements are no longer evidence 
at all.1 As French says, his whole theory 
collapses – as in Figure I.4:
[Figure I.4]
1 Unless of course French could produce another valid argument in which the measurements figure and where all the other 
premises can be assumed with confidence.
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Before turning to our second assumption, 
some remarks on terminology are in 
order. Sometimes "evidence" is used in 
a broader sense than ours. For instance, 
historian of physics Peter Galison argues 
that mathematics is the new laboratory of 
physics. In some branches of physics, like 
string theory, often the best evidence that a 
theory is on the right track is not whether it 
predicts new experimental results but rather 
whether its equations satisfy certain abstract 
mathematical constraints, often having to do 
with symmetries (Galison 2004). When we 
use the term "evidence" we mean something 
more narrow, we mean empirical evidence. 
Whether the facts are local, like "There is 
an 8-foot wall around our parking lot", or 
very general, like the law of gravitational 
attraction, for us evidence claims report facts 
about the world.
Others use the term "evidence" more 
narrowly than we do. Evidence claims are 
restricted to reports of the results of individual 
scientific studies. We reject this usage 
because our topic is evidence for predicting 
effectiveness, and the context is evidence-
based policy. There is a general assumption 
about evidence-based policy that if you have a 
great deal of trustworthy evidence, you are in 
a good position to predict whether the policy 
will work here. But if evidence is restricted 
to just results of individual scientific studies, 
this is badly mistaken. You need a lot more 
facts than specific results of specific scientific 
studies to argue that a policy will work here. 
You need, as we shall show, facts about 
causal roles and about support factors—that’s 
what our book is about. Without these 
facts, and without good warrant for them, 
your conclusion is not justified. If evidence-
based policy is to do its job then, it is best to 
construe evidence widely enough to cover all 
the facts without which you will not have a 
good argument.
2.2 Assumption 2
We begin with the observation that evidential 
relevance depends on the type of the 
hypothesis. Different types of hypotheses 
require different types of evidence. The 
hypotheses that we are concerned with in this 
book – policy effectiveness predictions – are 
causal claims: The proposed policy will cause 
an improvement in the targeted outcome 
if you implement it. That’s part of why you 
are willing to adopt the policy – because you 
expect it to make a difference.
The most straightforward argument to 
support the truth of a prediction is one that 
lays out the facts that would make that 
prediction come true. We are going to focus 
on this kind of argument because it is special: 
its premises must be true or the prediction 
won’t come true; if any of the premises 
fail, so too will the conclusion. When the 
conclusion is a prediction about what effects 
a policy would have in a given situation, these 
are the facts about the situation that ensure 
that the policy would produce the specified 
effect there. What are these?
We suppose that causes do not produce their 
effects by accident, at least not if you are to 
be able to make reliable predictions about 
what will happen if you intervene. Rather, if a 
cause produces an effect, it does so because 
there is a reliable, systematic connection 
between the two, a connection that is 
described in a causal principle. Our advice is 
grounded in basic assumptions about these 
causal principles and how they operate, 
which we describe below. Facts about these 
principles will play an essential role in the 
argument that justifies the prediction that the 
policy will work here, where you are.
What then about RCTs? How do they 
figure into our story about the need for a 
good argument and about the importance 
of citing facts about causal principles 
among the premises in arguments for 
policy effectiveness? After all, RCTs, and 
related studies that provide strong warrant 
that the policy worked somewhere, are 
the conventional focal point of evidence-
based policy. If your argument for policy 
effectiveness does not include evidence of 
this kind, you will probably be judged not 
to be doing evidence-based policy. And we 
agree that starting here can be a good idea, 
especially now that so many warehouses for 
vetting and storing this kind of evidence are 
available. So how do you get RCTs to figure in 
a good argument for effectiveness?
RCTs show that a policy works somewhere. 
That’s supposed to be one premise. What 
other premises are needed alongside this to 
produce a good argument that the policy will 
work here? This is our second assumption:
 
Assumption 2
To get a good argument from "It 
works somewhere" to "It will work 
here" facts about causal principles 
here and there are needed. 
Otherwise there is no good way to make 
the study results relevant to predictions 
about what will happen were the policy to 
be implemented in the target setting. Our 
approach is based on identifying just what 
facts about causal principles are needed 
to fill in the missing premises. Our advice 
throughout is principled in that it is based on 
an account of causation that is intellectually 
robust and that translates into practical 
suggestions for ways to recognize the facts 
that are relevant to policy prediction.
3. Causal Principles
3.1 What is a Causal Principle?
We take from recent philosophical work 
on causality a few basic assumptions about 
the kinds of causal principles that typically 
support reliable policy prediction. 
1. Causal principles do not record mere 
statistical associations; "Correlation is not 
causation". That’s because causes make 
their effects happen; they contribute to their 
production; they are responsible for them. 
That’s the point of adopting a policy. The 
policy should make a difference. And that 
should not just be a matter of chance.
2. There may be some causal principles 
that hold everywhere; perhaps the law of 
gravitational attraction, that two masses 
attract each other with a force GMm/r2, is an 
example. But this is not typical in the sciences 
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and especially not in the medical and social 
sciences. In these areas, principles can vary 
from one situation to another; they can be 
more or less general; and more or less deep. 
In II we shall be reminded how the fact that 
causal principles can differ from locale to 
locale means that you cannot read off that 
a policy will work here from even very solid 
evidence that it worked somewhere else, or 
even in a number of somewhere elses.
3. Causal principles are not all on a par. Some 
may be more fundamental than others. The 
less fundamental hold on account of the 
more fundamental; with the right additional 
assumptions about local structure, they 
can be derived from the more fundamental 
ones. Generally the more fundamental hold 
more widely. Planets circulate the sun in 
elliptical orbits that are described by Kepler’s 
laws. But the orbits are also described by 
Newton’s more fundamental laws and, with 
background assumptions about the starting 
velocities and masses and their arrangement, 
Kepler’s laws can be derived from Newton’s. 
Kepler’s elliptical orbits are the working out 
of Newton’s laws when planets interact with 
the sun; they are what Newton’s laws amount 
to given the structure and features of the 
planetary system. 
This classic case is from physics. But the same 
kind of layering of principles occurs in the 
biological and social realm. In II.B we shall 
see how this fact can sometimes provide a 
powerful tool for constructing new, different 
programs from ones that worked elsewhere 
or for avoiding failures, as in the Bangladesh 
Integrated Nutrition Project.
4. The causal principles employed throughout 
the biological, medical, and social sciences 
are ceteris paribus principles. They hold only 
"other things being equal", or, to put it more 
accurately, other things being "normal", or 
"within appropriate bounds". This is familiar. 
Reducing class sizes will not help reading 
scores if a hurricane wipes out the schools.
 
5. Causal principles can be deterministic, 
as in classical physics, where the causes fix 
exactly what effects must occur. They may be 
merely probabilistic, as in dicing or quantum 
mechanics, where a given effect occurs with 
some fixed probability. Or, as in our more 
general experience, they may be even less 
regimented than that. The effects occur 
sometimes, or more often than not, or most 
of the time. They may also be quantitative, 
expressed in equations; they can alternatively 
be qualitative, relating features that do not 
have exact quantitative measures.
 
6. As we explain with simple examples in II.A, 
generally for the kinds of effects aimed for in 
policy planning 
a. contributions to the effect can 
come from different sources and via 
different pathways,
b. the overall effect depends 
in some systematic way on the 
contributions from these separate 
sources – in the simplest case the 
contributions simply add up, and
c. in general social policies on are 
not enough by themselves to ensure 
a contribution to the targeted 
effect; the policy described needs 
the right support team before 
it can be expected to produce a 
contribution.
Philosophers have a technical term to 
summarize 6, which we shall explain in 
detail in II.A. They say, "Causes are INUS 
conditions for their effects".2 An INUS 
condition is an Insufficient but Necessary part 
of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition for 
producing a contribution to the effect. We 
introduce this philosopher’s edict because it 
underlines two important facts to keep in mind 
in evaluating whether a policy will work here. 
First, the program or policy under 
consideration will seldom be sufficient by 
itself, no matter how much effort has been 
taken to include in its description as much as 
possible of what is required. The policy will 
only be a part of a team of causes that work 
together. It takes the whole team to produce 
a contribution. Together, the factors in the 
team are Sufficient for a contribution. But the 
separate team members, though Necessary 
for that team to produce a contribution, are 
each by itself Insufficient for doing so.
The reminder that a policy under 
consideration is generally just part of a 
team and is insufficient by itself to produce 
a contribution focuses attention on the 
questions: Are the requisite team members 
– which we call support factors – at hand? 
If not, can they be introduced practicably? 
There may of course be more than one set of 
support factors that will round out a policy 
to form a complete team, in which case the 
questions is: Are there to hand all of the 
factors required in at least one team in which 
the policy figures?
Second, the team in which the policy figures 
will not generally be the only thing that could 
contribute to the outcome. The team with the 
policy in it is Unnecessary for a contribution 
since a number of other teams that may 
or may not contain the policy can also 
contribute. The actual value of the outcome 
in a situation will depend on all the teams 
that operate in that situation, and on the size 
and direction of the contribution from each. 
Some of these will contribute positively and 
some negatively. 
To estimate the value of the outcome after 
the policy, you need to catalog all those 
factors that will be operating to produce 
the effect, which is a tall order. Plus you will 
need some formula for calculating how they 
combine, how they "add up".3 You will need 
to do a little less if you want to predict by 
how much matters will be different after the 
policy, since for this you need to consider the 
effects only of teams containing factors that 
change, but you will need to consider both 
those that change as a result of your actions 
and those that change independently of what 
you do. To predict instead whether and how 
much things will change as a result of the 
policy and its implementation, you only need 
2 Note that we claim that causes are INUS conditions. But not the converse, that all INUS conditions are causes. The 
terminology comes from Mackie (1965).
3 See 7. immediately following.
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to know about the teams that include factors 
that you will be changing – both those that 
contain the policy itself and also any others 
that you may change during implementation. 
We discuss post-implementation effects 
further in 4. For the more restricted 
prediction of just what the policy itself does, 
independent of any other changes introduced 
in implementing it, you need only look at 
teams with the policy in them.
 
Even for these final two more typical and 
somewhat easier exercises, though, it is 
not always safe to ignore teams that you 
won’t be changing. For instance, if there are 
already present teams that produce very large 
contributions, your policy may make such 
a negligible difference that it is not worth 
pursuing. There is no point in feeding the 
prisoner a meal low in salt and fat in order to 
improve her health if she is to be executed the 
next morning.
 
7. There can be different rules for how 
contributions combine depending on what 
the subject matter is. The social sciences often 
assume simple addition. Even there, though, 
allowance is made for threshold and marginal 
effects: If the outcome reaches a certain size, 
additional contributions make no difference, 
or each new unit may make less difference 
than the one before. In mechanics, forces 
combine by vector addition. In econometrics, 
sometimes the contribution of each separate 
factor is represented in a different equation. 
When the factors all act together, the 
separate equations must all be satisfied at 
once. And in both physics and economics, it is 
often supposed that the net outcome will be 
some kind of equilibrium among the various 
contributions.
 
Even though many of the causal principles 
that ground policy predictions may be purely 
qualitative, as explained in 5., much of the 
standard literature supposes that principles 
can be expressed in equations. We shall focus 
on principles like this in order to exploit some 
of the ideas and derivations already available 
in this literature. For similar reasons we shall 
focus on equations in which contributions 
from different sources simply add, despite 
the more complicated rules for combination 
noted in 7. We shall also, as is standard, 
suppose the equations are deterministic, 
despite the cautions in 5. Without these 
simplifications, technical matters become 
more complicated. But the basic lessons we 
draw remain the same.
 
Given these simplifying assumptions, we can 
suppose that the causal principles for the 
production of an outcome y look like this:
CP: y(i) c= a1 + a2y0(i) + a3b(i)x(i) + a4z(i),
4
where the i’s range over the individual 
individuals in the population to which the 
principle applies (these could be anything 
from individual students to classrooms 
4 We wish to stress, as remarked in the text, that we use this simple linear form to avoid needless complications and to make 
the discussion easier to follow. Exactly the same lessons follow from more complicated forms, including, especially, the lesson 
that the RCT treatment effect is a function of the average over the values of the support factors in the RCT population.
or states), y(i) is the outcome, x(i) is the 
policy variable, a’s are constants across all 
individuals, y0(i) is a "base level" of y for i, b(i) 
represents all the different factors in all the 
support teams that work with x to ensure a 
contribution for i, and z(i) represents, in one 
fell swoop, all the other factors and their 
support teams that contribute additively with 
x but do not include x. a2, a3, and a4 represent 
what might be called "boost factors"; they 
fix the size of the contribution from given 
values of the variables that follow. (These are 
like the constant of gravity, G, in the force of 
gravitational attraction between two masses: 
GMm/r2.) We employ the symbol c= to 
represent that the quantities on the two sides 
are equal and that the ones on the right-
hand-side are causes of the one on the left.
3.2 An Illustration
To illustrate, here is a simplified version of one 
of the examples that we use in II.A, where we 
set out the causal cake metaphor as a more 
user friendly way of approaching the notion 
of INUS conditions. We emphasize later that 
premature or optimistic simplification is in 
general risky in thinking about social policy – 
much of the problem is that you can forget 
too readily how many and how various are 
the other factors that have to be present 
if your policy is to work. So the simplified 
version here must be seen as no more than 
an attempt to clarify the notion of an INUS 
condition, which is a long way from the 
complexities of a discussion of what actually 
has to be done when you are to make that 
notion operative in the field. 
Consider the case of Tamil Nadu, where 
infant health (i.h.) was improved by educating 
mothers about nutrition. We shall take this 
result as given. How can that be expressed in 
terms of our equation CP? Like this:
TN: i.h.(i) c= a1 + a2i.h.0(i) + a3bm(i) em(i) + 
a4z(i), 
where em is educating the mother, and we 
know what that means. But the other factors 
are unknowns. 
Suppose, just so that you can see what is at 
stake, the effectiveness of em in Tamil Nadu 
has been very well established via a very 
good RCT. A positive effect in the RCT in 
Tamil Nadu tells you two things: that em is 
a member of some team of factors, bm and 
em, that produced a positive contribution 
to infant health for some individuals under 
the causal principle that obtained in Tamil 
Nadu; and that the support factors for em 
required under that principle, represented 
by bm (whatever they may be), were present 
in Tamil Nadu. In the terminology we shall 
employ, em played a positive causal role for 
some individuals in Tamil Nadu. This means no 
more than what the RCT tells you. It does not 
tell you what causal principle was operating 
there, nor anything about the other factors 
that affected the outcomes in the individuals 
in the study (represented by z), nor anything 
about the support factors represented in bm, 
except that they were present, nor about the 
boost factor a2.
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You now go to Bangladesh and educate 
mothers in nutrition, betting on an equation 
like TN:
BD: i.h.(i) c= a1’ + a2’ i.h.0(i) + a3’bm(i)’em(i) + 
a4’z’.
We write a1’, etc. rather than a1, etc. because 
here, too, you do not know what a1’, etc. 
stand for. But whatever they stand for, there is 
no reason to think that it is the same as in TN. 
Nor, more important, do you know whether 
bm’, which represents the support factors for 
em, is the same as bm. 
Post hoc evaluations indicate that the 
program had little effect on infant health in 
Bangladesh. There are then two possibilities:
 
1. That em does indeed form part of the 
applicable causal principle BD, but the 
support  factors were not present. 
 
2. That em does not even appear in the causal 
principle, so the question of the presence 
or  
absence of support factors, such as bm and 
bm’, does not arise.
In cases like 1., we will use language like 
"could play a positive causal role". It actually 
does play a positive causal role only if the 
support factors are present as well. In cases 
like 2., there is no question of either an actual 
or a potential causal role.
In both cases, you have in practice to think 
about what may be the evidence for a 
particular policy being part of an applicable 
causal principle. You have also to think about 
what evidence there may be for this or that 
being a support factor; and what evidence 
there may be that those support factors are 
present in your situation. The nature of the 
evidence will in general be very different in 
each case. For example, science may tell you 
that this policy is part of a causal principle here, 
whereas the evidence required to know that 
a known support factor is present may be no 
more than the evidence of your eyes.
The distinction also matters when you 
think about what might have gone wrong 
in Bangladesh. If you spot that the mother 
was certainly educated and that could have 
contributed to i.h., but there was not enough, 
or not the right kind, of food for her education 
to pay off, then you have case 1.: em is in the 
causal principle, but you did not have bm’. But 
if you see that the mother is not in charge of 
handing out the food, but the mother-in-law 
is, you have case 2, and em is not relevant, so 
the presence of bm’ does not arise. You might 
in that case consider the following:
 
BD: i.h.(i) c= a1’ + a2’ i.h.0(i) + a3’’bml(i)eml(i) + 
a4’z’(i)
where eml is educate the mother-in-law. And 
a’’, etc. instead of a’ or a signals that you don’t 
know what a’’ stands for and certainly don’t 
know that a and a’ and a’’, etc. are the same. 
And the same in the case of the support factors, 
bml, for educating mothers-in-law in Bangladesh. 
They may not be at all the same as for 
educating mothers in Tamil Nadu, or mothers-
in-law in charge of households elsewhere.
If educating the mother-in-law works, you 
have two equations:
BD: i.h.(i) c= a1’ + a2’ i.h.0(i) + a3’’bml(i)eml(i) + 
a4’z’(i) 
TN: i.h.(i) c= a1 + a2i.h.0(i) + a3 bm(i)em(i) + a4z(i).
They represent two causal principles with 
nothing in common except their abstract 
form. If without doing any more testing you 
write epw, meaning educate the person with 
the power, for both em and eml, you get:
TN: i.h.(i) c= a1 + a2i.h.0(i) + a3’’’bpw(i)epw(i) + 
a4z(i) 
BD: i.h.(i) c= a1’ + a2
’
 i.h.0(i) + a3
’’’’b’pw(i)epw(i) + 
a4
’(i)z’(i).
These represent two causal principles with 
one thing (and only one thing) in common, 
the intervention epw. Even the support factors 
for educating the person in power might be 
different between Tamil Nadu and Bangladesh, 
hence bpw and bpw
’ in the two principles.
As II.B shows, this transformation, which 
appears to amount to no more than inserting 
mother and mother-in-law each into her 
equation under another, common, description, 
is more than just a smart way of creating 
causal principles that have something in 
common. As the modest process of reflection 
described above shows, thinking like that can 
lead you to the mother-in-law. And in parts of 
Africa it may lead you to the elder sister.
4. What Makes Effectiveness  
Predictions True?
Recall our second assumption: To get a good 
argument from "It works there" to "It will 
work here", facts about causal principles 
here and there are needed. Just which facts 
about causal principles are these? Start with 
the prediction that the policy will work here. 
The answer to our question depends on just 
what is meant by "will work here". What 
the facts are that will make an effectiveness 
prediction true depends on exactly what form 
the prediction takes, that is, on just what 
you want to predict about the outcome after 
policy implementation.
Below we present a catalogue for a variety 
of familiar predictions that you might want 
to make. For the most part, in this book we 
focus on the last, minimal, prediction: "The 
policy will contribute positively here." As you 
see from the catalogue, this is the weakest of 
the effectiveness predictions you might want 
to make, and the factors you need to know 
about for this conclusion are essential for all 
the others. For instance, to predict that the 
overall difference due just to the policy itself 
is positive, you will need to know about all 
the positive contributions it makes, and all 
the negative, and that the positive outweigh 
the negative. The lessons we propose about 
warrant for this minimal prediction are then 
all relevant when it comes to warrant for the 
stronger predictions. You will need at least 
the information we propose plus more if you 
want a stronger conclusion.
•   Almost always the most difficult thing 
to predict, even if you are prepared to 
admit a reasonable degree of error, is the 
actual value of the outcome, individual by 
individual. There are two kinds of facts that 
are responsible for what the actual value 
will be for an individual unit i: 
–  The causal principle for the production 
of y that obtains after implementation.
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–  The values for the given individual of all 
the quantities occurring in that principle.
•   Predicting the average outcome across the 
individuals in the population, though not so 
demanding, is still incredibly difficult. There 
are two kinds of facts that are responsible 
for the average outcome value:
–  The causal principle that obtains after 
implementation.
–  The averages across the population of all 
the terms occurring in that principle.
•   Often you would be pleased to predict with 
some confidence that the outcome average 
will be better if you adopt the policy than if 
you don’t, rather than predicting the actual 
average that would occur. In many cases 
this can be easier. But it can sometimes be 
tricky. The tricky part comes if the causal 
principle governing the production of 
the effect changes in the course of policy 
implementation. 
The possibility of changes in the course 
of policy implementation is an important 
feature of how the world works, not at all 
an unusual occurrence. A good many of the 
causal principles that produce the outcomes 
of interest in policy deliberation are not basic 
laws of nature but are derivative. They express 
what more fundamental principles give rise to 
in particular structures. When you implement 
policy you can change these structures and 
thus change the very principles you were 
hoping to rely on to predict the outcomes of 
your interventions. 
This is one of the fundamental reasons that the 
Chicago School in economics urged against 
government intervention. Robert Lucas, in what 
has become famous as "the Lucas critique" 
(1976), made just this claim. He produced 
models of interacting economic agents that—if 
the models are correct—show that the very fact 
that the government manipulates a cause, as 
opposed to the cause taking its "natural" value, 
will change the underlying structure so that it 
will no longer give rise to the principle used for 
policy prediction. His now classic example is 
of the Phillips curve, which relates inflation to 
unemployment—a relationship that Lucas argues 
breaks down when politicians attempt to reduce 
unemployment by manipulating inflation.
What Lucas claims happens with the Phillips 
curve can happen anywhere. In our BINP 
and TINP examples, educating the mother 
or the mother-in-law may make them feed 
the children better. But they may also get 
the idea from other members of the group 
where they are educated that they might 
get a job and hand over giving out the food 
to the eldest child. You have then, perhaps 
unintentionally, changed the social structure. 
Educating the mother or the mother-in-law 
may no longer work because the old causal 
principles no longer apply given the new 
social structure. Educating the mother or the 
mother-in-law will no longer play a causal role 
in contributing to children’s nutrition because 
it is not in the new causal principle, although 
educating the eldest child may be.
In cases such as these where the 
causal principle changes under policy 
implementation, the average difference 
will be the difference between the average 
that would have been produced under the 
principle that would have obtained were the 
policy not implemented minus the outcome 
average under the new principle. So the facts 
responsible for the average difference are
–  The old principle.
–  The new principle.
–  The averages of all the terms that 
differ between the two supposing, for 
the old principle, that the policy is not 
implemented and, for the new, that it is.
•   If the causal principle does not change, 
the facts that determine the difference 
between outcome averages are
–  The averages that would obtain were the 
policy not implemented, for all the terms 
whose averages change.
–  The averages that would obtain were 
the policy implemented, for all the terms 
whose averages change.
Notice that we mention "All the terms 
whose averages change". This is important 
because, as our discussion of the California 
Class-Size reduction Program illustrates, 
often in implementing policy you change 
more causes than just the ones described in 
the policy, sometimes wittingly, but, if you 
are inattentive or unlucky, you can easily 
do so unwittingly. In principles of form CP, 
the difference in average outcomes with 
and without the policy will depend on the 
differences in the averages of the factors 
represented in b(i) and z(i). 
•   You might be interested in what difference 
just the policy itself would contribute on 
average and supposing the causal principles 
stay the same, rather than what the 
average difference would be if the policy 
were implemented versus if it were not. 
That is, you may not be concerned about 
the difference in outcome average due to 
changes in any of the other causal factors 
that might change during implementation 
or due to changes in the causal principles 
themselves. This difference, when evaluated 
for a situation S, is often called the efficacy 
of the policy in S. Notice how slight, in 
terms of our taxonomy, is the significance 
of efficacy so defined.
Sometimes you may be interested in the 
efficacy of the policy in S because you think 
of implementing the same policy again in S, 
keeping the causal principles there fixed, or 
of implementing it somewhere else where 
the same principles obtain as obtain in S, 
but this time implementing it in a different 
way, perhaps in a way that keeps all other 
causal factors fixed or improves their values. 
The efficacy of the policy measures just how 
much the policy itself contributes, averaged 
over all the individuals in the population 
under study. How interesting that is 
depends on how much you can rely on the 
fixity of the causal principles and factors.
The factors that determine efficacy are
–  The causal principle that holds, which by 
hypothesis is supposed to stay the same 
before and after implementation.
–  The average across the values of the 
support factors for the policy under  
that principle.
5. RCTs
We focus on relevance; the well-known 
ranking schemes focus on trustworthiness, 
and especially on the trustworthiness of claims 
that a policy or program worked somewhere, 
where RCTs and meta-analyses of RCTs are 
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taken to be the best supporting evidence for 
such claims. Here we bring together these two 
projects and show how they relate. The central 
question for us is: Under what circumstances is 
an RCT evidentially relevant to an effectiveness 
prediction? We begin by explaining what an 
RCT is and why it is thought to be superior 
to other studies. Then we will investigate just 
what it is that an RCT can establish. But to 
be evidentially relevant, an RCT has not just 
to establish a fact, but offer what any other 
source of evidence must offer—support for 
a premise in an argument that leads to a 
conclusion. So in 6 we will describe how to 
make RCT results relevant to your effectiveness 
prediction by showing how to bring them into 
your argument that the policy will work here, 
in your setting.
5.1 What is an RCT?
An RCT is a study design based on John Stuart 
Mill’s method of difference for making causal 
inferences (Mill 1843[1850]: bk. III, ch.8). 
Mill’s method-of-difference supposes, as we 
do here, that effects are produced in accord 
with causal principles. The causal principles 
for a given kind of situation or population, 
S, say what the causes of a given effect in S 
are, what each contributes, and how they 
combine. A method-of-difference study then 
aims to compare individual units that are the 
same with respect to all causal factors relevant 
to the given effect except the one in question, 
by which they differ. If individuals that are 
otherwise the same differ in values for the 
effect, then the factor by which they differ 
must be among the genuine causes of the 
effect under the principles governing S.
It is difficult to conduct a straightforward 
method-of-difference study since it is so 
seldom known what all the factors for a given 
effect are, bar one. A familiar strategy for 
coping with this ignorance is to compare, not 
pairs of individuals, one-by-one, but rather 
two groups of individuals, one where the 
putative cause occurs, which is called the 
treatment group, and one where it does not, 
called the control group. Both groups are 
supposed to be subject to the same causal 
principle for the effect in question, and the 
distribution of causal factors other than the 
one in question between the two groups is 
(near enough) identical . For principles of form 
CP, that means that the distributions of y0, b, 
and z are the same. Then if the two differ in 
the distribution of values for the effect, the 
putative cause must be a genuine cause for at 
least some members of the population.
It is naturally difficult to set up such a study 
since, in general, not all the causal factors 
relative to an outcome are known, which 
makes it hard to check that they are distributed 
equally in the two groups. Moreover 
differences between the treatment and control 
are easy to introduce in setting up the two 
groups (by, for instance, unconscious bias in 
selecting to which group to assign a individual) 
or in implementing the treatment (consider, 
for example, the placebo effect). RCTs are 
supposed to help with just this problem. 
An RCT is a Mill’s method-of-difference group 
study in which individual units, all of which 
are supposed to be governed by the same 
causal principle, are randomly assigned to the 
treatment and control groups. There is also as 
much masking as possible – those delivering 
the treatment don’t know which group an 
individual is in, nor those receiving it, those 
diagnosing whether or to what degree the 
effect occurs, those doing the statistical analysis, 
etc. Finally the groups are supposed to be big 
enough to allow reliable inference from the 
observed frequencies to the true probabilities. 
The random assignment plus masking are 
supposed to make it likely that the two 
groups have the same distribution of causal 
factors. It is controversial how confident these 
measures should make us that they do this.5 
This issue bears on the trustworthiness of 
causal claims backed by RCTs. As we noted, 
trustworthiness is the central topic of many 
other guides. But we aim to move beyond 
that; we concentrate on relevance. In order 
to keep questions of relevance to the fore, let 
us suppose that these measures do succeed 
and henceforth focus on the ideal RCT: one 
where no causally relevant differences obtain 
between the two groups other than the policy 
and its effects.
5.2 What RCTs Establish
Consider an RCT designed to test what effect, 
if any, treatment x has in producing outcome 
y. The standard result from an RCT is the 
so-called "treatment effect", T, across the 
individuals participating in the study (letting 
Exp(θ) represent the expectation of θ and =df 
mean "is equal by definition"):
T =df Exp(y(i)|x(i) = X) - Exp(y(i)|x(i) = X’)
where X is the value of the treatment in the 
treatment group and X’ is its value in the 
control group.
Of what use is the treatment effect? Here 
we shall present an argument familiar in the 
evidence-based policy literature that shows 
the link between a positive result—a positive 
treatment effect—in an ideal RCT and the 
causal conclusion that the result supports. 
This conclusion, we shall see, is that the policy 
tested genuinely appears in the causal principle 
governing the production of the outcome in 
the experimental situation and that the support 
factors for it were there for some individuals in 
the study population; or, in language we use 
throughout this book, the conclusion that the 
policy played a positive causal role given this 
principle. It is important for our subsequent 
discussion that this, although elegantly arrived 
at, is all that it establishes. It is a different and 
difficult question how that fact can be given the 
status of evidence for an effectiveness conclusion.
RCT Argument 
Following the discussion in I.B.3.1, suppose that y 
in the study population is determined by a causal 
principle of form CP:
CP: y(i) c= a1 + a2y0(i) + a3b(i)x(i) + a4z(i)
The formula makes clear that, for any 
individual i, b not only determines in 
part whether x contributes to y at all 
5 For a skeptical take on this issue, see (Worrall 2002, 2007).
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for i but it also, along with a3, controls 
how much a given value of   
x will contribute to y. From CP and the 
definition of T it follows that
T =df Exp(y(i)|x(i)=X) - Exp(y(i)|x(i)=X’) 
= Exp(a2y0(i)|x(i) = X) - Exp(a2 y0(i)|x(i) 
= X’) 
+ Exp(a3b(i)|x(i) = X)X – Exp(a3b(i)|x(i) 
= X’)X’ 
+ Exp(a4z(i)|x(i) = X) - Exp(a4z(i)|x(i)) = X’).
 
If you are prepared to suppose that the 
masking and random assignment of 
individuals to X and X’ assures that for 
individuals in the study, x is probabilistically 
independent of y0, b, and z, as it should be in 
the ideal, then
 
T = a3Exp(b(i))(X – X’).
If T is positive then a3b is also positive for at 
least some individuals. So x genuinely appears 
as a cause for y in the law CP for the study 
population. As we say, x plays a positive 
causal role under that principle. If a3 = 0 or b 
= 0 for all individuals then x does not appear 
in CP. So under CP, x makes no contribution 
to y outcomes for any individual, it plays no 
causal role; the outcomes for y are produced 
entirely by the quantities represented in the 
other three terms in CP.
Notice that the treatment effect averages 
across the b values for different individuals. 
This has two important consequences. First is 
the familiar fact that averages conceal what is 
happening to individuals. A positive treatment 
effect is perfectly consistent with x making 
substantial negative contributions to y for a 
great many individuals in the population. This 
is apparently what was happening with the 
teenage antidepressant that was helpful on 
average but seemed to make some of those 
treated with it suicidal (MHRA 2004). Second, 
although a positive treatment effect shows 
that b must be positive for at least some 
individuals, the reverse is not the case. A zero 
average is consistent with exceedingly high 
values of b, both positive and negative, for 
every individual. So a positive treatment effect 
shows that x can play a positive causal role 
anywhere the same causal principle obtains, 
but the lack of treatment effect does not 
show that x cannot play a causal role under 
that principle.
5.3 Alternatives to RCTs
RCTs are supposed to be the gold standard for 
evidence in evidence-based policy. Says who? 
That’s the verdict of the usual evidence-ranking 
schemes recommended for evidence-based 
policy and used by most policy vetting agencies 
and policy warehouses. A good example 
is GRADE, constructed by the Grading of 
Recommendations Assessment, Development 
and Evaluation Working Group, which is used 
by over 50 organizations worldwide (Balshem 
et al. 2011). You can see their scheme, 
updated in 2011, in Figure IV.3, along with 
the definitions of what the various ratings are 
supposed to mean, in Figure IV.4. Although 
RCTs are at the top there, better than RCTs, 
both in GRADE’s overall philosophy and in 
most other ranking schemes, are meta-analyses 
of RCTs and systematic reviews. Why?
Meta-analyses. Many RCTs have small 
populations enrolled in the study. This 
threatens the validity of statistical inference. 
Suppose there’s a difference between the 
number of positive outcomes in the treatment 
group versus the control group. That could 
reflect a genuine difference in outcome 
probabilities. Or, it could be just an accident, 
like getting 10 heads in a row in flipping a 
fair coin. The larger the population, the less 
likely this kind of statistical accident is. Meta-
analyses use statistical techniques to blend 
together populations from different trials, 
tending carefully to differences between 
study designs, to create an imaginary 
super population in which inference from 
differences in frequencies of outcomes to 
differences in probabilities is more secure.
Systematic reviews. These are meant, in the 
words of the Campbell Collaboration, to 
‘’sum up the best available research on a 
specific question. This is done by synthesizing 
the results of several studies.’’6 The studies 
need not all be RCTs. But they are meant to 
be "best available", that is, of high quality 
judged by some explicit, well-grounded 
criteria. The criteria are given in the evidence-
ranking schemes. In our words, the results of 
the studies included in the review are meant 
to be highly trustworthy. 
Often the reviewers start by looking at 
dozens, even hundreds, of studies but end up 
with only a handful that meet the inclusion 
criteria. This gives rise to some lively debate. 
Surely it is better, opponents argue, to base 
a synthetic judgment on all the studies 
available, taking into account the merits and 
defects of each. In particular, what if there 
were two or three high quality studies that 
pointed one way and a very great many 
others of varying lesser quality, with a variety 
of different merits and demerits, that point in 
the opposite direction? Surely in that case you 
should not have high confidence in a verdict 
based on just the few top quality studies. This 
fits with a standard doctrine about scientific 
confirmation, based on what is called the 
no-miracles argument.7 It would be a miracle, 
so the argument goes, if so many separate, 
different kinds of defects from different kinds 
of studies conspired in just the right way to 
produce similar results. Unless, of course, 
there were some truth to those results.
 
Those who advocate considering only the 
most trustworthy results make two replies. 
First, "Garbage in, garbage out." Results 
that are not to be trusted taken as input 
produce untrustworthy results as output. 
Second, there’s no well-grounded system for 
"weighing" up evidence of different kinds of 
different qualities. Too much must be left to 
judgment, and judgment is not to be trusted.
6 See http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/what_is_a_systematic_review/index.php.
7 This argument was originally formulated by Hilary Putnam (1975: 73).
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We do not want join this argument. Whatever 
is the case about including less trustworthy 
results, it seems hard to quarrel with the 
idea that a verdict based on a synthesis of 
trustworthy results will be better than a 
verdict based on just this or that trustworthy 
result by itself. So too, it seems hard to 
quarrel with the idea that a good meta-
analysis of studies will be better than the 
verdict of a few smaller studies. That accounts 
for why these are at the top of the list.
But what about the study designs that 
appear below RCTs in the rankings? RCTs 
use Mill’s method of difference as their 
underlying logic. In the GRADE list, "low" 
and "very low" quality studies do so as well, 
but without randomization. They are lower 
in rank because, without randomization, 
you are supposed to have less assurance 
that other causally relevant factors have the 
same distribution in treatment and control 
groups. Whether this risk is really high or low 
if you do not randomize, or you do not mask 
thoroughly at all possible places, depends on 
exactly what you know about other causal 
factors, which can sometimes be a lot and 
sometimes very little. Randomization is often 
defended by the claim that it is the only 
way to deal with unknown causal factors. 
If so, then an ideal RCT can be the superior 
choice if you are not very secure that you 
know much about what the significant causal 
factors are. Supposing that you are in this 
situation, then ranking good RCT studies 
above otherwise good studies that do not 
mask and randomize seems correct—so long 
as it is remembered as well that what is at 
stake is trustworthiness, not relevance or cost 
effectiveness or moral acceptability.
What’s surprising, then, is not so much what 
is immediately above RCTs or immediately 
below, but what is left out of the usual lists 
altogether. An ideal RCT can clinch the result 
that the treatment works somewhere. We 
mean by this that if all the requirements 
for an ideal study are met, a difference in 
outcome probability between treatment and 
control groups deductively implies that the 
treatment caused the outcome in at least 
some individuals in the study population. 
That’s what the RCT Argument of 5.2 shows. 
But there’s nothing special about RCTs in 
this regard. There are many methods where 
positive outcomes deductively imply causal 
conclusions, including certain kinds of 
econometric modeling, process tracing, and 
causal Bayes-nets methods. Each of these can 
establish causal conclusions reliably—provided 
the assumptions backing these study designs 
are met. 
All methods require specific assumptions 
to be met if the conclusions drawn from 
them are to be justified. In particular, all 
methods establishing causal conclusions 
have assumptions about causality among 
their assumptions. Hence the slogan, "No 
causes in; no causes out." All Mill’s method-
of-difference studies suppose, for example, 
that every probabilistic dependency has a 
causal explanation. And they suppose that 
all causes other than the treatment are 
distributed in the same way in the treatment 
and control groups. And they suppose that 
that means that, if treatment and outcome 
are probabilistically dependent in the study, 
there’s no explanation left except that the 
treatment caused the effect in at least 
some individuals in the study. Other kinds 
of methods require other assumptions. We 
describe some of these here, very briefly, to 
acquaint you with them.
Causal Bayes nets. These use probabilistic 
dependencies plus any available causal 
knowledge to infer new causal conclusions. 
Unlike RCTs, they do not need to suppose 
the probabilities are from an experimental 
situation; they can do with data from an 
ordinary non-experimental population. Not 
surprisingly then, some of their assumptions 
are stronger than those required for RCTs. For 
example, they assume that, once information 
about a factor’s causal predecessors has 
been taken into consideration, that factor 
will not be probabilistically dependent on 
anything except its own effects. Also, it is 
difficult to get many new results out without 
the additional assumption that the causally 
antecedent factors not taken into account are 
probabilistically independent of each other.8
Econometric methods. Econometrics 
has evolved a number of sophisticated 
techniques for using probabilities in non-
experimental populations to infer functional 
relations between factors that hold in those 
populations. But it is well known that not 
all true functional relations are causal. For 
instance, if causes are functionally related to 
their effects, then two effects of the same 
cause will be functionally related to each 
other even though neither causes the other. 
Sometimes, however, the genuine causal 
relations can be identified. This will be possible 
if an instrumental variable can be found. An 
instrumental variable is essentially one that 
affects the cause under test but none of the 
other possible causes of the putative effect.9 
It is also possible to identify genuine causal 
relations with other kinds of background 
causal information, though generally far more 
background information will be needed.10
Process tracing. This method confirms the 
existence of a causal connection between 
start and finish by confirming, one-by-one, a 
series of smaller causal steps in between. For 
the method to work, the steps in between 
must either be of a kind that are already 
well-established or else be ones that can be 
established on the spot. Sometimes these 
intermediate steps are not established by 
direct observation but rather, for instance, by 
registering side effects that would be produced 
just in case the effect in question occurred, or 
by looking for effects of that effect. Process 
tracing is used regularly in daily life, often 
to draw negative conclusions. "My baseball 
couldn’t be what broke your window since 
my baseball never went out of my backyard." 
And it is a familiar method in both biology 
and physics. It is also regularly used in post 
hoc policy evaluation. The Carvalho and White 
(2004) study of social funds, discussed in 
III.B.2.3 is a case in point.
All of these methods are reliable, so long 
as their requisite assumptions are met. That 
8 See for instance (Pearl 2009: 146).
9 For more on instrumental variables, see (Reiss 2005) or (Angrist et al. 1996).
10 See (Fennell 2007) and (Cartwright 2007).
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is, there are arguments just as rigorous as 
the RCT Argument to show that a causal 
conclusion follows deductively from positive 
results. The special advantage of RCTs seems 
to lie in the fact that few of their assumptions 
require knowledge about the factors that 
might be involved or their setting. We have 
invented the term "self-validating" to label 
this. In an RCT, you do not need to know a 
lot of background causal information about 
this factor or that since the basic assumptions 
are supposed to be justified by the design of 
the experiment itself. For instance, you do not 
have to know the other relevant causal factors 
to have reason to think they are distributed 
the same in the treatment and control groups. 
Randomization, masking, and placebo control 
are supposed to make this likely. 
In many cases, however, there may well be 
enough information available to support 
reasonable confidence that assumptions for 
other methods are met; and in many cases 
it will be very difficult indeed to conduct a 
good RCT; and sometimes, as in the Nobel-
prize winning work of James Heckman (cf. 
Heckman and Vytlacil 2007), econometric 
methods can combine with randomized 
experiment to give better post hoc evaluations 
and predictions of policy success. So it is 
surprising that these other methods are not 
part of the evidence-based policy canon.
As with all other study designs, these kinds 
of studies can be done more or less well, 
and their background assumptions may 
be more or less trustworthy. They, like 
the study designs that appear in the usual 
evidence-ranking schemes, need vetting; 
and the vetting must be done by experts 
who know just what to look for. So knowing 
the existence of these methods is not likely 
to be of much realistic help to you in your 
attempts to use good evidence in your policy 
predictions until the social policy vetting 
agencies, warehouses, and systematic reviews 
figure out how to take them into account. In 
the meantime, much good evidence is being 
scattered to the winds. 
6. Relevance 
6.1 What Makes RCT Results Relevant to 
Effectiveness Predictions?
This depends on the exact form of the 
effectiveness prediction. But before discussing 
that, it is important to notice that the 
treatment effect in an experimental population 
is not directly relevant to any effectiveness 
prediction outside the study population; its 
relevance will always be indirect. We shall for 
the most part discuss the weakest effectiveness 
prediction: "The policy will contribute positively 
if it is implemented here," where this will be 
determined under the causal principle that will 
hold here post-implementation. We focus on 
this, first, because it is the easiest to predict, 
requiring the fewest further assumptions, and, 
second, because, as we mentioned, you will 
need the same information, plus more, for any 
stronger predictions. 
Start with the simplest case, where it can be 
taken for granted that the study situation 
and your situation – there and here – are 
subject to the same causal principle for the 
production of the targeted outcome y. Will 
x make the same average contribution; that 
is, is the efficacy, which is measured by the 
treatment effect in the study situation, the 
same there as here? Certainly if the same 
principle holds there as here, a3 will be the 
same since it is constant. But Exp(b(i)) is not; 
it is an average – an average over x’s support 
factors. The average in each situation depends 
on the distribution of these factors in that 
situation. Even if the same principles govern 
the two situations, that provides no reason 
to suppose that the distributions of support 
factors are the same. To the contrary, this 
distribution often depends heavily on local 
circumstances. So it is unlikely to be the same.
Moreover, the same distribution is not really 
what you hope for. What you would like is 
that you have – or can arrange to have – a 
distribution that favors the good values of 
b – the ones that provide the largest positive 
contribution from the policy. At the least, 
you will want to have some values that make 
x’s contribution positive and these should 
outweigh the effects of those that make x’s 
contribution negative; and if getting negative 
contributions in some individuals is to be 
avoided, then you don’t want any of these 
"bad" values of b at all.
Laying aside for the moment worries about 
negative contributions in some individuals, 
suppose that you want to predict that the 
policy will contribute positively in your 
situation. What does it take to make RCT 
evidence relevant? Or, more broadly, since 
RCTs are only one way among many to 
support "It works somewhere", what does it 
take to make "It works there" (howsoever it 
is established) relevant to "It will work here"?
6.2 From "It works there" to "It works here"
Suppose "It works somewhere" is 
trustworthy. When is that evidentially relevant 
to "It will work here" and under what 
conditions? From now on, we will take "It 
will work here" in its weakest sense. Unless 
we state otherwise, "x works in situation 
S with respect to outcome y" means "x 
produces positive contributions to y for some 
individuals in S". Recall that this allows that x 
may produce negative contributions in other 
individuals, and may even produce an overall 
negative average contribution; and even if it 
produces an overall positive contribution on 
average, this does not mean that the average 
will be better than before because of the 
possible negative effects of other factors that 
change, either independently or as a result of 
implementing x. 
When then will x work in S with respect to 
outcome y? That happens exactly when x 
genuinely appears in the causal principle 
that governs the production of y in S post 
implementation and the support factors 
necessary for x to contribute to y are 
present for at least some individuals in S 
post implementation. In the language we 
introduced earlier, when x plays a positive 
causal role (with respect to y) in S. 
Now we are ready to address the question 
with which this section began. To know 
whether "It works somewhere" is evidentially 
relevant to "It will work here" and under what 
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conditions, you have to start by asking what 
kind of argument can go from "It worked 
there" to "It will work here"? Here is one:
1. x works there (ie, x genuinely 
appears in the causal principle that 
governs the production of y there post 
implementation). 
2. Here and there share that causal 
principle post implementation.
3. The support factors necessary for x 
to contribute under that principle are 
present for at least some individuals 
here post implementation.
Conclusion. x works here (ie, x 
genuinely appears in the causal 
principle that governs the production 
of y here post implementation and 
the support factors necessary for it 
to contribute to y are present for 
at least some individuals here post 
implementation).
This argument reflects the fact that "It works 
there" gives information about the causal 
principle that obtains there and about the 
existence of the requisite support factors there. 
But it gives no information about what the causal 
principle here is, nor about what support factors, 
if any, obtain here. You can think, "Surely it is 
the same here as there." Maybe so. But the 
issue is, "What do you have warrant for; What 
degree of confidence are you justified in?", not, 
"What do you think?" And the answer to the 
question, "The same how?" matters. Heedful 
of our remarks in 6.1 about the distribution of 
support factors, this argument does not suppose 
the distributions to be the same in both locations. 
The argument would be valid – the conclusion 
would still follow from the premises – with that 
premise substituted for premise 3. But the same 
distribution is not necessary for the conclusion 
that it will work for some individuals here; and, as 
we noted, a "better" distribution here than there 
would be preferable. 
This argument nevertheless demands a lot. It 
requires the same causal principle to govern 
the production of the outcome here as there. 
Recall that a causal principle records the 
full set of causes that operate, what each 
contributes, and how they combine. That’s 
what it takes for nature to set the value the 
outcome will have. But in many domains 
the causes that operate shift frequently and 
unpredictably, from locale to locale and from 
time to time, as economists from John Stuart 
Mill (1836[1967], 1843[1850]: book VI) to 
British econometrician David Hendry (Hendry 
and Mizon 2011) have argued. That’s why, 
said Mill, economics cannot be an inductive 
science. The principles that held in the past 
can in no way be relied on to hold in the 
future, due to the shifting of causes.
But that need not make information about 
causes there irrelevant to what happens 
anywhere else. As Mill stressed, many causes 
have what he called a "stable tendency". 
They make the same contribution across a 
variety of different situations; that is, they 
appear in the same form across a variety of 
different principles. The forces of physics are 
a clear example. In different situations – from 
Galileo dropping balls from the Leaning 
Tower to airplanes flying at 10,000 feet above 
the Earth to electrons moving in a battery 
– gravity always makes a contribution – the 
same contribution – to the total force exerted 
on the object, a contribution of size GMm/r2. 
It does so no matter what other causes affect 
the outcome; it plays the same causal role in 
all the different causal principles for all the 
different situations where masses appear.
Not all causes have stable tendencies. Some 
seem to operate totally locally. Among those 
that do have stable tendencies, the range of 
stability can vary. Perhaps some are universally 
stable, but most have boundaries. They make 
the same contribution in a range of situations 
but not in others, where the breadth of the 
range can vary dramatically. The trick is to 
figure out what kinds situations are safely 
within the range. Within that range you can 
suppose that the contribution you see there 
will appear here as well. Ideally this is what 
science will provide for you. But often the 
science has not done so, or not done so yet, 
especially with the kinds of causes at stake in 
social, economic, and health policy. Then you 
will have to think about this – seriously – for 
your special situation and get what advice 
and help you can. 
II.B is all about finding the right kind of 
causes to be employed in policy design, ones 
that can make a positive contribution in 
your setting. A policy that is known to have 
a stable tendency to contribute positively 
will fit the bill perfectly. But warranting 
assumptions about stability of contribution is 
difficult – it is the meat of serious on-going 
science. Nevertheless you may have to rely 
on assumptions like these being true if your 
policy is to work. For very often the best 
warrant for the claim that x plays a causal role 
here is that it is already well established that 
x has a stable tendency to produce y, stable 
across a wide variety of kinds of situations, 
including ones like yours. It produces a 
positive contribution to y in some individuals 
here because it always – across this range – 
produces a positive contribution for some 
individuals, or, even possibly for all individuals. 
So watch out. This is a difficult assumption to 
warrant and where the warrant for it is weak, 
so too is the warrant for any effectiveness 
predictions it is supposed to support.
We shall, for shorthand, say x can play a causal 
role with respect to outcome y in a situation 
if x genuinely appears in the causal principles 
only for that situation. For principles of form 
CP, that means that x does (or will) play a 
causal role in situation S if it can play a causal 
role under the principles that govern S and the 
support factors (designated by b) required under 
those principles take non-zero values for some 
individuals. Then x can play the same causal role 
in situation S’ as in S means that it genuinely 
appears in the principles for the situation S just 
in case it genuinely appears in those governing 
situation S’, and with the same sign. This is 
difficult knowledge to come by.
Even if you are reasonably warranted in the 
assumption that the policy can play a positive 
causal role in your situation, it is essential to 
keep in mind that a policy can play both a 
positive causal role for some individuals and 
a negative role for others. If this matters, you 
had better be at pains to learn about both 
possibilities. And, recall, to predict which 
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dominates, you will need information about 
the distribution of values of the support 
factors for the positive and negative roles.
A final thing to note is that it is generally 
a whole causal team that has a stable 
tendency, not an individual cause by itself. 
Recall, individual causes are generally INUS 
conditions. Each is usually only part of what 
it takes to get a contribution. It seems that 
usually, where there are stable tendencies, 
the entire team is required to get the stable 
contribution. Masses, like the sun, cause 
other masses, like the planets, to experience 
an attractive force. But what that force is 
depends not just on the first mass alone (the 
mass of the sun) – that is only an INUS cause 
– but on the whole team, which includes the 
constant of gravity (which is an instance of 
what we have called a "boost factor"), the 
mass of the second body (the planet), and the 
separation between them. You won’t get the 
stable contribution to the force if any member 
of the team fails to show up for work. 
With these considerations in mind, we can 
construct a different argument for getting from 
"It works there" to "It will work here", one 
that does not require the same causal principle 
to obtain here and there but substitutes for 
this the assumption that the policy plays the 
same causal role here as there.
Effectiveness Argument
1. x plays a positive causal role there 
post implementation.
2. x plays the same causal role here as 
there post implementation.
3. The support factors necessary for 
x to play a positive causal role are 
present for at least some individuals 
here post implementation.
Conclusion. x works here (ie,, x can 
play a positive causal role here post 
implementation and the support 
factors necessary for it to do so are 
present for at least some individuals 
here post implementation).
Our task in this section has been to show how 
to get from results that provide good evidence 
for "It works there" to the conclusion "It will 
work here". The task is almost accomplished. 
All that’s needed is to add, as support under 
the subargument, a sub-subargument, like 
the RCT Argument of section 5.2, that takes 
the study results as one of its premises and 
that concludes with "x plays a positive causal 
role there". If you find the policy vetted by 
a good policy warehouse like What Works 
or the Campbell Collaboration, you can take 
for granted that there is a good argument 
like this for premise 1. With this addition, the 
Effectiveness Argument does the job. 
This Effectiveness Argument is the one we 
shall rely on throughout. That’s because 
it is a very special argument. Not only do 
its premises imply its conclusion, as they 
should in any good argument. In addition its 
premises are necessary for the conclusion; 
the conclusion will not hold without them. 
Suppose, as we have been taking for granted 
about the policy under consideration, that it 
has been shown to work there, say in an RCT 
study. If the policy does not play the same 
causal role here as there, it will not work here. 
Similarly, if the necessary support factors for 
it are not in place here post implementation, 
it will not work here. So for the policy to 
succeed here, premises 2 and 3 must be true. 
If they are not true, the policy will definitely 
not work here. 
6.3 External Validity
This is a central notion in the RCT orthodoxy, 
and it does not do the job that it is meant to do.
It is meant to deal with the issue that we 
have raised, whether a policy that has been 
shown to have worked by a good study can be 
expected to work in a different context. Every 
practical person knows, from the high risks 
and failure often found in rolling out successful 
pilots, that this is a real problem. So it has to 
be faced. That’s what this book is about.
The orthodoxy approaches this by 
distinguishing between internal validity and 
external validity. A study has internal validity 
when the study provides strong warrant for the 
study results. The RCT Argument of 5.2 shows 
that RCTs can provide strong warrant for 
causal conclusions. There are well established 
procedures, to do with randomization, 
masking, and so on, for ensuring that a 
positive treatment effect – a  positive average 
difference between what happens to those 
who had the treatment, say a drug or small 
classes, and those who did not – implies that 
the treatment played a role in producing the 
outcome in the study population. We have 
no quarrel with this nor generally with the 
notion of internal validity. We think that there 
are many well conducted RCTs, that many are 
internally valid, and that the casual conclusions 
that they show are trustworthy.
In the orthodoxy, a study has external 
validity when the "same treatment" has 
the "same result" in a specific target as 
it did in the study. The orthodox advice is 
that external validity can be expected if the 
target population is "sufficiently similar" 
to the study population. For us the key 
question is how good a job this advice does 
in getting you from "It worked there" to "It 
will work here". The answer: you are lucky 
if it gets you anywhere. First, the advice is 
vague, surprisingly so given how specific the 
orthodox guidelines are in assessing RCTs, 
meta-analyses, and systematic reviews. 
Second, similarity, if taken seriously, is 
too demanding; you’d hardly ever be able 
to export study results if you insisted on 
similarity. Third, similarity is the wrong idea 
anyway. Fourth, it is wasteful. 
First, vague. "Same treatment". Using the 
same treatment can be fine – so long as you 
have identified the right description for the 
treatment. And the right description is the one 
that plays the same causal role in the target as 
in the study. Recall our illustration in 3.2. For 
Bangladesh and Tamil Nadu, that’s "educate the 
person in power", not "educate the mother". 
"Same result". What result? Suppose 
you are interested in getting the "same 
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treatment effect". This won’t happen unless 
the policy can play the same causal role in 
the two populations. Let’s make that easy 
by supposing that the two populations are 
governed by the same causal principle, say 
a principle of form CP in 3.1. Recall from 
the RCT Argument that the treatment effect 
in a population depends on the average of 
b(i) there. In this case b(i) represents in one 
fell swoop all the different support factors 
necessary in the population if the policy is to 
produce a contribution there. Each separate 
combination of values of these factors 
corresponds to a different value of b(i). The 
treatment effect depends on the average 
of these values across the study population. 
Averages depend on the probabilities for the 
numbers averaged over; so, the treatment 
effect depends on the probabilities for 
each different arrangement of values of 
the support factors, where each different 
arrangement is represented by a different 
value, B, for b(i): Prob(b(i) = B). 
So, when can you expect the average of 
b(i) to be the same in the two populations? 
Represent the probabilities in the two by 
ProbSP for the study population and ProbTP 
for the target population. You can expect the 
average to be the same when ProbSP(b(i) = 
B) = ProbTP(b(i) = B) for all B’s; that is, when 
all the combinations of values of the support 
factors have the same probability in the study 
and target populations. Otherwise it is an 
accident of the numbers. 
So, except for lucky accidents, the treatment 
effect will be the same in the study and 
the target only if the policy can play the 
same causal role in the two populations, 
the support factors are the same, and the 
distribution of their values is the same in the 
two populations. That’s a tall order indeed. It 
is an absurdly tough test to require the same 
treatment effect as in the study population. If 
that then is external validity, there is no real 
chance that a study will have it. 
But perhaps "same effect" is to be 
understood differently. Maybe as "same 
overall outcome"; or, "same in making a 
positive contribution in both places". These 
are different predictions, and, as in section 4, 
different kinds of facts must be in place for 
these different predictions to come true. It’s 
these facts you need to know about if you 
want to predict that you’ll get the "same 
result", not some vague set of similarities. 
What about similarity? In what ways are the 
target and the study to be similar? In all the 
ways you can think of? Maybe you don’t 
need to bother getting more precise about 
what similarity means, though, because of 
our second and third worries.
Second, similarity is too demanding. Consider 
a paper by a team of authors from Chicago, 
Harvard and Brookings, "What Can We Learn 
about Neighborhood Effects from the Moving 
to Opportunity Experiment?" (Ludwig et al. 
2008). The paper explicitly addresses the 
question of where outside the experimental 
population you are entitled to suppose the 
experimental results will obtain—for instance, 
where can you expect higher high school 
graduation rates for girls in the families that 
moved. The authors first report "MTO defined 
its eligible sample as…" We won’t write out 
their long list in this quotation because you 
can read it in their conclusion:
Thus MTO data […] are strictly 
informative only about this population 
subset – people residing in high-rise 
public housing in the mid-1990’s, who 
were at least somewhat interested 
in moving and sufficiently organized 
to take note of the opportunity and 
complete an application. The MTO 
results should only be extrapolated to 
other populations if the other families, 
their residential environments, and their 
motivations for moving are similar to 
those of the MTO population. (Ludwig 
et al. 2008: 154-5)
If that’s the limit of where MTO results are 
relevant, maybe it wasn’t worth doing the 
study in the first place.
Third, similarity is the wrong idea. Consider 
the list in the MTO quote. It’s a potpourri. The 
authors seem to have tossed in everything 
they could think of without system or reason; 
why for instance did they leave out the 
geographical location of the cities in the 
experiment? And anyway, the list does not 
get at what is necessary. Look at it again. You 
know that the same treatment effect requires 
that the policy play the same causal role in 
the two populations and the support factors 
have the same distribution in both. Are we 
really meant to suppose that sharing this long 
list of factors will ensure that? 
Maybe you are to think of the factors in 
this list just as indicators, where the hope is 
that sharing the indicators ensures that the 
two populations share the facts that really 
matter. But why are these good indicators? If 
you offer a list of indicators, you need some 
defence of why the indicators are up to the 
job. And this will be hard to give without any 
thought about how MTO plays the role it did 
in the Chicago study population and of what 
its support factors might be here.
We are not alone in our demands that you 
must try explicitly to identify the support 
factors. Here is what Edward Leamer, an 
econometrician famous for a classic paper, 
"Taking the Con out of Econometrics", has to 
say about it, using slightly different language 
(his "confounders" are our "support factors"): 
[…] the overall treatment effect is not 
a number but a variable that depends 
on the confounding effects […]. If little 
thought has gone into identifying these 
possible confounders, it seems probable 
that little thought will be given to the 
limited applicability of the results in 
other settings. (Leamer 2010: 35-6)
[…] which is a little like the lawyer 
who explained that when he was a 
young man he lost many cases he 
should have won but as he grew older 
he won many that he should have 
lost, so that on the average justice was 
done. (ibid.)
 
Fourth, similarity is wasteful. The treatment 
effect averages over arrangements for the 
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support factors. Some of these arrangements 
enable the policy to make a big contribution, 
others only a small contribution. And for others 
the policy may even be counterproductive. 
You shouldn’t aim for the same mix of these 
arrangements in your population as in the 
study population. Rather you want a good 
mix – a mix that concentrates on arrangements 
that allow the policy to do the most for you.
We have been talking mostly about expecting 
the same treatment effect. That, we said, 
is a tall order. Why not drop the hope that 
the policy will produce the same treatment 
effect and substitute something weaker, 
like "It will make a positive contribution" or 
"It will produce an improvement over what 
would have happened otherwise." Should 
you be looking for similarities between your 
population and the study population in these 
cases? No. You should be looking for what 
matters to getting the prediction you have 
in view right. What’s wrong with the ideas 
of external validity and similarity is that they 
invite you to stop thinking. Why did you 
decide to try it in Bangladesh? Presumably 
because you thought that it might work 
there. Why? Presumably because you had 
some idea of how and why the policy might 
work. And that, using our categories, is about 
causal roles and support factors. Only by 
thinking in terms of causal roles and support 
factors can you begin to see what evidence 
you need if you are going to bet that the 
policy will work here. You cannot avoid 
thinking like that. The notions of external 
validity and similarity are no substitutes. 
7. Bottom Line, Put Simply
7.1 Introduction and Apologia
This section aims to give you a simplified 
version of our theory, so that you can read 
the rest of the book even if the theory 
chapter so far has left you confused. As 
with all simplifications, we cannot pretend 
that it contains all the detail and rigor of 
the full version. And it simplifies by, among 
other things, making what we say rather 
cruder, so that the skeleton of the analysis 
is visible without so many qualifications and 
complexities. This is at a cost, so that even the 
previously confused reader may wonder at 
times whether our assertions here can properly 
be as bald as they are. But that is for clarity.
And in the rest of the book we use the theory 
to back our discussion. That discussion will 
inevitably use more or less technical terms, and 
most of those appear in this section italicized. 
But we have also tried to use simpler language 
that relies on the theory without always 
making it rigorously explicit. That too is not 
without cost. But it may further encourage 
those who find our theory hard.
7.2 How our Theory Works
This book is about evidence, because it is 
about evidence-based policy. The point of 
evidence-based policy is to choose policies that 
are effective, that will work. And that means 
will work where and when they are put into 
effect – what we call here. And the general 
question is, what kind of evidence, and in any 
particular case, exactly what evidence, will 
help you with that effectiveness prediction. To 
start to answer that, we need to step back. We 
need to think about causes and effects and we 
need to think about evidence.
Will this policy work here, in your setting? Will 
it cause the result you want where you are? 
That depends on what the causal principles 
are where you are. Causal principles fix what 
causes what. Your policy will not produce the 
outcome you want if there’s no causal principle 
connecting the two. Getting lung cancer is 
correlated with owning ashtrays. But buying 
ashtrays will not bring on lung cancer. There’s 
a causal principle, studied in the biomedical 
sciences, that connects smoking and lung 
cancer; and there’s a causal principle, studied 
by sociologists and market researchers, that 
connects smoking and owning ashtrays. But 
there’s no casual principle that connects buying 
ashtrays and lung cancer.
The causal principles that hold where you are 
fix two important facts that matter to whether 
your policy will work there. The first is about 
causal roles: Can the policy play a role in 
producing the desired outcome in your setting? 
Smoking can play a causal role in producing 
lung cancer; owning an ashtray can’t. The 
second is about support factors: What other 
factors must be in place for it to do so? Maybe 
smoking only produces lung cancer if one has 
the right genes. But genes or not, there’s no 
way ashtrays will play a role in producing lung 
cancer. There’s no support factors that can help.
Turn to evidence now. You are looking for 
evidence to support an effectiveness 
prediction, a prediction that your policy will 
work here, where you are. The facts that you 
need to support this prediction cannot be just 
any old facts – it is Thursday. They have to 
be relevant facts. That is what evidence is. It 
is evidence for something. In this case, for a 
conclusion that is an effectiveness prediction.
And conclusions are the result of arguments. 
That is a technical term. It does not mean, 
for example, "reason" as in "my argument 
for going was that I had promised to". It 
means a chain of reasoning, or more strictly 
a set of claims – premises – set out in support 
of a conclusion. The familiar syllogism "All 
men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore 
Socrates is mortal." is an argument in which 
Socrates is a man is relevant and therefore, if 
a fact, evidence by virtue of playing a role in 
the argument that leads to the conclusion. "It 
is Thursday" plays no such role.
So to make an effectiveness prediction you 
need to know what facts to verify. They have 
to be the facts relevant to the prediction – 
that is what makes them evidence. What is 
relevant is determined by the structure of the 
argument, the chain of reasoning, that leads to 
the prediction. Because that argument is about 
what causes the outcome in your setting, its 
structure will reflect facts about the causal 
principles that hold there, in particular, facts 
about causal roles and support factors.
Having promised simplicity, we may in the last 
paragraph have delivered only brevity without 
clarity. So in the rest of this section, we use 
some of the analysis from the earlier parts of 
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the chapter to put (back) some of the flesh on 
the bones of the discussion. But before that, 
two further points.
We say that "you need to know what facts 
to verify". Our book tries to help with that 
question. But it does not tell you how to verify 
the facts you need once you have identified 
them. The distinction is important. If you want 
to drive off by pressing the accelerator, you 
rely on a causal principle in which the presence 
of fuel plays a causal role. We help you to 
realize that, therefore, There is fuel is relevant, 
and that you need evidence for it. We do not 
help with how you find out whether there is 
fuel, how you get that evidence. In this toy 
example, finding out is trivial – look at the fuel 
gauge or dip the tank. Often it is not trivial. At 
worst, it may not even be clear how you would 
verify some facts. But anyway, we do not deal 
with that. And the main reason is that there 
are a very large number of ways of establishing 
facts, and hence evidence, from common 
observation to elaborate statistical research.
Second, we spend time here using our theory 
of evidence to discuss what is the relevance 
of the fact that a good RCT has shown that 
the policy worked there. We show that, 
although this may indeed be a fact, whether 
it is relevant, and hence evidence, depends on 
what argument it contributes to. And it turns 
out that its relevance will often be slight. 
7.3 Causal Principles
"Will this policy work here?" The question 
focuses attention on the policy. But to answer 
it, your focus must be directed elsewhere. 
Where? The answer to that is supplied by 
considering some general facts about how 
causes work to produce their effects. 
Causes do not produce their effects willy-
nilly but for a reason. They produce effects 
in some systematic way, in accord with some 
causal principles. A causal principle for a 
situation lays out all the factors that operate 
to bring about the outcome in question in 
that situation and shows how these combine 
to produce it. We stress three important 
facts about causal principles that matter to 
getting the right prediction about whether a 
proposed policy will work for you:
1. The causal principles that 
underwrite policy prediction are not 
universal.
2. Few causes work on their own; 
causal factors work together in teams.
3. There are generally a number of 
distinct teams at work in any situation, 
each making its own contribution to 
the effect.
1. Causal principles are not universal. They differ 
from place to place and from time to time. That 
means that it is not enough for you to know 
that the policy worked somewhere or even that 
it has worked at some time here. "It worked 
there"; it played a positive causal role there. So 
it was one of the factors from a causal principle 
that holds there. To predict that it will work 
here, you need to know that it is one of the 
factors from a causal principle that holds here. 
That is what ensures that it can play a positive 
causal role for you. You will read more about 
finding factors that can do so in II.B.
2. Causes work in teams. What gets 
highlighted as the cause – where for you 
that means your policy – is rarely enough to 
produce a contribution to the effect on its 
own. It needs team support. If any of the 
essential team members is absent, the policy 
won’t make any contribution at all. It is like 
trying to make pancakes with no baking 
powder. So even if you know, maybe from a 
good RCT, that the policy worked there and 
that the same causal principles hold here as 
there, that is not enough to conclude that 
it will work here. That only shows that it 
can play a causal role here. To know that it 
will play a positive causal role here, you also 
need to know that you will have the requisite 
support factors here when you need them. 
That’s what II.A is about.
3. Distinct teams produce distinct 
contributions. The overall effect achieved is 
usually made up of separate contributions 
from a number of different teams of causes, 
some of which can pull in different directions. 
The magnet, in team with the iron in the pin, 
contributes an upward force on the pin; the 
pull of the earth, in team with the pin’s mass, 
contributes a downward force. The overall 
force is a combination of the two. Social 
causes are just the same. Some improve the 
outcome in view; others contribute negatively 
to it. This makes predicting the actual 
outcome difficult. To predict that, you must 
take account of all the factors at work and of 
how they combine; that is, you need to know 
the full causal principle. 
Our concern is with less ambitious predictions 
than "What will the actual outcome be?". 
We focus on "Will this policy make a positive 
contribution?" Will it make things better for 
some individuals than they otherwise would 
be? In our terminology, "Will the policy play a 
positive causal role here?"
We talk more about the effects of other 
teams, both ones that do and ones that do 
not include the policy, in II.A.
7.4 Evidence, Argument, and Warrant
No-one can doubt that basing your 
predictions about policy effectiveness on 
evidence is a good idea. But what counts 
as evidence – good evidence – that a policy 
worked there or that it will work here? Our 
answer is theory based. It is grounded in a 
systematic account of evidence, knowledge, 
and warrant.
Some claims are self-evident or already well 
established. They do not need to be backed 
up by anything further for you to be justified 
in taking them to be true. Policy effectiveness 
predictions are not like that. They need 
support. What does the support look like? To 
justify having a high degree of confidence in 
a questionable claim, a claim that is not self-
evident, you need to produce some further 
claims that, taken together, ensure that the 
questionable claim is likely to be true. That is, 
you need a good argument. An argument, 
recall, is a set of claims – premises – offered in 
support of a conclusion. A good argument is 
one in which the premises themselves are all 
well warranted – trustworthy – and together 
imply the conclusion, or at least make it 
highly likely. (In technical language, the 
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first means that the argument is sound; the 
second, that it is valid.)
What holds in general holds for the particular 
case of policy effectiveness conclusions. 
There is nothing special about them in this 
respect. Suppose, then, you have trustworthy 
information that a policy works somewhere, 
or in a number of somewheres. So you can 
take for granted "It works there". What 
does it take for this information to count as 
evidence for "It will work here"? It takes a 
good argument, an argument in which the 
conclusion—"It will work here"—genuinely 
follows from the premises, including the 
premise "It works there", and the premises 
themselves are trustworthy. It is important 
to keep in mind that the conclusion of an 
argument can be no more trustworthy than 
any of its premises: dicey premises yield 
dicey conclusions. So identifying what all the 
premises are matters.
What then about evidence? Suppose you had 
access to a gigantic encyclopedia that reported 
every true fact there is. Which facts should 
get labeled "Evidence for my conclusion" 
and which not? Evidence is supposed to help 
justify taking your conclusion to be true, and 
what it takes to do that is a good argument. 
So facts can’t be just labeled "Evidence for 
this conclusion" one way or another. It takes a 
good argument to connect the two. Any fact 
that gets so labeled will have to be one among 
many, possibly very many, premises that are 
each themselves well warranted and that 
together make the conclusion probable. This 
makes evidence highly conditional. No matter 
how trustworthy a fact from the encyclopedia 
or a result from a scientific study is, it provides 
no justification at all without the other 
premises to connect it to the conclusion.
7.5 Arguments for Effectiveness
For evidence-based policy you are urged to use 
only policies that have been shown to work 
somewhere. If you are lucky you will be able 
to find lists of such policies in a warehouse 
that vets studies and ensures that the claim 
"It works somewhere" is trustworthy. What 
does it take to turn that into evidence that it 
will work here? A good argument that takes 
"It works somewhere" as a premise and 
concludes with "It will work here".
There are a number of different arguments 
that can do the job, with more and less 
demanding premises. The Effectiveness 
Argument from 6.2 is the argument of choice 
for evidence-based policy. It has the weakest 
premises and, what really matters, its premises 
are essential to the truth of the conclusion. If 
either premise 2 or premise 3 of this argument 
is false, the policy that worked there will not 
work here. We express this argument in a very 
simple, straightforward form here.
The basic argument that links "It worked there" 
with effectiveness predictions looks like this:
Effectiveness Argument
1. The policy worked there.
2. The policy can play the same 
causal role here as there post 
implementation.
3. The support factors necessary for 
the policy to play a positive causal 
role here are in place for at least some 
individuals here post implementation.
Conclusion. The policy will work here. 
By support factors, we mean the other 
members of the team of causes that will be 
required for the policy to make a contribution. 
Of course it is going to be difficult to 
warrant a claim like premise 3 without any 
commitment about what the support factors 
are. So you will probably have to have a 
subargument that defends your claims about 
what these factors are in your situation.
4. So there are the two further pieces of 
information besides "It works there" that are 
needed to justify taking "It will work here" as 
true. These are our chief focus in this book. 
We explain about them in detail, and with 
examples; the first, which concerns causal 
roles, in II.B and the second, which concerns 
support factors, in II.A. In III we provide 
advice for how to go about identifying the 
information these premises demand. 
Our central claim in this book is made graphic 
in Figures I.5 and I.6. If you start, as you are 
urged to do, with evidence that the policy 
you are considering worked somewhere, the 
prediction that the same policy will work here, 
in your situation, is like the seat of a three-
legged stool. It doesn’t matter how sturdy 
one leg is, if either of the others fails, the 
stool collapses and you are dumped flat on 
the ground.
[Figure I.5]
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7.6 RCTs and Effectiveness Predictions
Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are 
supposed to be the gold standard in evidence-
based policy. So we want now to apply our 
theory to the claim that a good RCT is strong 
evidence for an effectiveness claim.
A good RCT with a positive outcome 
does indeed show that the policy worked 
somewhere; that it made a positive 
contribution for some individuals there, 
then, in the study population under the 
study conditions. In our language, "It played 
a positive causal role there." That tells you 
something about the causal principles that 
obtained there. It guarantees that the policy 
appears in a team that contributes positively 
according to those principles and that all the 
other members of the team – the support 
factors – were present there for at least some 
individuals in the study population.
That information is not much use to you if, 
as we discuss in II.B, the causal principles for 
your situation are very different from those of 
the study situation. So, to use this RCT result 
to back up a prediction that the policy will 
work here in your situation – that it will play 
a positive causal role here – you need warrant 
for assuming that the principles that hold here 
are sufficiently like those that hold there. They 
do not need to be exactly the same. You may 
have a different mix of causal factors at work. 
[Figure I.6]
But they definitely must be the same in this 
respect: The policy appears in both principles 
and in a team whose contribution is positive. 
Whatever is true about what other causes you 
have here and whatever they have there, if 
the policy is to make a positive contribution 
here, it must appear in the principles here just 
as it did in the principles there. 
If the principles are the same in this respect, 
we say that the policy could play a positive 
causal role here. We say "could" for a good 
reason. Whether it will or not depends on 
whether you will have here all the other 
members of the team needed to support it 
according to the causal principles that obtain 
here, and at the right times. If you know 
that’s the case, you can predict with high 
confidence that the policy will play a positive 
casual role here just as it did in the RCT.
So a positive outcome in an RCT shows that 
the putative cause did play a causal role in the 
study situation. It did so because it could play 
a positive role there – it appears in a team that 
makes a positive contribution under the causal 
principles that hold there; and because, for 
some individuals in that situation, the support 
factors for it were in place. That’s what we 
mean by "It worked there" – there, in the study 
population. Hence, "It works somewhere"
There is also the case where it could play a 
causal role but does not because not all the 
factors in the support team are present. We 
want to make this distinction between did 
play and could play to preserve the insight 
that an intervention may have the potential to 
play a causal role in producing an outcome, 
even if it does not because not all the support 
factors are present. So small class sizes could 
play a causal role in producing better reading 
scores in California, even if that policy did 
not play a causal role because there were 
not enough good teachers to take the larger 
number of classes. Could then refers to the 
fact that smaller class sizes did at least figure 
as part of the causal principles, that is, as part 
of a story about relevant factors and how they 
combine to produce the effect. Unlike eating 
tomatoes twice a day, which does not figure 
as a part of a causal principle for reading 
scores, so forget support factors.
To turn RCT results into evidence it takes 
a good argument – an argument with 
trustworthy premises from which the 
conclusion genuinely follows. We have 
proposed above in 7.5 an argument – the 
Effectiveness Argument – that gets you to 
the conclusion you want, that the policy will 
work here. But you can see that RCT results 
do not figure anywhere this argument. Where 
do they enter? They figure as a premise in 
a subargument – the RCT Argument – for a 
premise in the Effectiveness Argument, as in 
Figure I.7. 
The RCT Argument (which we described in 
5.2) starts with the claim that the results were 
positive in the study and concludes that the 
policy played a positive causal role there – "It 
worked there". The other premises in the 
RCT Argument describe the design of the 
study and provide the connection between 
causes and probabilities that allows a causal 
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conclusion to be derived from a difference 
in the average values of the outcome in the 
treatment and control groups.
We do not focus on the RCT Argument since 
there are a number of good warehouses, like 
What Works and the Campbell Collaboration, 
that take on the job of policing RCT 
Arguments for you. Though they may not 
put it this way, what they do is to check 
to make sure, for specific studies, that the 
other premises in the RCT Argument are 
trustworthy, so that a positive result in the 
study does indeed support the claim that 
the policy played a positive causal role there. 
What we are concerned with are all the 
things that have to be established once the 
RCT Argument is in place – the other premises 
in the Effectiveness Argument. This is what 
our lessons are about.
The important lesson about RCTs is that the 
relevance of RCT results is highly conditional, 
depending on both the Effectiveness 
Argument and the RCT Argument. 
[Figure I.7]
As in Figure I.7, a positive result in an RCT 
is leveraged into evidence that "It works 
there", there in the RCT situation, by the RCT 
Argument. Then "It works there" is leveraged 
into evidence for "It works here" by the 
Effectiveness Argument. If either of these 
arguments fails, as in Figure I.8, the lever 
drops. The evidential relevance disappears 
with a thud. Worse, you will end up with a 
policy that does not work for you.
[Figure I.8]
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1. A Focus on Development Economics
The World Bank estimates that in developing 
countries 178 million children under five 
are stunted in growth and 55 million are 
underweight for their height (World Bank 
1995). Malnutrition leaves children vulnerable 
to severe illness and death and has long-term 
consequences for the health of survivors. The 
Bank has funded a wide range of nutritional 
interventions in developing countries, in Latin 
America, the Caribbean, Africa and East and 
South Asia. This included the Bangladesh 
Integrated Nutrition Project (BINP), modeled 
on its acclaimed predecessor, the Indian Tamil 
Nadu Integrated Project (TINP). What was 
integrated? Feeding, health measures and, 
centrally, education of pregnant mothers 
about how better to nourish their children.
TINP covered the rural areas of districts with the 
worst nutritional status, about half the Tamil 
Nadu state, with a rural population of about 
9 million. Malnutrition fell at a significant rate. 
The World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 
concluded that half to three fourths of the 
decline in TINP areas was due to TINP and other 
nutrition programs in those areas.
The Bangladesh Project was modeled on TINP. 
But Bangladesh’s project had little success. A 
Save the Children UK assessment concludes 
that program areas and non-program areas 
still had the same prevalence of malnutrition 
after 6 years and this despite the fact that the 
targeted health educational lessons sank in to 
some extent: Carers in the BINP areas had on 
the whole greater knowledge about caring 
practices than those in non-BINP areas. Why 
then did the project fail in Bangladesh?
Before that we had better ask: "Why 
should it have been expected to succeed?" 
The extrapolation to Bangladesh from 
uncontroversial success in India was not 
warranted, I shall argue, because it was based 
on simple induction; and simple induction is no 
better method in social science than in natural 
science and no better in policy science than in 
pure science. Moreover, we can do better, and 
often with knowledge already at hand.
My talk will concentrate on development 
economics and on a vigorous take-over 
movement fast gaining influence there, a 
new methodology to improve development 
outcomes: randomized controlled trials. As a 
Public Radio International interview reports: 
"A team of economists at MIT says it’s 
time for a new approach – one that makes 
prescriptions for poverty as scientifically-based 
as prescriptions for disease."1 MIT’s Esther 
Duflo is one of the leaders of this movement. 
She tells us:
The past few years have seen a veritable 
explosion of randomized experiments 
in development economics. (Duflo and 
Banerjee 2009, 152)
Creating a culture in which rigorous 
randomized evaluations are promoted,  
4.2 Will ThiS POliCy WOrK FOr yOu? PrEDiCTiNg 
EFFECTiVENESS bETTEr: hOW PhilOSOPhy hElPS
1 http://www.pri.org/theworld/?q=node/10887
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encouraged, and financed has the 
potential to revolutionize social policy 
during the 21st century . . . (Duflo, 
quoted by The Lancet 2004, 731)
Witness also the recent Journal of Economic 
Perspectives symposium on a paper 
commending RCTs by my LSE colleague Steve 
Pischke and another MIT economist, Joshua 
Angrist. As one exemplar of good research 
design they cite:
. . . in a pioneering effort to improve 
child welfare, the Progresa programme 
in Mexico offered cash transfers 
to randomly selected mothers, 
contingent on participation in prenatal 
care, nutritional monitoring of 
children, and the children’s  
regular school attendance . . . . 
Progresa is why now thirty countries 
worldwide have conditional cash 
transfer programmes. (Angrist and 
Pischke 2010, 4)
That’s serious extrapolation!
And, to see why I am concerned: Even since 
I wrote this in draft I have learned that the 
father of Progresa, Santiago Levy says that 
many of the places that want them are places 
where they will obviously fail. In some of these 
countries success would require people to go 
to clinics that don’t exist (Deaton 2010, 449). 
Here’s another, from the Jamil Poverty 
Action Lab (J-PAL), which Duflo and other 
MIT economists work with: the Deworm the 
World Movement. J-PAL website reports that 
"Research by J-PAL associates . . . Kremer 
and . . . Miguel has shown that school-based 
deworming is one of the most cost-effective 
methods of improving school participation." 
The Kremer and Miguel study looked at 75 
primary schools in Busia Kenya. Busia, the 
J-PAL website explains, "is a poor and densely-
settled farming region in western Kenya 
adjacent to Lake Victoria. [It has] some of the 
country’s highest [intestinal worms] infection 
rates, in part due to the area’s proximity to 
Lake Victoria Kenya." The website goes on:
The evidence from [the Kremer and Miguel] 
study has helped inform the debate and has 
contributed to the scale-up of school-based 
deworming across 26 countries where over  
7 million children have been dewormed  
since 2009.2
I focus on development and on RCTs. But the 
problem of using evidence of efficacy from 
good studies and pilots to predict whether 
a policy will be effective if implemented is 
a general one. And it is a mega problem. It 
affects us all. This mega problem, like a good 
many other problems involving the practice 
and use of science, is one philosophers 
of science can contribute to. We are in a 
position to step in and help, and we should. 
If we don’t step forward to act to improve 
the decisions that influence all our lives, 
what is philosophy good for? So let’s look at 
some philosophy that can help. I start with a 
familiar philosophical concern.
2 http://www.povertyactionlab.org/scale-ups/school-based-deworming
2. Let’s get straight what we are  
talking about
RCTs, proponents argue, are the "gold 
standard" for warranting causal claims. But 
there’s startlingly little attention to what these 
claims claim. In particular there’s widespread 
conflation of 3 distinct kinds of causal claims. 
RCTs are especially good only for the first:
1. It works somewhere. 
2. It works in general. 
3. It will work for us.
Here’s a typical example from a paper by 
Duflo and Kremer. Already in line 5, in one 
single sentence, all three kinds of claims are 
mixed together without note:
The benefits of knowing which 
programs work . . . extend far beyond 
any program or agency, and credible 
impact evaluations . . . can offer reliable 
guidance to international organizations, 
governments, donors, and . . . NGO’s 
beyond national borders. (Duflo and 
Kremer 2005, 205)
I take it from the language and use that they 
mean:
Which programs work = It works in general
Impact evaluation = It works somewhere
Reliable guidance = It will work for us
I focus on these three kinds of causal claims 
because I endorse evidence-based policy and 
I want to improve policy outcomes by the use 
of evidence. The first –it works somewhere – is 
where we are encouraged by evidence-based 
policy guidelines to start. These are the kinds of 
claims that our best scientific study designs can 
clinch. The third is where we want to end up – 
the proposed program will produce the desired 
outcome in the target situation and as it will be 
implemented there. The middle –g "general" 
causal claims – is the central route by which 
"It works somewhere" can make for evidence 
that it will work for us. But the road from "It 
works somewhere" to "It will work for us" is 
often long and tortuous. There are four essential 
materials for building a passage across: 
1. Roman laws. I call them this on 
account of Luke 2.1: "And it came to 
pass in those days, that there went 
out a decree from Caesar Augustus, 
that all the world should be taxed." 
The laws involved need not be really 
universal. But they must be wide 
enough to cover both the evidence 
and the prediction the evidence is 
evidence for.
2. The right support team. We need all 
those factors without which the policy 
variable cannot act.
3. Straight sturdy ladders. So you can 
climb up and down across levels of 
abstraction without mishap.
4. Unbroken bridges. By which the 
influence of the cause can travel to 
the effect.
You must have all four; if any one is missing, 
you can’t get there from here.
3. What’s an RCT and what’s it good for?
I would hope to stay away from formulae in 
an address like this but we do need some 
technical results to get started.
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An ideal RCT for cause X and outcome Y 
randomly assigns individual participants in 
the study, {ui}, into two groups where X = x 
universally in the treatment group and X = x’ ≠ 
x universally in the control group. No relevant 
differences are to obtain in the two groups 
other than X and its downstream effects. 
The standard result measures the average 
"treatment effect" across the units in the 
study: So T average is the average of Y in the 
treatment group minus its average in the control 
group. Of what interest is this strange statistic 
about randomized units in a study group?
Supposing that Y values for the units in the 
study are determined by a causal principle 
that governs the study population, the RCT 
can reveal something about the role of X 
in this principle. Without significant loss of 
generality we can assume that the principles 
governing Y look like this:3
L: Y(u) c= a(u) + β(u)X(u) + W(u)
where W represents the net contribution of 
causes that act additively in addition to X and 
where X may not play a role in the equation 
at all if β = 0. So doing a little algebra (and 
letting <Φ> represent the expectation of Φ),
<T> =df <Y(u)/X(u)=x> - <Y(u)/X(u)=x’> 
         =   <a(u)/X(u) = x> - <a(u)/X(u) = x’> + 
              <β(u)/X(u) = x>x - <β/X(u) = x’>x’ + 
              <W(u)/X(u) = x> - <W(u)/X(u) = x’>.
Suppose, as is hoped, that the random 
assignment of u’s to x and x’ implies that 
for u’s in the study, X is probabilistically 
independent of a, β, and W. Then,
 T = <β(u)> (x - x’).
 Recall L: Y(u) c= a(u) + β(u)X(u) + W(u)
  So T ≠ 0 à X is a contributing cause 
for Y in L.
You don’t really need to follow the details 
here; just note the bottom line: If the 
standard assumptions for an ideal RCT are 
met, the average treatment effect is the 
difference in X between treatment and 
control times beta average. So if the average 
treatment effect is positive then β is too, in 
which case X genuinely appears as a cause 
for Y in law L. This, however, provides no 
evidence that X will produce a positive 
difference in the target unless the target and 
the study share L.4 L must be general to at 
least that extent. But the stretch of L is in no 
way addressed in the RCT and for the most 
part generality cannot be taken for granted. 
That’s because the kinds of causal principles 
relevant for policy effectiveness are both local 
and fragile.
4. Roman Laws are not all that easy  
to come by
The causal laws we rely on for reliable 
predictions in real policy, real technology, and 
real experimental settings are local. They are 
local because they depend on the mechanism 
or the social organization, what I have called 
the "socioeconomic machine",5 that gives rise 
to them. Economists know about this kind 
of locality. The Chicago School notoriously 
used it as an argument against government 
3 The important lessons follow equally for more complicated functional forms.
4 Or at least share the important feature of L that X genuinely appears in it.
5 See (Cartwright 1989).
intervention: The causal principles that 
governments have to hand to predict the 
effects of their interventions are not universal. 
They arise from an underlying arrangement of 
individual preferences, habits, and technology 
and are tied to these arrangements. Worse, 
according to the Chicago School, these 
principles are fragile. When governments try 
to manipulate the causes in them to bring 
about the effects expected, they are likely to 
alter the underlying arrangements responsible 
for those principles in the first place, so the 
principles no longer obtain.6 
Or, British econometrician Sir David Hendry 
urges the use of simple "quick catch-up" 
models for forecasting rather than more 
realistic causal models because the world 
Hendry lives in is so fluid that yesterday’s 
accurate causal model will not be true 
today.7 J.S. Mill too. Economics cannot be 
an inductive science, he argued, because 
underlying arrangements are too shaky; 
there’s little reason to expect that a principle 
observed to hold somewhere sometime will 
hold elsewhere or later because there’s no 
guarantee the underlying arrangement of 
basic causes will be the same.8
Because so many of the causal principles 
we employ are tied to causal structures that 
underpin them, you can’t just take a causal 
principle that applies here, no matter how 
sure you are of it, and suppose it will apply 
there. After all, common causal structures 
are not all that typical, even in the limited 
and highly controlled world of structures 
we engineer. Consider for instance these 
three toasters I found on sale in Oxford: the 
Cuisinart Classic 4-slice at 41.46 GBP, the 
Krups expert black and stainless steel at 44.99 
GBP, and the Dualit 3-slice stainless steel at 
158.03 GBP. Even these three toasters – man-
made and for the same job – do not have the 
same structure inside. (Or at least we hope 
not given the big price differential!)
Perhaps you think – as many other 
economists and medical RCT advocates seem 
to – that the different populations you study, 
here and there, are more likely to share causal 
structure than are toasters. That’s fine. But to 
be licensed in that assumption in any given 
case you better be able to produce good 
evidence for it.
Simple induction is no more warranted 
here than anywhere else. It requires stable 
principles, and stable principles require stable 
substructures to support them. Without 
at least enough theory to understand the 
conditions for stability, induction is entirely 
hit or miss. This I take it is a key point of 
Princeton economist Angus Deaton’s British 
Academy Keynes lecture in economics. He 
says of RCTs that they are,
unlikely to recover quantities that are 
useful for policy or understanding. 
Following Cartwright . . . I argue that 
6 See (Lucas 1976).
7 See (Hendry and Mizon 2011).
8  See (Mill 1836/1967, 1843/1850: book VI).
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evidence from randomized controlled 
trials has no special priority . . . the 
analysis of projects needs to be 
refocused towards the investigation of 
potentially generalizable mechanisms 
that explain why and in what contexts 
projects can be expected to work . . 
. thirty years of project evaluation in 
sociology, education and criminology 
was largely unsuccessful because it  
focused on whether projects work 
instead of on why they work.9
Moving on. Let’s suppose though that:
* there are causal principles that enable X to 
produce Y in the study,
*these are shared in the target, and 
* contrary to expectations from the Chicago 
School of economics, these principles will 
be unaffected if the proposed policy is 
implemented in the target.
There are still three central problems for the 
prediction that the policy will work in the 
new setting. The next problem concerns the 
support team necessary if X is to produce a 
contribution to Y.
5. Support Teams
Return to the abstract form L for the causal 
law that, for purposes of argument, we are 
now taking to be shared between study and 
target situations:
L: Y(u) c= a(u) + β(u)X(u) + W(u).
The RCT tells about β. It is tempting to think 
of β as a constant or as an undecomposable 
random variable. But it isn’t. And this despite 
the fact that you can find it treated thus in 
sundry works in our field (maybe not from A to 
Z but at least from Cartwright to Woodward). 
The difference depends on the kinds of factors 
that the variables represent. When I write β 
as a constant or a random variable I assume 
that "X" represent a full, not a partial cause. 
But most policy variables represent only partial 
causes – INUS causes, extending J.L .Mackie’s 
sense10 to multivalued variables:
X is an INUS contributor to Y: X is 
an insufficient but nonredundant 
part of a complex of factors that are 
unnecessary but together sufficient to 
produce a contribution to Y.11
What matters here is that policy variables are 
rarely sufficient to produce a contribution 
– they need an appropriate support team if 
they are to act at all. The support factors are 
represented by β.12 And the values of these 
factors can be expected to vary across the 
units just as the values of X and W vary.
9 Read at the Academy 9 October 2008 and published, in a revised form, as (Deaton 2009).
10 See (Mackie 1965).
11 "Contributions" are, at least as I make sense of them, defined relative to a metaphysics of capacities, other contributions, 
and laws of composition. In a law of form L, each separate additive term on the right hand side represents a contribution. 
See (Cartwright 2009).
12 In this case we are supposing that the size of the contribution of X to Y is fixed once the values of the "helping factors" are 
set. But this contribution could still vary arbitrarily from unit to unit. It would be more usual though to suppose that a full set 
of helping factors would at least fix the probability for a contribution of a given size.
This is well-known in philosophy and in social 
science. Nevertheless the consequences are 
frequently ignored. Consider for example 
the usual advice in the evidence-based policy 
literature about how to grade policy proposals 
on the basis of evidence. The US Department 
of Education explains that what you need 
are successful RCTs in two or more typical 
school settings, including "school settings 
similar to yours" (USDE 2003, 10). And SIGNs, 
used to help set best practice for the UK 
National Health Service, provides an A grade 
to a policy if it is supported by "At least one 
meta-analysis, systematic review, or RCT rated 
as 1++, and directly applicable to the target 
population . . ." (SIGN 2011, 51) This advice 
is vague, surprisingly so given how specific 
the guidelines are in assessing RCTs, meta-
analyses and systematic reviews. Moreover, 
if properly spelled out, it is hard to follow. 
Worst, it is generally bad advice.
Start with hard to follow and consider a paper 
by a team of authors from Chicago, Harvard, 
and Brookings, "What Can We Learn about 
Neighborhood Effects from the Moving to 
Opportunity Experiment?" The paper explicitly 
addresses the question of where outside the 
experimental population we are entitled to 
suppose the experimental results will obtain. 
The authors first report "MTO defined its 
eligible sample as . . ." I won’t read their 
long list because I am about to cite it in their 
conclusion:
Thus MTO data . . . are strictly 
informative only about this population 
subset – people residing in high-rise 
public housing in the mid-1990’s, who 
were at least somewhat interested 
in moving and sufficiently organized 
to take note of the opportunity 
and complete an application. The 
MTO results should only be  
extrapolated to other populations if 
the other families, their residential 
environments, and their motivations 
for moving are similar to those of the 
MTO population. (Ludwig et al. 2008, 
154-155)
The list is a potpourri. It seems as if they 
have tossed in everything they can think of 
that might matter without any systematic 
grounds; why for instance did they leave out 
the geographical location of the cities in the 
experiment? And anyway, the list gets at 
what’s necessary indirectly. 
Look again at β in principle L and in the 
treatment effect:
L: Y(u) c= a(u) + β(u)X(u) + W(u) 
<T> = <β(u)> (x - x’).
β represents in one fell swoop all the different 
supporting factors necessary if X is to contribute 
to Y . Each separate combination of values of 
these factors corresponds to a different value 
of β. The average treatment effect depends on 
the average of these values across the study 
population. That means we suppose that 
each different arrangement of values of the 
supporting factors represented by a different 
value, b, of β appears in that population with a 
specific probability: ProbSP(β = b).
So, supposing L obtains in both the study 
and target populations, when can we expect 
<β(u)> to be the same? Exactly when ProbSP(β 
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= b) = ProbTP(β = b) for all b’s; ie, when all 
the combinations of values of the supporting 
factors have the same probability in the study 
and target populations. Otherwise it is an 
accident of the numbers. I expect that the 
distributions in the study population are rarely 
duplicated in other populations.
Independent of that, the list in the MTO 
article does not seem to be a list of 
supporting factors. Perhaps the hope is that 
the list includes sufficient "indicator" factors 
to ensure that populations that share these 
indicators will have the same probability 
distributions over β. Maybe sometimes this 
is the best we can do. But if we resort to it, 
we need some defense of why the indicators 
might be up to the job. And this will be hard 
to provide without explicit discussion of what 
the supporting factors might be.
Suppose though we solve the problems of 
identifying these factors. Still advice like 
that of the Department of Education is 
wasteful. The treatment effect averages over 
arrangements for the supporting factors. 
Some of these arrangements enable X to 
make a big contribution, others only a small 
contribution, and for others X may even be 
counterproductive. We shouldn’t aim for the 
same mix of these arrangements as in the 
study population but rather for a good mix – 
a mix that concentrates on arrangements that 
allow X to do the most for us.
I am not alone in this view. In 1983 Edward 
Leamer wrote a classic paper, "Taking the 
Con out of Econometrics". The symposium 
discussing the Angrist and Pischke paper was 
called "Con out of Economics". Leamer’s 
contribution to that symposium makes the 
same point about supporting factors I have 
long argued. Here are Leamer’s words:
With interactive confounders [NC’s 
"supporting factors"] explicitly 
included, the overall treatment effect 
[our <β>] is not a number but a 
variable that depends on the  
confounding effects . . . . If little 
thought has gone into identifying 
these possible  confounders, it seems 
probable that little thought will be 
given to the limited applicability of the 
results in other settings. 
. . . which is a little like the lawyer who 
explained that when he was a young 
man he lost many cases he should 
have won but as he grew older he 
won many that he should  have lost, so 
that on the average justice was done. 
(Leamer 2010, 34-35) 
For a final example of sensitivity to supporting 
factors, return to the integrated nutrition 
program. The need for getting the requisite 
supporting factors into place was not ignored 
in either Tamil Nadu or in Bangladesh. One 
of the central ideas of the nutrition program 
was that better nutrition can be secured with 
meager resources, but to do so, mothers 
need to know what makes for good nutrition. 
On the other hand nobody expects that 
education is enough by itself. You can’t feed 
children better if you can’t feed them at all. 
So the educational program for mothers was 
coupled with a supplemental feeding program. 
Nevertheless the results were disappointing. 
To see what is supposed to have gone wrong, 
despite the presence of a good support team, 
turn to my 3rd problem: ladders.
6. Ladders
I am a pluralist and a particularist, inclined 
to suspect that everything is different. 
Economists are often more homogenizing 
(though not Hendry and Mill!). They believe 
that they can base their economics on 
relatively Roman laws. We are, they argue, 
really much the same at base, governed 
by the same motivations and the same 
laws of human nature. Gary Becker is a 
notorious limiting-case. Becker won the 
Nobel Prize for modeling great swathes of 
what we do in day-to-day life under the 
principles of market equilibrium and rational 
choice theory, from drug addiction to racial 
discrimination to crime and family relations. 
Basically Becker supposes that the agents he 
models act so as to maximize their expected 
utility. The trick is to prescribe just what in 
the case under study utility consists in, which 
can include anything from financial gains to 
inconvenience to serious illness or the joys of 
watching your spouse consume. As you will 
see, I shall call this "climbing down the ladder 
of abstraction". Note that in Becker’s cases 
this enterprise is relatively unconstrained, so 
the accounts are unfalsifiable, which many 
of us still take to be a damming charge. As 
economist Robert Pollak argues, "The devil is 
in the details." (2003, 120)
Pischke and Angrist seem to have an 
optimistic view about breadth:
. . . anyone who makes a living out of 
data analysis probably believes that  
heterogeneity is limited enough that the 
well-understood past can be informative 
about the future. (2010, 23)
As I remarked, I am suspicious about 
principles of behavior that are supposed to 
apply almost across the board. But that is 
not the source of my worries about ladders. 
After all, even though the specific causal 
principles describing the functioning of the 
Cuisinart, the Dualit, and the Krups toasters 
are all different, still I agree that there are a 
set of even more basic principles that all three 
share. Even assuming shared principles and 
laying aside worries about falsifiability, trouble 
looms: There may be a set of laws that enable 
X to be a contributing cause to Y in the study 
and these laws may be shared with the target 
but in the target they do not connect X and Y. 
That’s because what counts as a realization of 
a given factor in the study often cannot do so 
in the target.
This problem arises because of the way 
properties at different levels of abstraction 
piggyback on one another. To use vocabulary 
familiar from another problem area, abstract 
features are generally multiply realizable at 
the concrete level, but the abstract does 
not supervene on the concrete. The causes 
in a causal principle can be more or less 
abstract; because of the piggybacking, 
principles involving factors at different levels 
can all obtain at once. On a sphere, "The 
trajectories of bodies moving subject only to 
inertia are great circles" is true; so too is "The 
trajectories of bodies moving subject only to 
inertia are geodesics (ie, the shortest distance 
between two points)". They are equally true 
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because on a sphere, being a great circle is to 
be a geodesic.13 For spheres there’s a "ladder" 
down from the abstract "geodesic" to the 
more concrete "great circle", but there is no 
such ladder for Euclidean surfaces.
Generally the higher the level of abstraction of 
a causal principle, the more widely it is shared 
across populations. Bodies on Euclidean planes 
subject only to inertia follow geodesics but not 
great circles. And the lower the level, the more 
likely that the principle is only locally true. This 
can make serious problems when it comes 
to the stretch of the principles that RCTs can 
establish. The Bangladesh nutrition program 
provides a vivid example.
There was good evidence that the integrated 
nutrition program had worked in 20,000 
Indian villages. But it failed on average in 
Bangladesh sites. Looking at the standard 
account of what went wrong, we will see 
that issues about levels of abstraction were at 
the heart. Nothing in this account supposes 
that Bangladeshis and Indians are altogether 
different. On the contrary it seems likely 
they share a common principle that allowed 
the program to improve children’s nutrition 
in India. But this principle couldn’t do the 
same job in Bangladesh because things in 
Bangladesh just aren’t what they are in India.
I imagine those who adopted the program in 
Bangladesh expected Bangladesh and India to 
share a simple, common-sense principle:
Principle 1: Better nutritional 
knowledge in mothers plus 
food supplied by the project for 
supplemental feeding improves the 
nutritional status of their children.
But they did not.
The first reason for the lack of impact in 
Bangladesh, it seems, was "leakage": The 
food supplied by the project was often not 
used as a supplement but as a substitute, 
with the usual food allocation for that child 
passing to another member of the family 
(STC 2003). The principle "Better nutritional 
knowledge in mothers plus food supplied by 
the project for supplemental feeding improves 
children’s nutrition" was true in the original 
successful cases but not in Bangladesh. 
This suggest that a better shot at a shared 
principle would be:
Principle 2: Better nutritional 
knowledge in mothers plus 
supplemental feeding of children 
improves children’s nutrition.
This is a principle about features at a higher 
level of abstraction than those in the first 
principle. In the successful cases in India the 
more concrete feature "food supplied by the 
project" constituted the more abstract feature 
"supplemental feeding". But not in Bangladesh. 
There the ladders are missing that connect the 
abstract features in the shared principles with 
the concrete features offered by the program.
13 I shall here be relatively cavalier about the metaphysics of properties. I treat abstract features and concrete ones both 
as real and I treat them as different features even if having one of these (the more concrete feature) is what constitutes 
having the more abstract one on any occasion. I take it that claims like this can be rendered appropriately, though probably 
differently, in various different metaphysical accounts of properties.
A second major reason for the lack of positive 
impact is also a problem with connecting 
ladders between the abstract and the 
concrete. It’s labeled "the mother-in-law 
factor" by Howard White, who also points 
out what I call "the man factor":
The program targeted the mothers 
of young children. But mothers are 
frequently not the decision makers 
. . . with respect to the health and 
nutrition of their children. For a start, 
women do not go to market in rural 
Bangladesh; it is men who do the 
shopping. And for women in joint 
households – meaning they live with 
their mother-in-law – as a sizeable 
minority do, then the mother-in-
law heads the women’s domain. 
Indeed, project participation rates are 
significantly lower for women living 
with their mother-in-law in more 
conservative parts of the country. 
(White 2009, 6)
This suggests yet another proposal for a 
shared principle:
Principle 3: Better nutritional 
knowledge results in better nutrition 
for a child in those who
a. provide the child with supplemental 
feeding 
b. control what food is procured
c. control how food gets dispensed 
and
d. hold the child’s interests as central 
in performing b. and c.
Just as the food supplied by the project 
did not count as supplemental feeding in 
the Bangladesh program, mothers in that 
program did not in general satisfy the more 
abstract descriptions in b. and c.
The all-too-common fact that things in one 
setting may not be what they are in another 
makes real trouble for the use of RCTs as 
evidence. The previous successes of the 
program in India are relevant to predictions 
about the Bangladesh program only relative to 
the vertical identification of mothers with the 
more abstract features in b., c., and d. But not 
all of these identifications hold. So the previous 
successes are not evidentially relevant.
7. Roman laws, ladders, and  
structural parameters
The lesson of BINP is that the way abstract 
and concrete features relate implies:
1. In different contexts the same isn’t 
always the same.
And,
2. This limits the usefulness of 
it-works-somewhere claims for 
predicting "It will work for us."
But the very same facts about the relations 
between the abstract and the concrete 
equally imply:
1.’ In different contexts very different 
things can be the same.
And because of this,
2.’ It-works-somewhere claims can 
support policy predictions in contexts 
far away and very different from the 
study populations that warrant them.
Pishke and Angrist employ this in their 
commendation of RCTs. "Small ball 
sometimes wins big games", they tell us 
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(2010, 25). How so? Because sometimes from 
RCTS, they urge, you can learn "structural 
econometric parameters", where following 
David Hendry, "Structure . . . is defined as the 
set of basic features of the economy which 
are invariant to [various specific] changes in 
that economy", including "an extension of 
the sample" (Hendry and Mizon 2010, 1-2). 
How wide an extension? That depends on the 
theory. For the moment let us assume, wide 
enough at least to cover the policy target.
Suppose that in the study a structural law 
of form L allows X to cause Y. Then β from 
that law is a structural parameter. Because β 
is a structural parameter, β ≠ 0 in the study 
population shows that it’s unequal to 0 in 
extensions of the population. This line of 
reasoning is familiar. Because the gravitational 
constant G is a structural parameter, Galileo can 
measure it on balls rolling down inclined planes 
and Euler a century later can put the same G 
into formulae calculating the "true curve" of 
cannonballs that are subject to the buoyant and 
resistant forces of the air as well as to gravity.
The parameter discussed by Angrist and 
Pischke is the "intertemporal [labor supply] 
substitution elasticity" (2010, 4); that is, 
a parameter that represents how much 
transitory wage changes contribute to hours 
of work a worker supplies. This is a theoretical 
parameter in, for example, life cycle theory. Is 
it constant enough for Angrist and Pishke to 
play the Galileo-Euler game? Maybe, maybe 
not. As Angus Deaton remarks, "Structural 
parameters are in the eye of the beholder."14 
Or see Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of 
England: "There are probably few genuinely 
“deep” (and therefore stable) parameters or 
relationships in economics . . . ."15
I don’t know if the labor supply elasticity is a 
structural parameter nor how far the structure 
stretches if it is. But Pischke and Angrist must 
take it that way. Here is the longer passage 
from which I quoted before:
Small ball sometimes wins big games. 
In our field, some of the best research 
designs used to estimate labor 
supply elasticities exploit natural and 
experimenter-induced variation in 
specific labor markets. Oettinger . . . 
analyzes stadium vendors’ reaction  
to wage changes driven by changes in 
attendance, while Fehr and Goette . . . 
study bicycle messengers in Zurich who, 
in a controlled experiment, received 
higher commission rates for one month 
only. (2010, 25)
Oettinger’s analysis of stadium vendors at 
major-league baseball games (Oettinger 1999) 
supposes that the vendors’ expectations 
about the size of the crowd constitute their 
wage expectations and in turn their wage 
expectations constitute "laborers" wage 
expectations’ in this case. Similarly the 
number of vendors constitutes the labor 
supply in this case. So Angrist and Pishke 
seem to assume that labor supply elasticity is 
14 Private conversation.
15 Read at the Royal Society 22 March 2010.
a structural parameter and that the parameter 
connecting vendor’s expectations of crowd 
size with number of vendors showing up at 
the stadium is the labor supply elasticity in 
this situation.
What warrants these two assumptions? We 
confront here the twin problems of Roman 
laws and warranted ladders. For the first, it 
is usually theory that teaches that there is 
a structural parameter, but it had best be 
credible well-supported theory. As to the 
second, we need help both in climbing up the 
ladder of abstraction in the study situation; 
then in new settings, in climbing down. How 
do we know that what Oettinger measured on 
his stadium vendors was an instantiation of the 
labor supply parameter? And when we turn to 
a new situation with this parameter in hand, 
how do we figure what concrete features 
count as labor supply elasticity there? Theory 
can help. But it will also take sound knowledge 
of the local context. The point is that studies 
like Galileo’s and Oettinger’s – and RCTs –  can 
measure structural parameters but they cannot 
tell us that that there is a structural parameter 
to be measured. That information must come 
from elsewhere.
8. Unbroken Bridges
My final problem involves causal chains. 
Generally getting from cause to effect is not a 
one-step process. Rather the policy variable is at 
the head of a causal chain with the hoped for 
outcome at the tail, with a number of links in 
between. Policy X causes outcome Y in the study 
situation because X causes U which causes V 
which causes W which . . . which causes Y. We 
can expect X to cause Y in a different situation 
only so long as the chain is unbroken.
Consider figure 1 and look at the first step:
What enables X to cause U? I have been 
Figure 1: Two routes from a cause to an effect, at different levels of abstraction.
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arguing that it is often not because of a 
general principle connecting X and U but 
rather because X and U are concretizations 
of features X1 and U1 at a higher level of 
abstraction where X1 and U1 are joined by a 
reasonably general principle. Similarly U may 
cause V not because of a principle connecting 
U and V but rather because of a general 
principle between more abstract features U2 
and V1 that they instantiate. Note the new 
subscripts. There is no reason that the very 
same features under which U is the effect of 
X should be the feature in virtue of which U is 
the cause of V. 
Let me illustrate with a possible example 
social workers have been worrying about 
from UK child welfare policy where a child’s 
care-givers are heavily encouraged, perhaps 
badgered, into attending parenting classes. It 
is illustrated in figure 2: 
Figure 2: An example of a "broken bridge".
Consider making fathers attend parenting 
classes. Different cultures in the UK have 
widely different views about the roles fathers 
should play in parenting. Compelling fathers 
to attend parenting classes can instantiate the 
more abstract feature, "ensuring care-givers 
are better informed about ways to help the 
child" in which case it can be expected to 
be positively effective for improving a child’s 
welfare. But it may also instantiate the more 
abstract feature "public humiliation", in 
which case it could act oppositely. Attending 
classes, as a result of pressure, can constitute 
a public humiliation and by virtue of being 
a public humiliation can lead to aggressive 
and violent behavior, which may be directed 
towards the child. There is then no unbroken 
bridge at the level of more widely applicable 
principle but there is a linked-up sequence at 
the more concrete level.
This of course has mixed policy implications. 
If we found that pressing fathers to attend 
parenting classes in this cultural group led 
to negative outcomes, that would not mean 
it should be expected to do so in other 
groups. The general principles that affect 
the different populations may be the same 
but they don’t make an unbroken bridge for 
the negative effects to move along. On the 
other hand, getting positive results in other 
groups where the humiliation mechanism is 
not activated does not tell us what will be 
the overall outcome where it is activated. This 
is yet another case where knowing that a 
policy works – or fails – somewhere is at best 
a starting point for figuring out if it will work 
for us.
9. Conclusion
We can do better at predicting policy 
effectiveness. And philosophy helps show 
how. RCTs can help too, as their advocates 
maintain. But, as I have argued, it is a long 
and tortuous road from learning that a policy 
works somewhere, which is the kind of claim 
an RCT can clinch, to correctly predicting that 
it will – or won’t – work for you. And you 
can go wrong in both directions: accepting 
programs that won’t work for you, as 
Levy claims has repeatedly happened with 
Progresa, and rejecting ones that would, like 
the J-PAL rejection of textbooks in favor of 
deworming or in my hypothesized example, 
sending caregivers who won’t feel humiliated 
to parenting classes.
I’ve rehearsed four essential materials 
it takes to secure a safe pathway:
1. Shared laws.
2. Supports.
3. Ladders.
4. Laws that interlock.
No matter how secure the starting point, if 
any one of these is missing, you just can’t get 
there from here.
 
I don’t need to remind you that a conclusion 
is only as secure as its weakest premise. 
RCTs may be gold standard for underpinning 
the start point but you can’t pave the road 
in between with gold bricks. Evidence for 
these other factors is necessarily different 
and varied in form: theory – big and little, 
consilience of inductions, and a great deal 
of local information about study and target 
situations. Philosophy matters because once 
you know what you need, you can hunt for 
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it. And often you can find it. Here is Howard 
White again: "In the Bangladesh case, 
identification of the “mother-in-law” effect 
came from reading anthropological literature 
. . . ." (2009, 15) But to find it you must be 
encouraged to look. And where it doesn’t 
exist, the sciences must be encouraged to 
uncover it. It’s no good just putting all your 
money into gold bricks.
We philosophers of science are faced then 
with a hard job. Here as elsewhere in the 
natural and social sciences, in policy, and in 
technology, we can help. But to do so we 
need to figure out how better to engage with 
scientific practice and not just with each other.
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